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I. Introduction
In this Survey, the Notre Dame Lawyer presents an analysis of the
Church-State relationship in America. This is the fifth such analysis in a
biennial series begun in 1958.' The purpose of this study is twofold. It first
seeks to report completely the relevant judicial decisions and legislative enact-
ments which have occurred during the previous two years; it then analyzes this
activity in an attempt to determine both the recent developments the Church-
State relationship has undergone and the trends presaged by this activity.
The first four studies in this series bear witness to the changing emphasis
given to the many facets of this relationship. While the area is crossed by mighty
rivers of decision which have long flowed within well-defined banks, it con-
tinually experiences a flow of new problems from previously uncharted springs.
Sometimes the flow quickly dries. At other times it becomes a raging torrent
cutting new channels in the law.
The volatile nature of the Church-State relationship continues to be re-
flected in the present Survey. The first section, Religious Institutions, treats
of the direct conflicts which arise between Church and State, considered as
juridical entities, when each seeks to "justify its rights against the asserted
authority of the other."2 Within this problem area, the law applicable to matters
involving Church Property continues to be static. On the other hand, the area
of Education continues to develop significantly with the passage of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Further consideration is also given
to the School Prayer Cases.
In the second section, Free Exercise, an examination is made of the defer-
ence accorded to religiously motivated actions under the guise of free exercise.
1 The four previous surveys are: Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey(1955-57), 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 416 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1955-57 Church-State
Survey]; Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1958-60), 35 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 405 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1958-60 Church-State Survey, part 1], 35 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 537 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1958-60 Church-State Survey, part II]; Reli-
gious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1960-62), 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 649 (1962)[hereinafter cited as 1960-62 Church-State Survey]; Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal
Survey (1963-64), 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 427 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1963-64 Church-
State Survey].
2 1955-57 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 417.
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The effect of the recent cases in this area is ambivalent. The long-awaited
Supreme Court interpretation of the "belief in a Supreme Being" requirement
applied to conscientious objectors was handed down in United States v. Seeger.$
The courts also furthered a spirit of accommodation by showing an increasing
sensitivity for the religious rights of imprisoned Black Muslims. Finally, in
Schowgurow v. State,4 the Maryland Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
provision of the state constitution requiring jurors to affirm a belief in God.
In contrast, a lack of sympathy for certain minority beliefs was evident in the
Supreme Court's refusal to reevaluate Sunday closing law precedent, and in
the actions of several tribunals in ordering the transfusion of blood to adult
Jehovah's Witnesses.
The third section, Religious Values, deals with the broader problem of
religious values seeking recognition before the legal tribunals of our country.
Consideration is given both to instances of religion attaining the status of a
legal value and to examples of the law invading the moral order. The section's
peculiar concern is with the law's appraisal of religion and "religious" aims.
Particular emphasis has been given to the field of Obscenity, as major evolutions
have occurred culminating with the recent Supreme Court pronouncements in
the Ginzburg,5 "Fanny Hill,"6 and Mishkin' cases. The areas of Birth Control
and Anti-Miscegenation have also seen developments, primarily in the Griswold'
and McLaughlin' decisions.
The determination of the proper relationship between Church and State
is an important one, affecting as it does, men's allegiance to two Sovereigns.
From the birth of America to the present, its citizens have recognized this
importance and, with an ardor that is found only where men's deepest ideological
beliefs are in issue, have long sought the resolution of this question. And yet,
agreement on what is the proper relationship has not been achieved. In the
words of Justice Black,
Our insistence on "a wall between Church and State which must
be kept high and impregnable" has seemed to some a correct exposi-
tion of the philosophy and a true interpretation of the language of
the First Amendment to which we should strictly adhere. With
equal conviction and sincerity, others have thought the... decision
fundamentally wrong and have pledged continuous warfare against
it1°
The American concept of Church and State, then, continues to develop. This
Survey charts that development.
3 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
4 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
5 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
6 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
7 Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
10 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
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II. Religious Institutions
A. Church Property
1. Intra-Church Property Disputes - Continuity with the Past.
"A fundamental principle of American religious freedom is that secular
courts have no jurisdiction over religious controversies and will not question
any decision of a church tribunal relating to its internal affairs, in the
absence of an interference with civil or property rights."'1  There are three
reasons for this doctrine of nonintervention. The first is the constitutional prin-
ciple of the separation of church and state;' the second is that those who join
a church are deemed to have implicitly consented to submit to the authority
of that church in ecclesiastical matters;"8 and the third is that the courts recog-
nize the greater expertise of ecclesiastical bodies in adjudicating religious disputes,
which by their very nature are fraught with complexities.'
Where civil or property rights are involved, however, the civil courts are
willing to enter the conflict.' 5 As would be expected, the courts have had difficulty
in ascertaining the point at which an ecclesiastical dispute becomes one involving
• a civil or property right. 6 The problems in this area are typified by the recent case
of United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues.' Here plaintiff, an
association of kosher retailers, was refused the certification of the defendant, a
committee which certifies caterers as authentic purveyors of kosher foods. Plain-
tiff's products had long been deemed acceptable, and the refusal of certification
was made without any complaint of departures from the strict regulations of the
defendant. After this refusal, the defendant required that kosher caterers purchase
only from retail stores which it supervised. Due to the resulting loss of its busi-
ness, the plaintiff charged defendant with a restraint of trade and sought an
injunction and damages. The court refused plaintiff's plea, explaining that
"the background against which the plaintiff's prayer for relief is made, however,
reveals that in any consideration of the merits of its case the crucial questions
facing the court would be questions of religious law or practices."'" The neces-
sary questions of criteria, authority and procedures for determining what food
was kosher were "determinable only by reference to Jewish law, a domain into
which the courts will not venture."' 9
Once property rights are found to be in dispute, however, the courts will
venture into the conflicts of religious bodies. The standards which the courts
employ in dealing with disputes over church property were proclaimed in 1871
11 TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 118 (1948).
12 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
13 Watson v. Jones, supra note 12, at 729.
14 Ibid.
15 See generally PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM ch. 8 (1953); Duesenberg,
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 508 '(1959).
16 For statements of criteria utilized in determining jurisdiction, see 3 STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 387-89 (1950).
17 211 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1965).
18 Id. at 335.
19 Ibid.
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in Watson v. Jones." These standards quickly found favor with the courts and
have been determinative since that time.
Watson divided these disputes into three divisions, as follows:
1. The first of these is when the property which is the subject
of controversy has been, by the deed or will of the donor, or other
instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of
the instrument devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some
specific form of religious doctrine or belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious con-
gregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly inde-
pendent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church
government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher
authority.
3. The third is where the religious corigregation or ecclesiastical
body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some
general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical
tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less
complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership
of that general organization.21
Each division has its own rule of decision. In cases within the first division, the
donor's intent will prevail.' In the second division, the courts will follow the
will of the majority of the congregation.2 3 In the third division, the decision of
the supreme ecclesiastical body will be controlling.24
In considering the first division, note must be taken that it governs only
express trusts. It does not encompass the implied trust theory, which was
developed prior to the Watson decision. 5 Under the implied trust theory, the
courts viewed giving property to a religious organization as analogous to giving
property in trust, and said that while no express trust had been imposed on
the property, it should be treated as though it were subject to a trust. The
purpose of the trust was sufficiently defined when the name of the denomination
was included in the gift. Then it was implied that the property was given
in trust for the support of the ecclesiastical body in the form in which the body
existed at the time the gift was made.26 Mr. Justice Miller in Watson did not
share the view that property given to a named denomination was subject to
a trust. He distinguished "property acquired in any of the usual modes for
the general use of a religious congregation" 2 from "property devoted forever
by the instrument which conveyed it, or by any specific declaration of its owner,
to the support of any special religious dogmas, or any peculiar form of wor-
ship .... ,"I Thus, only property acquired by the latter means- by express
20 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
21 Id. at 722-23.
22 Id. at 723.
23 Id. at 725.
24 Id. at 727.
25 See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135
(Ch. 1817). For an excellent historical analysis of the implied trust doctrine, see Note, 75
HARv. L. Rnv. 1142, 1145-54 (1962).
26 Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868).
27 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 726 (1871).
28 Ibid.
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trust - falls within the first division of Watson.
The second division of the Watson test governs the situation where the
ecclesiastical organization is congregational in nature; that is, independent of
any other ecclesiastical organization.29 Here the courts will look to the wishes
of the majority of the congregation in determining which faction shall be awarded
control of the church property."s This test permits the beliefs of the congrega-
tion to change, and thus does not look upon a static, unalterable ecclesiastical
organization as desirable. No intent to preserve a status quo is reflected in the
second Watson approach.
Approval of this principle of majority control in congregational organiza-
tions is indicated in the current decisions. In Barber v. Irving,31 the members
of an independent church decided to incorporate. Many members felt the
resulting charter changed fundamental customs, and the majority of the con-
gregation voted against accepting the charter. Nevertheless, a minority faction
filed the articles of incorporation and caused the pastor to deed over the church
property to it. The court was powerless to undo the incorporation, as it could
only be attacked by the state attorney general, and not by private citizens. How-
ever, the court did look to the majority vote of the congregation and declared that
the minority had committed a wrong by obtaining control of the church property.
Therefore, it ordered the property returned to the control of the majority.
In Austin v. Mt. Zion Primitive Baptist Church,2 the court said it had
previously found the Baptist Church groups involved to be congregational in
form. It held that where a schism develops in the membership of a church
congregational in form, the assets which are not subject to express trusts belong
to the majority faction and are subject to its control.
In Rowland v. Wilkerson,"s the church's form of government did not provide
for an appeal to any higher ecclesiastical authority. Based on this form, the
court upheld the decision of the majority of the congregation entitled to vote,
on the question of whether or not to dispose of church property.
Similarly, the court in Camp v. Durham4 held that it was proper for the
disputing factions in a church congregational in form to settle their rights to
the church property by settling the congregation's internal dispute as to faith
and doctrine by a majority vote of the congregation.
The major exception to the Watson standards, an exception to this
second rule, is termed the fundamental change rule. It states that a majority
may not use the church property in support of a doctrine fundamentally different
from the doctrine which was originally characteristic of the congregation and
which is still followed by a minority.
The fundamental change rule continued to find application in the cases
reported within the period covered by this Survey. In Mills v. Yount, 5 a local
29 Id. at 722.
30 Id. at 725.
31 226 Cal. App. 2d 560, 38 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
32 165 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
33 389 S.W.2d 627 (Ark. 1965).
34 219 Ga. 543, 134 S.E.2d 598 (1964).
35 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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church had a "connective thread of submission" 6 to a supreme organization.
Normally, disputes in such a situation would be controlled by the third rule
of Watson. In Mills, however, the court said the local congregation was not
bound by the decision of the supreme tribunal. Having determined this, the
court then considered the dispute only as it affected the local congregation.
The court found that a new doctrine was being promulgated which was incon-
sistent with and repugnant to the established doctrine of the congregation. The
will of the majority of the congregation had not been tested, so the court was
unable to tell whether a majority or minority favored the new doctrine. The
court ruled, however, that the faction adhering to the fundamental doctrines
and established practices of the faith which existed before the schism was the
group entitled to the property.
Similarly, in Cantrell v. Anderson, 7 a minority faction brought suit against
the majority over the right to use church property, contending that the majority
had departed from the fundamental doctrines of the church. The minority
was awarded the property as a result of the application of the rule that when
a schism occurs in a congregational church, the group that adheres to the
fundamental doctrines of the church as advocated and practiced at the time
of its organization is entitled to possession of the property as against those who
have departed or deviated from the fundamental doctrines.
This fundamental change rule can be viewed as a modem statement of
the implied trust doctrine. There seem to be two justifications for the modem
rule: (1) to protect the church's body of doctrine; and (2) to protect those
who have contributed to the church in reliance on its being dedicated to the
continued promulgation of its basic doctrine." The rationale underlying the
first justification is that the rights of a minority can be unjustly harmed where
the doctrine is radically changed. "It is clear that, if a majority should spring
up in a Protestant congregation in favor of the Roman Catholic or Mohamme-
dan religion . . . the liberties and rights of the minority which adheres to the
Protestant faith would be grossly violated.", 9 Under the second justification,
the reasoning is that it would be unfair for an ecclesiastical organization to hold
itself out as the advocate and protector of certain beliefs, thereby inducing
believers to contribute money and services, and then adopt beliefs which differ
substantially from those held by the contributors." Doctrinal stability and
reliance, then, comprise the most important justifications for the fundamental
change rule.
The fundamental change rule faces, it seems, three counterarguments.
The first counterargument has its basis in the premise that the civil courts are
not qualified to intervene in disputes involving ecclesiastical structure and reli-
36 Id. at 103.
37 390 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1965).
38 See generally Note, 75 HAav. L. REv. 1142, 1167-68 (1962); Comment, 12 KAN. L.
Rav. 436, 437-40 (1964).
39 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAw 154 (1917).
40 Analogously, the court in Newhall v. Second Church and Society, 209 N.E.2d 296
(Mass. 1965), said that while no express trust was created, silver vessels inscribed as dedi-
cated "for the purpose of baptism" and "for use at the communion table" were given and
received subject to a commitment as to their use, which effectively limited the power of the
church to dispose of the vessels.
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gious beliefs. The Cantrell4 case provides an illustration of some of the basic
difficulties that courts can encounter. There, the majority defended themselves
on the basis that they had not departed from the fundamental doctrines of the
church, principally because the differences of opinion did not involve the fixed
beliefs of the congregation or else involved matters of interpretation. The
court then had to determine what the congregation's beliefs were and whether
they differed from the original fundamental beliefs.
Likewise, in the Mills case,42 the court was faced with the prospect of
interpreting the meaning of an article of faith and then determining if it con-
stituted a change from fundamental beliefs. The article read: "Entire sanc-
tification is that second definite work of grace, subsequent to regeneration,
whereby the heart of a justified person is cleansed from the original or Adamic
nature, and is filled with the Holy Ghost."48 The court approached the task
of interpretation with an understandable lack of confidence, saying, "If we
are able to interpret this addition (and we doubt our competency to do so but
do our best from the evidence) . . . ."" The premise that a civil court is not
competent to interpret these ecclesiastical matters is the whole thrust of Mr.
Justice Miller's reasoning in Watson. His concern is with setting out principles
that will limit the court's involvement in this area. Only in the first division,
where an express trust exists, is the court's competence admitted. In the second
and third divisions, which involve the congregational and hierarchical organiza-
tions, the court is to follow the decision of the congregation or hierarchy
respectively.
The second counterargument to the fundamental change rule is that
when a church has adopted a congregational form of government, the favoring
of a minority is an interference with the freedom of religion guaranteed by the
first amendment, as this is an infringement of the freedom of the majority to
govern their church by the form they have chosen. The third major counter-
argument is that courts which do investigate the doctrinal dispute and then
favor the faction most closely adhering to the original practices of the church
are favoring stability in doctrine rather than development in doctrine. Whether
stability is to be less desired than change, thus making this argument a valid
one, depends not on any legal criterion but on one's theological viewpoint.
When a dispute occurs within a church organization which is not con-
gregational in nature, but rather, is subject to the dominion of a parent
church organization, the third division set out by the Watson case becomes
applicable. Here the rule is that the decision of the superior ecclesiastical tri-
bunal will be controlling.45
The first justification for such a rule lies in the principle of separation of
church and state. Mr. Justice Miller stated in Watson that among the funda-
mental rights of a religious association is the right to create religious tribunals:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in
41 390 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1965).
42 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
43 Id. at 99.
44 Ibid.
45 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith
within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all
the individual members, congregations, and officers within the gen-,
eral association, is unquestioned.4 6
If the secular courts could step in and reverse the decision of the religious body,
it "would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies. . .. "'7 Mr.
Justice Miller concluded, then, that in order to protect the fundamental right
of the religious association, its decision had to be final. "It is of the essence of
these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding
in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the
organism itself provides for."4
Another reason for ruling that the decision of the superior body is con-
trolling over its members is that "all who unite themselves to such a body do
so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it."' 9
A final reason for judicial deference to the ecclesiastical tribunal lies in its
special competence in resolving the complexities presented by religious questions.
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be
as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these
bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It
would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the
law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.50
The final and controlling nature of the decision of the highest church tribunal
in a hierarchical church was raised to constitutional standing in 1952 in Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.51 The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the
supreme hierarchical authority was to be controlling. A state statute which
interfered with the decision was held to conflict with the right of the free
exercise of religion and of the separation of church and state guaranteed by
the first amendment.5" The same issue was raised again in 1960 in St. Nicholas
Cathedral v. Kreshik,5" but the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Kedroff holding."'
As would be expected, this third rule of Watson, so recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court, has been adhered to in the current decisions. In New York
East Annual Conference of the Methodist Church v. Seymour,5 a will had left
property to testators son for life, with the remainder in fee to a local church.
When the son died, the local church had by then been abandoned. The court
recognized the claim of the plaintiff under the hierarchical church rules which
46 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871).
47 Id. at 729.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
52 See generally FELLMAN, RELIGION IN AmERICAN PUBLIC LAW 62 (1965); The Supreme
Court 1952 Term, 67 HAv. L. REv. 91, 109 (1953); 54 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1954);
28 NOTRE DAME LAwYsEr 398 (1953).
53 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687 (1959).
54 Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
55 151 Conn. 517, 199 A.2d 701 (1964).
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provided that if a local church was abandoned, the property then became the
property of the hierarchical organization.
St. John's Greek Catholic Hungarian Russian Orthodox Church v. Fedak5 6
and Cosfol v. Varvoutis,57 both involved the disposition of church property.
In both cases, the court found the decision of the highest tribunal in the hier-
archical organization to be controlling. Both relied on Watson v. Jones as
precedent.
A very limited exception to the third rule of Watson was followed recently
in the Mills 8 case, as the fundamental change rule was applied to a church
having a hierarchical organization. In this case, the highest body itself had
changed its fundamental doctrine. The court said that the church body could
not reach a decision the "effect of which ... [is] a departure from the essential
denominational faith, and a diversion to another, different, and repugnant one,
and by this means carry the property of one faith over to the other."5 It ruled
that members adhering to the established faith were entitled to the church
building.. The court succinctly stated its view, saying that "the right to religious
freedom is not the right to steal churches."6 It asked, "Is the local congre-
gation 'automatically bound' by reason of having the connective thread of
submission to ecclesiastical determination? We think not. This carries the
theory of representative estoppel too far when a fundamental change in faith
is involved." 1
The impact of such a decision is further emphasized by a consideration
of the question of church mergers. Normally there is no problem with the
merging of hierarchical churches, as the courts follow the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal. However, there have been a few cases where it was held
"that a local church does not have to go along with a denominational merger
even though the denomination be one of hierarchical polity."62 Whether a
decision utilizing the reasoning of Mills should now be reached is questionable.
The well-reasoned view expressed in a recent commentary would seem analogously
appropriate. It states: "Most cases, however, seem to require the local church
to follow the higher authority into the merger, and it seems probable now,
after the Kreshik case, that to absolve the local church from the duty to follow
the hierarchical authority would be unconstitutional."6 3
The ecumenical movement with its thrust towards unity may have great
importance in the area of intra-church disputes. The most probable method
of achieving unity will be through merger. As noted, there is normally no
problem in the merger of hierarchical churches, as the courts usually follow
the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal. In contrast, the problem of
merger becomes real when the church organizations involved are congregational
56 89 N.J. Super. 65, 213 A.2d 651 (Oh. 1965).
57 419 Pa. 28, 213 A.2d 331 (1965).
58 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
59 Id. at 100-01.
60 Id. at 101.
61 Id. at 102-03.
62 Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 Micir. L. REV.
419, 460 (1964) citing Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (1911), and
Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1908).
63 Casad, supra note 62, at 460.
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in form. As discussed above,"' while the second rule of Watson applies to
this area conferring court approval on decisions made by a majority of the
congregation, it is subject to an important exception. This is the "fundamental
change" rule whereby a majority may not use church property in support of
a doctrine fundamentally different from the doctrine which was originally char-
acteristic of the congregation and which is still followed by a minority. That
such a recognition of minority rights effectively blocks unity through merger
should be made clear to the courts.
The ecumenical movement is having an ever-widening effect in
changing basic, longstanding notions about the importance of de-
nominational distinctiveness. It is inducing changes in theories as
to the nature and role of demoninations and probably in notions
of religious freedom as profound as the changes wrought by the
labor movement in theories relating to freedom of contract. Unless
the courts are made aware of these changes they are likely to go on
applying to present-day problems rules of law developed to meet
the needs of an older order, without realizing that in so doing they
are casting themselves in a partisan role in a struggle between the
old and the new, in which the state should really be neutral."s
Thus, if the desire for unity proves a potent force, it may well in time weaken
severely the fundamental change exception, thereby leaving the rules of Watson
as the principal source of guidance to the courts.
The tripartite Watson v. Jones rule has been controlling and will in all
likelihood continue to be the dominant source of guidance to the courts. The
major exception to Watson, the fundamental change rule, faces a reappraisal
if the ecumenical spirit does provide a significant thrust toward unity. The
recent cases most definitely reflect the continuity of the past; they also hint at
the problems that must be solved in the future.
2. Zoning - Consistent Diversity.
"Zoning is a separation of the municipality into districts, and the regula-
tion of buildings and structures in the districts so created, in accordance with
their construction and the nature and extent of their use." 6 The justification for
this regulation is found in the police power of the state to enact laws for the
safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the people67
The topic of the following discussion is the various ways in which this
power has been exercised in relation to religious institutions, and the rationales
underlying such exercises of this power. Zoning ordinances affecting churches
have been classified into three types: (1) ordinances permitting churches in
all residential districts, (2) ordinances permitting churches in residential districts
64 See discussion which begins with the paragraph preceding the text accompanying
note 35.
65 Casad, supra note 62, at 426.
66 Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Ati. 225, 228 (Sup.
Ct. 1938). Accord, Antonelli Construction, Inc. v. Milstead, 34 N.J. Super. 449, 112 A.2d
608, 612 (1955).
67 Kennedy v. City of Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932); Connor v. Tovn-
ship of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789, 794 (1957).
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only upon a special permit, and (3) ordinances that exclude churches often,
if not usually, from districts where residential use is itself restricted to certain
types of dwellings.6" The majority of jurisdictions are controlled by ordinances
of either type (1) or (2), while a minority follow type (3).69
The enactment of the first type of ordinances, those permitting churches
in all residential districts, is encouraged by three arguments. The first argu-
ment is that the first amendment, as applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment,7" protects churches from ordinances which would exclude them.
While this issue has been raised in the cases," no state court has based its decision
directly on this ground, nor has the United States Supreme Court ruled directly
on the merits of this issue."2 The second argument is utilized where an exclu-
sionary ordinance which permits uses even less compatible than churches is
in effect or has been proposed. The attack on such an exclusionary ordinance
is that it .discriminates unfairly, thus violating the rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws.7" The third and most common argument for
allowing churches in all residential areas is that an ordinance excluding churches
is not a proper exercise of the police power because it does not promote the
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the community. 4 Underlying this argument
is the belief that the very purpose of a church's existence is to promote the general
welfare. The exclusionary ordinance, then, frustrates a major aim sought to
be achieved by zoning - the promotion of the general welfare. Thus, it con-
stitutes a taking of property without due process of law.75 These three argu-
ments seem to have been found acceptable in jurisdictions controlled by the
first type of ordinance, as no case involving such an ordinance has been reported
during the periods covered by this and the preceding Survey.7 6
The second type of ordinances are those which permit churches upon a
special permit. These ordinances classify churches as special exception uses.
This means that churches are recognized as valid uses in residential areas, but
for a particular church to be allowed in such an area, it must first obtain a
permit from the zoning authority. This requirement is to insure that the use
will meet the standards prescribed. In special exception ordinances, the standards
68 City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 172, 175
(1961) (concurring opinion); Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281,
330 P.2d 5, 9 (1958); State ex reL. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Board
of Trustees, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1961).
69 See generally II METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING ch. x-m-2 (2d ed. 1955); I
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 19 '(3d ed. 1964).
70 E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
71 E.g., Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
72 An appeal on the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop
v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), was dismissed for want
of substantiality. 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
73 State ex reL. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 115 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1953). See North Shore Unitarian Society v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109
N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
74 North Shore Unitarian Society v. Village of Plandome, supra note 73.
75 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 833-34
(1956). State ex rel. Synod of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39
N.E.2d 515, 525 (1942); City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415, 416
(1944)..
76 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1 at 427.
77- 74 A.L.R.2d 377-411 (1960) lists various factors which have been considered by
courts. Among the factors are: (1) traffic conditions; (2) effect on property values; (3)
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that must be met are st forth in the statute, and all churches that meet the
standards must be given the required permit. In some ordinances, the standards
are set forth with such specificity that the zoning authority is somewhat restricted
in its discretion; " in others, the standards are set forth in such general terms that
there is little restriction of the zoning authority's discretion in determining
whether or not the church should be granted a permit.7 In jurisdictions in
which the controlling philosophy is that a church is per se a furtherance of
the public welfare, the courts will not look favorably upon findings of the
local zoning board which deny a permit. "In these states the mere fact that
a church is the subject of an application changes the ordinary rule as to burden
of proof and places the burden squarely upon the administrative officials to
justify the denial of the permit.""0 If, however, the state does not share in this
philosophy, the burden of proof is upon the complaining church to show that
the zoning authority acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in denying the special
permit.
Two cases have arisen during the period of this Survey in which churches
were regarded as special exception uses. In both of these cases, upon denial of
the necessary permit, the burden of proof was determined to be on the church.
In Rogers v. Mayor and Aldermen"' the burden was met. The court ruled that
the objections of residents that the granting of the permit would devaluate their
property was not a proper basis for denying the church a building permit.
Where the applicant meets the standards required by a special use permit
zoning ordinance, the court said that a denial, unsupported by evidence justify-
ing the denial, is an abuse of discretion. In The Church of Our Lord Jesus
Christ, Inc. v. Lower Merioti Township, 2 the court held that the special
exception statute did not interfere with the free exercise of a religion, and that
the church had the burden of showing affirmatively that the board acted
erroneously.
The third type of ordinance excludes churches, often, if not usually, from
districts where residential use is itself restricted to certain types of dwellings.
The underlying philosophy in the jurisdictions controlled by this third type
of ordinance is that a church is not per se a furtherance of the general welfare.
Rather, the church is looked upon as any other property use. Viewed in this
manner, the exclusion of a church may be a furtherance of the general welfare
due to the balancing of interests among uses that are all mere property uses."
Thus, churches can be totally excluded from a particular residential zone with
no provisions for special exception use being made. Two states subscribe to
loss of tax revenue; (4) noise and other inconvenience; (5) the size of the congregation;
(6) sanitary facilities; (7) setback requirements; and (8) the size of the building or area
of the lot.
78 See, e.g., the ordinance controlling in Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen,
214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5, 8 (1958).
79 See, e.g., the ordinance controlling in Spieth v. Planning Comm'n (1953) reported
only as Pomo C 1688 Superior Court, Los Angeles County. The provisions of this ordinance
are quoted in I RATH KOPF, op. cit. supra note 69, ch. 19, at 11-12 n. 18.
80 1 id. ch. 19, at 14.
81 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E.2d 668 (1964).
82 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (Dist. Ct. 1964).
83 See generally Comment, Zoning for Churches, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 367 (1962).
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this view, and thus have adopted the third type of ordinance."4 Wisconsin
maintains a minority position in which it is recognized that churches may be
totally excluded from a district on the basis of the furtherance of the general
welfare, but balanced against this is the requirement that a consideration must
be made of the resultant burden on the freedom of worship."5 No cases have
been reported in these minority jurisdictions during the periods covered by this
and the preceding Survey.
The same arguments and controls that are applied in the zoning of
churches are found in the area of parochial school zoning. "Church schools
have been almost generally regarded as occupying the same status as churches,
both by the courts which have granted them exemption from the restrictions
of the zoning ordinance and by those which have not."8 " The courts even
refer to cases dealing strictly with churches as precedent for their holdings in
the parochial school cases.
In Sisters of the Holy Cross of Massachusetts v. Town of Brookline,8" the
zoning ordinance in question expressly declared that its provisions were not to
be applied to any church or other organization having a religious purpose or
any educational purpose which was religious or public. It was claimed that
such a law was an arbitrary exercise of the police power and a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The court, however, upheld the zoning ordinance.
It stated that the requirement of equal protection does not prohibit a state from
making classifications which may result in the unequal treatment of various
classes, but only precludes irrational discrimination between persons or classes.
The court stated, "[W]e do not believe it irrational for the legislature to de-
termine that educational and religious institutions, because of their unique
locational requirements and because of their importance to society generally,
may be exempted from the application of zoning laws."8 8 The court also ruled
that the zoning ordinance did not constitute an establishment of religion. It
stated that even if the wording referring to "religious purposes" did constitute
an establishment of religion, it was not open to argument that the exemption
of educational institutions from zoning laws was such an establishment. The
reason given was that the power of the legislature to exempt schools from the
zoning laws may be applied to schools which are supported by sectarian or
denominational interests. The court concluded, "Indeed, if the Legislature
had attempted to exempt from zoning laws only schools with no religious
affiliation, the constitutionality of such distinction would be subject to con-
siderable doubt."8' 9
84 They are California, and Florida. E.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. City of
Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805
(1949); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880
(Fla. 1955).
85 State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Board of Trustees, 12
Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961). For a discussion of this case, see 1960-62 Church-
State Survey, supra note 1, at 656-60; Note, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 358.
86 I RATHcKOPF, op. cit. supra note 69, ch. 18, at 7.
87 347 Mass. 771, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964).
88 Id. at 632.
89 Id. at 633.
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In Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus9 a
parochial school exemption was again upheld, this time by the court striking down
an ordinance. The ordinance, which barred all schools from an exclusive residen-
tial district, had been passed as soon as the parochial school had made known its
intent to build. The court declared that the ordinance was not discriminatory
because of unequal treatment, as it treated both public and private schools
alike. However, the public school needs of the borough had already been fully
taken care of, and the court found that the ordinance had been passed because
the borough did not now welcome a tax-exempt organization on the boroughs
remaining land. The court held that this was not a proper ground for zoning
against a school and remanded the case on the issue of arbitrariness.
Zoning ordinances applicable to churches and schools, then, are quite
diverse, with the ordinances reflecting the various jurisdictions' conceptions
of the rights inherent in, and the community welfare promoted by, churches
and parochial schools. There have been few cases involving the zoning of
churches and schools reported during the past two years. Apparenty, this
indicates public satisfaction in each jurisdiction with the controlling laws and
philosophies. The reported cases reflect the diversity of the zoning laws, but
they are entirely consistent with the existing laws.
3. Tax Exemption -Firmly Rooted.
It has always been the general policy in the United States to grant tax
exemptions to religious organizations. 1 Although the basis for the exemptions
is somewhat indefinite,92 the practice of granting the exemptions is not peculiar
to the United States; it can be traced back to antiquity.3" In the United States,
the policy appears to stem from the nature of the relationship between the state
and the church in the colonial period. The church, in its status as an "established"
public institution, was an agency of the state, and it was considered financially
unsound for the state to tax its own agency. 94 This historical basis, however, is
not the entire explanation. When the church was disestablished, the exemptions
did not cease. The reason, apart from sheer custom, seems to lie in the basicaljy
religious nature of the people. The practice of exempting church property was
"so entirely in accordance with the public sentiment, that it universally pre-
vailed .. . ."I' It became apparent, however, that the exemptions had little
legal support, and so, appeals to the legislatures were made. The legislatures
responded by promptly passing. the exemption statutes or constitutional pro-
visions demanded by public opinion. 8
The constitutional provisions adopted have been of two main types. The
90 42 N.J. 556, 202 A.2d 161 (1964).
91 FELLMAN, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 44 (1965).
92 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 343 '(1933).
93 Instances of treatment favoring the established clergy are found in Genesis. 47:26;
1 Esdras 7:24. Exemption of churches and church property is based on European tradition
dating from the fourth century, when Constantine the Great, after his conversion, gave .the
church this privilege. 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950).
94 TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES Or RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171 .(1948); Van
Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHno ST. L.J. 461, 462 (1959).
95 State v. Collector of Jersey City, 24 N.J.L. 108, 120 (1853).
96 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIviL CHURCH LAw 240 (1917); Torpey, op. cit. supra note
94, at 171-72.
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first type makes exemptions mandatory, while the second type permits exemp-
tions to be made.97 The statutes granting exemptions are of three types: (1)
statutes exempting "places of worship"; (2) statutes exempting "property used
for religious purposes"; and (3) statutes exempting property "owned by a
religious organization.""8 Some states' statutes require a combination of these
characteristics. The wording of the particular statute involved is the primary
factor in explaining the diverse results which the opinions in this area tradi-
tionally reflect. While judicial predispositions as regards church-state relations
may be present, the courts have responsibly adhered to the legislative policy
expressed in the controlling statutes.99 Thus, "the specific statutory language
in which the exception is formulated has had a far greater influence upon
decision than theoretical doctrines of interpretation." '
In Evangelical Covenant Church of America v. City of Nome,"' the con-
trolling statute granted an exemption to property used for religious purposes.
The contention of the church was that its church-operated radio station which
sold commercial air time was not subject to taxation on its profits. That the
station's profits were used to support the operations of the church was the pro-
posed justification for an exemption. The court denied that it is the use of the
income that determines whether the institution is entitled to a tax exemption.
The court stated that to rule otherwise would force taxed commercial businesses
to compete with the commercial activities of institutions having a tax exempt
status under the law. 0 2
A similar result was reached in Board of Publication of the Methodist
Church v. State Tax Commission,"' where the church's bookstore sold to the
general public, with the profits going to the church. The court denied plaintiff's
contention that the destination of the income rather than its source determines
the right to an exemption. It considered the cardinal principles underlying its
doctrine of exemption to be that the basis for the exception to the rule that
taxes should be uniform is that churches provide such a service to the public
that they are entitled to an exemption, and that property so occupied does not
come in competition with the property of other owners. Therefore, after noting
that these principles had permeated all of their decisions, the court ruled that
"the competitive, commercial nature of its business precludes exemption to
plainitiff."' 04
In Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln,' the question presented
was whether property of a woman's club which included bible study among
its many benevolent activities could be exempt as property used for religious
97 Van AIstyne, supra note 94, at 761.
98 See Van Alstyne, supra note 94, at 463-65.
99 Van Alstyne, supra note 94, at 465-66.
100 Id. at 504.
104 "394 P.2d 882 (Alaska 1964).
102 .Id. at 885. The court also determined that the exemption provision was broad enough
to include the residence of the minister's assistant. For two other recent cases, considering
the'exempt status of ministers' dwelling places, see International Missions, Inc. v. Borough
of Lincoln Park, 87 N.J. Super. 170, 208 A.2d 431 (1965); City of Houston v. South Park
Baptist Church, 393 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1965).
103 239 Ore. 65, 396 P.2d 212 (1964).
104 - 396 P.2d at 214.
105 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965).
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purposes. The court ruled that "the term 'religious' has been held to require
neither the profession of a sectarian creed, nor the formal dedication or occu-
pation of property to promote the objects and purposes of a faith thus ex-
pressed."'08 Applying this guideline, they ruled that the activity of the club
came within the meaning of "religious" as used in the exemption statute. The
court also reiterated the theme expressed in the immediately preceding two cases,
declaring that it is the use of the property as distinguished from the use of the
income from the property that determines if it is exempt.
A use tax was levied on a church's Communion wine, missals, rosaries
and other property of that type in State v. Toolen.07 Such an application of
the tax was the result of the statutory language in question, as the statute ex-
empted only real property from all taxes; personal property was exempt only
from ad valorem taxation. The question before the court was whether sub-
jecting the property to a use tax violated the first amendment. The court dis-
tinguished precedent which released Jehovah's Witnesses from the obligation
of paying sales taxes on the religious pamphlets which they sold. 9 There the
pamphlet sales were protected as a form of religious activity, as this was the
method followed by the sect to disseminate their tenets of faith. The court
relied instead on precedent which declared that the taxation of personal property
merely while it was stored was permissible. The property was not sufficiently
in "the stream of worship" 0 to come within the protection of the first amend-
ment.
The meaning of the word "used" was the issue in South Iowa Methodist
Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review."' The statutory exemption was granted to
land and buildings used by religious societies. The court was faced with the
problem of whether the land and buildings were being "used" while the building
was in the process of construction. The purpose of exempting religious institu-
tions, the court said, was to encourage such institutions because they benefited
society and lessened the burden on the government. This purpose would not
be served by adding to the building costs, so the court ruled that the property
was being used in a manner that satisfied the requirements of the exemption
statute."
A widely watched suit, brought by well-known atheist Madalyn Murray,
has produced the most complete and carefully reasoned opinion among the
current cases in the area of tax exemption. In Murray v. Comptroller of the
Treasury,"" the appellants contended that the exemption of church property
from taxation was in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the
106 133 N.W.2d at 459.
107 277 Ala. 120, 167 So. 2d 546 (1964).
108 The term "ad valorem tax" means a tax or duty on the value of the article or thing
subject to taxation estimated at a certain percent of the valuation of the property. Pacific
Fruit Growers Express v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 27 F. Supp. 279 '(W.D. Okla. 1939).
109 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
110 277 Ala. 120, 167 So. 2d 546, 55i (1964).
111 136 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1965).
112 At the opposite end of the spectrum, a church was able to claim an exemption after
it had entered into an agreement to sell the property. The carefully worded agreement
enabled the church to retain ownership, possession, and use until they occupied new quarters.
Maricopa County v. North Phoenix Baptist Church, 409 P.2d 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
113 216 A.2d 897 (Md. 1966).
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United States Constitution, and also of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 1 '
The court first found that the appellant taxpayers had standing to sue on
the basis of Maryland precedent. Once this was determined, the appellant
taxpayers were then entitled to raise federal constitutional questions in this
state court action. The first such question considered was that of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Maryland court looked
to a pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court which declared that
"inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxa-
tion or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.""' 5  The court then
stated that since all organizations having beliefs in religion were treated uniformly
as a class, the equal protection clause was not violated.
Finally, consideration was given to the crux of the case, the first amend-
ment. The appellants contended that the first amendment prohibits the appro-
priation of public funds to support religious organizations; that exempting them
from paying taxes is the same in effect as if direct grants had been made to
them; that the "establishment" clause of the first amendment bars not only
laws establishing a church, but any law respecting an establishment of religion;
and that the Maryland tax exemption is such a law respecting an establishment
of religion, because the state cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
The court did concede a basic contention of appellants in recognizing that
"indubitably, religious organizations benefit from the exemption.""' 6 Moreover,
the court admitted that members of the general public pay higher taxes than
they would if the exemptions were not granted. As to the appellants' reason-
ing, the court stated, "Logically, this argument is strong . . . [but] logic is a
minion of the law, not its master.""'  It then discussed the factors that made
this logic less than inexorable.
One factor looked to by the court was history. The widespread presence
of exemption laws suggested that the states' policies were the result of a "ra-
tionally conceived and deep-seated policy, and not an accidental or vestigial
survival of outmoded practices.""' The court noted that the historical argu-
ment was not conclusive. Nevertheless, it took refuge in the words of Justice
Holmes: "If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
*t o "119
it...
Next, the court noted that in granting the exemption, Maryland did not
espouse acceptance of any or all religious bodies. Rather, the exemptions are
extended to all property owned by any organization which has definite views
about religious beliefs, including those not believing in a Supreme Being, as
Buddhists, and even atheists.
The court then considered a general rule as to when a state may give aid
without violating the principle of "separation":
114 This contention was rejected by the Court. Id. at 902-04.
115 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
116 Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 216 A.2d 897, 906 (Md. 1966).
117 Ibid.
118 Id. at 907, citing Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious
Activities, TnE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95, 110 (Oaks ed. 1963).
119 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
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A state cannot pass a law to aid one religion or all religions,
but state action to promote the general welfare of society, apart
from any religious considerations, is valid, even though religious
interests may be indirectly benefited. If the primary purpose of
the state action is to promote religion, that action is in violation
of the Amendment, but if a statute furthers both secular and reli-
gious ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to de-
termine whether the state could reasonably have attained the
secular end by means which do not further the promotion of
religion.120
With this general rule in mind, the court turned to a consideration of the rea-
sons why the General Assembly of Maryland, acting within its discretion, could
have reasonably determined that the exemption was for the general welfare,
apart from any benefits that religious organizations derived from it.
Three main reasons were found. The first was that religious organizations,
as a major part of their functions, "carry on activities secular in nature, of
substantial benefit to the community ... ."121 Examples given included aid
to the poor and aged, day nurseries, and efforts to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion. These programs fill public needs, the court said, and save the state the
expense of providing the same services. The court concluded that if no exemp-
tion were granted to religious organizations for the partial use of their properties
for secular purposes, while charitable and other institutions did receive exemp-
tions, serious questions of unconstitutional discrimination could arise.
The second reason that the court found could have motivated the General
Assembly was its belief that to tax church owned property would run the risk
of contravening the "free exercise" clause. Fear of constitutional restrictions,
the court said, is a proper consideration in a legislative exemption.
The third reason, entirely secular in nature, was that the state was en-
couraging the building and maintenance of houses of worship in order to attract
persons to communities to increase the general tax assessment base. The court
noted instances of real estate developers donating sites to churches as part of
their efforts to attract purchasers to their planned communities. Thus, to effect
an increase in the tax base as a result of the building of houses by people attracted
by a church is a governmental motive in no way connected with the support
or establishment of religion, the court stated. The object sought could not be
reasonably attained with equal effect without the grant of tax exemptions to
houses of worship.
The Maryland court closed its opinion by stating that it did not decide
whether taxation of church owned property would violate the "free exercise"
clause of the first amendment. A consideration of that question was unneces-
sary, as the court held, for the reasons set forth, that the exemption did not
violate the "establishment clause," and was constitutional.
The historical basis for the presence of tax exemptions in the United States
has been shown.2 2 Modern justifications for exemptions have been developed.
120 Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 216 A.2d 897, 906 (Md. 1966).
121 Id. at 907.
122 Text accompanying notes 91-100.
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Many of these justifications are reflected in the current cases, especially in
Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury. Generally, they may be classified under
two general theories, the "public burden" theory and the "public benefit"
theory. 2' The approach taken by the proponents of the public burden theory
is that religious institutions deserve to be exempt because they perform many
of the burdens that would otherwise devolve upon the state. The theory an-
alogizes to hospitals and other charitable organizations providing services other-
wise the burden of the state. It is difficult, however, to see what public burden
a church fulfills, as the state is expressly forbidden to propagate sectarian doc-
trine."4 This theory has prompted rather extreme examples as justifications,
such as the suggestion that as a result of a church's contribution to the moral
standards of the community, the state is relieved of the burden of making ex-
cessive expenditures for reformatory and penal institutions. 22 Closely analogous
to the public burden theory is the "humanitarian goals" concept. This concept,
which is a justification for exemptions to "drama schools, women's clubs, labor
temples, and temperance societies,"uG is based on the notion that organizations
furthering humanitarian goals deserve the gratitude of the state."2
The more convincing justification would seem to be the public benefit
theory. This theory states that religious institutions contribute greatly to the
moral welfare of society.'2 Thus, aid to religious institutions enhances "the
first element of good government . . . [which is] to promote the virtue and
intelligence of the people themselves."'2 9
Among the criticisms of the policy of tax exemptions are charges that an
exemption is in effect a utilization of public funds to aid religion;2 . that it
places an unfair burden on nonchurch members,'' and even upon church
members when the per capita value owned by one religious society is less than
123 See generally PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 183-90 (1953); 3 STOKES, op.
cit. supra note 93, at 418-32; ToRPY, op. cit. supra note 94, at 171-97; ZOLLMANN, Op. Cit.
supra note 96, at 236-84; Van Alstyne, supra note 94.
124 U. S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
125 This argument of the advocates of the public burden theory is cited by STOKES, Op.
cit. supra note 93, at 422.
126 Comment, 5 VILL. L. REv. 255, 268 (1959-60).
127 "The long and the short of it is, gentlemen, that the things that make it worthwhile
to live in Massachusetts - to live anywhere in the civilized world - are precisely the things
which are not taxed; the things exempted are the things which are in the highest degree
profitable to the community, the colleges, museums, churches, schools . . . . Let nobody
persuade you for a moment that these invaluable reservations from taxation are a burden on
the public; they are what makes the common life worth living." From an address in 1906
by Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, reported in 3 STOKES, op. cit. supra note 93,
at 423.
128 South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, 136 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1965);
YMCA v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924 (1900).
129 MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 337 (Great Books of the Western World ed.
1952), noted in Van Alstyne, supra note 94, at 463.
130 E.g., Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14
LAw & CONTEMP. PRoa. 144, 147 (1949) ("[There is no practical difference between making
appropriations and failing to send a tax bill. In either event the church is given aid by the
state."); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d
394, 407 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ("A tax exemption is, obviously, an indirect subsidy.").
131 See, e.g., Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956) (dismissed for want
of substantial federal question); General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961).
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that owned by another;.32 that the inequalities become more oppressive as the
tax burden grows; and that tax exemptions give church-owned businesses a
discriminatory advantage over privately owned businesses. Even churches33
and churchmen3 have joined in the criticism of exemptions.
It is conceivable that hostility to the exemptions could grow and result
in their abolishment. A combination of an increasing dollar amount of tax-
exempt property coupled with a rising cost of government could produce wide-
spread dissatisfaction with both the amount and distribution of the tax bur-
den. 5 That this will happen seems unlikely. The present cases exhibit no
trend or recognition of the need for changes in the policies of exemption. As
one authority has said, "Despite occasional doubts which have been voiced,
and in the teeth of judicial acknowledgments that such exemptions are indeed
a substantial form of economic assistance, there seems to be no ground for
believing that an assault upon first amendment grounds would succeed today
or in the foreseeable future."'3 6
The current decisions did refuse to grant exemptions to church-owned
businesses which were in direct competition with other commercial enterprises.
To ascertain whether this presages complete adoption of this view, which is
already the majority view,' will require more decisions, particularly in those
jurisdictions which now allow the exemption. In the main, it can be said
that the recent decisions reflect no indications of dissatisfaction with the prac-
tice of granting tax exemptions to religions institutions, but rather, continue
to be in the mainstream of the law. In the light of the current decisions,
one can validly agree with Van Alstyne in saying, "[TMhe church exemption
has weathered the storms of criticism and is today more firmly rooted in Ameri-
can tax policy than ever before."'38
4. Tort Immunity -No Longer the Rule..
It is now clear that the eventual demise of charitable immunity is inevitable
in almost all jurisdictions."4 A confusing array of qualifications and exceptions still
132 Comment, 5 VILL. L. Rav. 255, 277 (1959-60).
133 The Central Presbyterian Church of Des Moines in 1963 voted to donate $4,000 to
the city, the amount approximately equaling the cost to the city of maintaining the congre-gation's share of the cost of streets, public safety, and sanitation. Reported in 80 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 1458 (1963). The First Presbyterian Church, Morrison, Illinois, ratified a budget
calling for a payment of $400 to be paid to the county treasurer as a gift in lieu of property
taxes on the church manse. The action was in response to that part of the church-state
report of the 175th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. which
stated: "Congregations should be encouraged to make contributions to local governments in
lieu of taxes, in recognition of services government provides." Reported in 81 CHRISTA NA
CENTURY 229 (1964).
134 E.g., statements by Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, in Christianity Today, Aug. 3, 1959, p.
7, and in "Should Church Property Be Taxed," Together, April, 1962, at 28-30.
135 Comment, 5 VILL. L. Rmv. 255, 277-78 (1959-60).
136 Van Alstyne, supra note 94, at 461.
137 Evangelical Covenant Church v. City of Nome, 394 P.2d 882, 883-84 (Alaska 1964).
138 Van Alstyne, supra note 94, at 463.
139 It is not within the scope of this survey to examine the entire field of charitable immunity.
Only its effect upon church-state relations is considered herein.
140 Only six states imposed full liability upon charitable institutions in 1942. Fisch,
Charitable Liability for Tort, 10 VILL. L. Rav. 71, 91 n.142 (1964). In that year, in the
landmark case of President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810(D.C. Cir. 1942), Mr. Justice Rutledge refused to recognize the defense of charitable im-
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exists in a number of states. 41 At present, however, the only remaining bar
to its total elimination from American jurisprudence appears to be the refusal
of some states to overrule a doctrine that is so firmly embedded in their case
law.1
4
2
The exemption of charitable institutions from tort liability originated in
the dicta of two nineteenth century English opinions. 4 ' Though the rule was
discarded in England only a short time later,"" Massachusetts, apparently un-
aware of this fact, imported charitable immunity into this country in 1876.145
While several state courts did not adopt the doctrine,'4 6 it was accepted by
the majority of American jurisdictions until quite recently.'47
During the past two years, two state supreme courts summarily rejected
attempts to overthrow charitable immunity, 4 8 but decisions of other courts
clearly demonstrate that the "movement toward uniformity through abroga-
tion' 4 9 is still continuing.
In Ball Memorial Hospital v. Freeman,'0 while expressly refusing to rule
on the present vitality of the doctrine of charitable immunity in Indiana, the
Supreme Court of that state affirmed an award for a plaintiff who was injured
when an improperly prepared anesthetic was administered to her while she
was a patient in the defendant hospital. Charitable hospitals were held to be
liable for injuries caused by the negligent use of instrumentalities employed
munity. Only twenty-three years later, in Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Freeman, 196 N.E.2d 274,
278-79 (Ind. 1964), the court noted that the doctrine has now been repudiated in thirty-two
jurisdictions.
141 E.g., liability has been recognized when a judgment does not have to be satisfied out
of the charity's so-called "trust funds," Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 355 P.2d 1078
(Colo. 1960) ; when the institution's officers or managing directors, rather than its employees,
were negligent, Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 172 A.2d 192 (1961);
when the institution was negligent in hiring employees, Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237
N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953); and when the charity negligently placed in the hands of
its employees instrumentalities capable of inflicting injury, Medical & Surgical Memorial
Hosp. v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949).
142 See Fillipone v. Corporation of the Church of the Immaculate Conception, 25 Conn.
Supp. 242, 202 A.2d 152 (1964) ; Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hosp., 208 N.E.2d 232 (Mass. 1965).
Neither case discussed the merits of continuing to recognize charitable immunity. In response
to the argument that only the legislature can abrogate charitable immunity, in Flagiello v.
Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193, 202, 205 (1965), Justice Musmanno replied
as follows:
This Court fashioned it, and, what it put together, it can dismantle ...
Stare Decisis channels the law. It erects lighthouses and flies the signals of safety.
The ships of jurisprudence must follow that well-defined channel which, over the
years, has been proved to be secure and trustworthy. But it would not comport with
wisdom to insist that, should shoals rise in a heretofore safe course and rocks emerge
to encumber the passage, the ship should nonetheless pursue the original course,
merely because it presented no hazard in the past. The principle of stare decisis
does not demand that we follow precedents which shipwreck justice.
143 Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 '(1846);
Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
144 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 11 H.L. 686 (1866).
145 McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
146 E.g., Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Mulliner v.
Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920).
147 Not until 1964 did the Church-State Survey announce that the doctrine of charitable
immunity is no longer adhered to by a majority of American jurisdictions. 1963-64 Church-
State Survey, supra note 1, at 444.
148 Fillipone v. Corporation of the Church of the Immaculate Conception, 25 Conn. Supp.
242, 202 A.2d 152 (1964); Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hosp., 208 N.E.2d 232 (Mass. 1965).
149 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 5, at 448.
150 196 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 1964).
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in treating patients. The court's language is sufficiently broad, however, to
suggest that Indiana hospitals would be imprudent to continue to rely upon
any past exemptions from tort liability. A lengthy dissenting opinion supports
this conclusion. 1 '
Another hospital case, Darling v. Charlestown Community Hospital,'52
prompted Illinois to abandon its modified acceptance of charitable immunity.
The Illinois court held that the liability of charitable institutions is no longer
limited to the amount of their insurance coverage. Justice Schaefer concluded
that continued adherence to the court's previous rule would enable charitable
corporations, by limiting their liability insurance, to determine effectively, not
only the limits of their tort liability, but also whether they are to have any funds
subject to a judgment at all. Recognizing the impact of its decision -the
complete repudiation of the doctrine of charitable immunity - the court spe-
cifically held that its ruling is to be applied prospectively, giving previously
immune institutions the opportunity to obtain adequate insurance protection.
In two very well-considered opinions, treating all arguments for and against
exempting charitable institutions from tort liability,'53 both Pennsylvania and
West Virginia refused to allow the defense against claims by hospital patients.'
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania55 marks a radical departure from Pennsylvania's
firmly established rule of unqualified immunity.' While Justice Musmanno
focused his argument on the self-sufficient nature of the modem hospital in
holding such institutions liable for injuries suffered by paying patients, a scathing
dissent by Chief Justice Bell insisted that the decision abrogates immunity for
all charitable institutions. 5
In Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital,'58 the Supreme Court of West Virginia
extended its previous exceptions which impose liability where hospital employees
151 Although the majority opinion purports "not at this time to express any opinon
as to whether the charitable immunity doctrine is or is not the law of this state,"
as applied to charitable hospitals, it occurs to me that, under the facts stated in the
majority opinion, it does, in effect, repudiate such doctrine.
Id. at 279.
152 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
153 Justifications for the doctrine of charitable immunity include the following: (1)
charitable trust funds can be used only for charitable purposes; (2) the doctrine of respondeat
superior is inapplicable because charitable organizations do not really benefit from the acts of
their employees; (3) one who accepts the benefits of charity waives his right to damages for
tortious conduct by the organization or its employees; (4) such organizations are quasi-govern-
mental and, therefore, are entitled to the protection of governmental immunity; and (5)
public policy requires that individuals bear the cost of a charity's torts to prevent the diminution
of funds otherwise available for charitable purposes. For a succinct discussion of these arguments
and their rebuttals, see 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 445-46.
154 Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965); Adkins v. St. Francis
Hosp., 143 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965).
155 Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, supra note 154.
156 Michael v. Halmemann Medical College and Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769
(1961). This case was expressly overruled in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, supra note 154, at 208.
157 By eliminating charitable immunity for non-profit, charitable hospitals, the
majority Opinion likewise abolishes it for Churches, schools and universities, homes
for the blind, homes for the aged, homes for crippled or retarded or homeless
children, . . . and in short for every other charity-small as well as large-and will
undoubtedly jeopardize especially in small communities, the very existence of many
of them which today, in spite of State and City aid and large charitable gifts, are
barely able to make both ends meet.
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania, supra note 154, at 210.
158 143 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965).
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are negligently selected159 and where the plaintiff is a mere stranger or invitee
of the hospital. 6 ' It held that hospitals are liable to all patients for injuries
negligently inflicted by their agents or employees. Judge Caplan's opinion
persuasively rebutted the basic arguments employed to support charitable immu-
nity, portraying it as a legal anachronism. Despite the narrowness of the court's
specific holding, this opinion is an eloquent denunciation of the doctrine gen-
erally. It is submitted that Adkins leaves the availability of the defense of
charitable immunity in serious doubt under any circumstances in West Virginia.
The potential impact of Flagiello and Adkins, and possibly Freeman, be-
comes more apparent upon an examination of Friend v. Cove Methodist Church,
Inc. 1 In an earlier case, Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,'62 the
Supreme Court of Washington rejected the defense of immunity against a claim
by a paying hospital patient. Extending this holding, the court in Friend reversed
the dismissal of a complaint in which the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries
sustained on church property after attending a smorgasbord. Relying upon Pierce,
the court unequivocally abandoned the doctrine of charitable immunity in its
entirety. The specific holding of Pierce was identical to that of Flagiello. Likewise,
the opinions in Pierce, Flagiello, and Adkins all contained much dicta attacking
the whole concept of charitable immunity. Thus, considering the increasing dis-
favor with which courts are treating the doctrine, it is submitted that both Flagiello
and Adkins are likely to be similarly extended.
As is apparent from the cases discussed herein, that the institution involved
is church-related is of no significance in the judicial treatment of charitable
immunity. Religious institutions are subject to the same rules of liability as are all
other charities.
Only indirectly can religious institutions even hope to receive any special
consideration. If holdings such as those in Flagiello and Adkins are narrowly
construed, small religious corporations might receive the benefits of immunity
because they have not yet achieved the same self-sufficiency as the modem hos-
pital. This privilege would not be granted because of their religious affiliation,
however. Instead, it would be afforded to all financially insecure charitable
institutions that need such consideration because of their particular value to
the community they serve. If recognized, such a privilege is likely to be a mere
respite from the imposition of full liability for all tortious conduct. It is sub-
mitted, however, that such an exception, even if temporary, does not comport
with fundamental justice and will not be made, especially in view of the avail-
ability of adequate insurance protection.
B. Education
1. Religion in the Schools - Confusion
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale6 and School
159 Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
160 Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp., 137 W. Va. 764, 73 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
161 396 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1964).
162 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
163 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,"' various religious exercises were
conducted in a large number of American schools," 5 despite the tenuousness of
the constitutional basis of such activities. These two decisions made it quite
clear that most, if not all, of these exercises are unconstitutional.
In Engel, the Court invalidated a New York statute authorizing district
boards of education to direct the opening of each school day with a brief, non-
denominational prayer composed by the State Board of Regents. 6 ' Though
no student was required to participate in the prayer or be present during its,
recitation, the Court held that such use of a public school system constitutes
an establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.6 7
In Schempp, the Court held that state laws providing for Bible reading
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools are unconstitutional. It
was in this case that the Court elucidated its criterion for determining the
validity of legislation under the establishment clause:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."6
The full import of this test cannot be appreciated without a consideration of
the Court's definition of the word "religion." In Torcaso v. Watkins, 9 the
Court unequivocally extended the religious guarantees embodied in the first
amendment to non-theistic religious and philosophical beliefs:
We repeat and again reaffin that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither
164 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
165 Shortly before the Court's decision in Engel, a nationwide survey of 2183 school
principals and district supervisors was conducted. 87.92% of the school system observed
religious holidays with some type of activity in their schools, 86.84% conducted baccalaureate
services in connection with high school graduations, 42.74% permitted the distribution of
Gideon Bibles in their schools, 41.74% allowed Bible reading to be conducted, and 33.16%
held homeroom devotional services. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the Public Schools Before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 3, at 2424, 2422,
2429, 2418, 2420 (1964) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on School Prayers]. For a
collection of 27 charts on various other religious practices in public schools and on the attitudes
of school officials who responded to the survey, see House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 3,
at 2413-40.
166 In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962), the Court quoted the prayer as follows:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."
167 The first amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof...." In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court
applied the establishment and free exercise clauses to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
168 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
169 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs. 70 [Emphasis added.]
In an accompanying footnote, the Court included within the class of non-
theistic beliefs Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, "and
others."
1i
Initial adverse reaction to the School Prayer Cases was widespread.""
A concerted campaign to overturn the Court's decisions reached its climax in
April, 1964, when the House Judiciary Committee opened hearings on 154
proposed constitutional amendments.' 3 By early June, however, the more
prudent counsel of many very prominent legal scholars and religious leaders
was heeded,' averting a favorable committee report on any of the proposals.
Agitation for a constitutional amendment has apparently subsided, and
several states have insisted upon full observance of the law as enunciated in
Engel and Schempp.' Nevertheless, there is evidence of a continued refusal
by some states and local school authorities to comply. 6 During the past two
170 Id. at 495.
171 Id. at n.11.
172 See Beaney and Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the
Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475 (1964). The House Committee on the Judiciary received
numerous petitions for a constitutional amendment, some with as many as 120,000 signatures.
House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 1, at 253, 340, 400. Gallup Polls of a number of
congressional districts indicated that between 80% and 90% of the general public favored an
amendment between September, 1963 and April, 1964. House Hearings on School Prayers,
pt. 2, at 988. On July 3, 1964, the Governors' Conference at Hershey Pa., unanimously
voted their support for such an amendment, with only one abstention-Governor Rockefeller
of New York. Beaney and Beiser, supra at 481.
173 These proposals are printed in full in House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 1, at 1-59.
The best known of these proposed amendments is the Becker Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 693, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). It is named after its staunchest supporter, Congressman Becker of
New York, and is printed in House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 1 at 22 as follows:
"SECTION 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit the offer-
ing, reading from, or listening to prayers or biblical scriptures, if participation therein
is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, institution, or place.
"SEC. 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit making
reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being
in any governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school,
institution, or place, or upon any coinage, currency, or obligation of the United
States.
"SEo. 3. Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion.
"SEC. 4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the
Congress."
174 On June 8, 1964, 223 law school Deans and teachers of constitutional law submitted
a signed letter to the House Judiciary Committee urging "that Congress approve no measures to
amend the first amendment in order to overrule these decisions." House Hearings on School
Prayers, pt. 3, at 2483, 2484. In March, 1964, an ad hoc committee of Protestant and Jewish
religious leaders and civil liberties groups was organized to oppose the Becker Amendment.
By the end of the Hearings, both Protestant and Catholic leaders had moderated their previous
adamant opposition to the Court's rulings. Beaney and Beiser, supra note 172, at 484, 497-500.
175 Beaney and Beiser, supra note 172, at 489; 4 4 TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AmERicAN
CvmL LIBERTIES UNION 36 (1964).
176 Beaney and Beiser, supra note 172, at 486-91. A survey conducted in Kentucky disclosed
that only 61 of 177 school districts had discontinued prayer and Bible reading. 44TH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AmERICAN CivrL LIBERTIES UNION 36(1964). Another survey of 227
Indiana public school superintendents indicated widespread non-compliance in that state. As
of April, 1964, Bible reading was still permitted or practiced in one-third of the districts, and
about one-half permitted or practiced the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Hill, Religion and
Public Schools: Policy and Practice in Indiana, INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
RnESEARCH BULLETIN No. 14 (April 1964).
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years, however, decisions of federal and state courts, summarily invalidating
legislation similar to that held unconstitutional in the School Prayer Cases,
leave no doubt that full compliance with the Court's mandate is inevitable."
One recent case can only intensify the present controversy over the proper
application of the Schempp test' s In Stein v. Oshinsky"' the plaintiffs sought
a mandatory injunction to require school officials to afford their children the
opportunity to pray in school. 8 ' Finding that participation in the prayers was
completely voluntary and that the exercise was not prescribed by any law, the
district court granted the injunction. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed,
directing a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint. While expressing
serious doubts that even permitting the recitation of prayers in public schools
is constitutional, the court held that New York is under no obligation to tolerate
the practice: "After all that the states have been told about keeping the wall
between church and state... high and impregnable, . . . it would be rather
bitter irony to chastise New York for having built the wall too tall and too
strong.' 8'
The plaintiffs in Stein were relying upon the free exercise clause. In denying
their claim, the court inadvertently sanctioned an establishment of religion under
Schempp. If the Supreme Court has truly recognized Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism, and other non-theistic religions and philosophies as entitled to the
full protection of the first amendment's free exercise guarantees, then these
schools of thought are also subject to that amendment's proscription of their
establishment. In prohibiting any manifestation of a theistic belief, New York
arguably took affnmative action with the "purpose and primary effect'
82
of advancing another religion, i.e., Secular Humanism. 83
In holding as it did, the court expressly refrained from answering the
question that should have been determinative of the case: did the religions
exercises of the plaintiffs constitute an abridgement of the free exercise rights
of non-participating school children? Since the children involved were in kinder-
garten and probably no more than five or six years of age, there is a definite
177 Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (per curiam);
Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1964); Adams v. Engelking, 232 F. Supp. 666
'(D. Idaho 1964); Attorney Gen. v. School Comm., 347 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 553
(1964); Sills v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 351, 200 A.2d 615 (1964).
178 See text accompanying notes 168-171 supra.
179 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1966).
180 The Second Circuit quotes the two prayers that were recited as follows:
God is Great, God is Good and We
Thank Him for our Food, Amen!
Thank You for the World so Sweet,
Thank You for the Food We Eat,
Thank You for the Birds that Sing-
Thank You, God, for Everything.
Id. at 1000.
181 Id. at 1002.
182 Text accompanying note 168 supra.
183 In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963), the
Court recognized the possibility of state action constituting an establishment of secularism
and specifically condemned such a result: "We agree of course that the State may not
establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility
to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.'
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possibility that the student-initiated prayers required active teacher participa-
tion. Any voluntary religious observation must be accompanied by safeguards
to protect subtle infringements upon the rights of those children who do not
adhere to the particular faith manifested. They must be free from any coercion
to participate, no matter how subtle such pressure may be."4 If the religious
observances practiced in Stein are objectionable, it is because they were not
accompanied by conscientious efforts to protect the rights of children having
no desire to participate. However, if such rights were not infringed and if
the prayers were truly initiated by the students, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court's test in Schempp precluded the school officials from proscribing the
prayers in Stein. 5
Sensitive to the above considerations, in Reed v. Vanhoven,"'8 one federal
district court judge made a very carefully reasoned attempt to balance the stric-
tures of the establishment clause with the demands of all children and their
parents to be provided the protection of the free exercise clause. The plaintiffs
sought to enjoin all religious activities conducted in the public schools attended
by their children. Judge Fox resorted to the so-called "accommodation prin-
ciple" of Zorach v. Clausones" in refusing to issue the injunction. He suggested
a rather detailed plan designed to insure the neutrality of the school authorities
with respect to religion while guaranteeing both the rights of school children
wishing to manifest their religious beliefs and the rights of those wishing to
refrain from any religious observances. The basic requirements of Judge Fox's
proposal are the following: (1) Students desiring to pray or read Scripture
before or after school begins should be allowed to meet in rooms other than
their home rooms; (2) Such exercises should be completed at least five minutes
before regularly scheduled classes or should not be given until at least five
minutes after the completion of the regular school day; (3) No bells should
184 In a legal memorandum prepared at the request of former Representative John V.
Lindsay of New York, the following observation was made:
Behavorial scientists have pointed out that children place great importance on
how they are esteemed by their classmates. The urge to conform is extremely strong
and the fear of being "different" is liable to cause them to emulate a majority that
they are convinced are wrong.
House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 3, at 2768. While teacher participation in prayers
presents an establishment issue, more subtle pressures to conform raise the question of the
State's affirmative obligation to protect its citizens' freedom of religion from infringement by
other citizens. Though the holdings in Engel and Schempp were based on the establishment
clause, the Court manifested a concern for any indirect compulsion upon non-participants to
take part in a religious exercise. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1963). Without passing on the
question, Judge Friendly in Stein intimated that the plaintiffs' children were under indirect
pressure to participate in the prayers. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1966).
185 See note 183 supra.
186 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
187 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). The principle was stated as follows:
'When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best
of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accom-
modates the public service to their spiritual needs.
The present vitality of this principle is suspect in light of the Court's decisions in Engel and
Schempp. However, the same type of accommodation between the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause may be necessary if the Court is to implement the protections afforded
by both. In Reed, Judge Fox is also seeking this latter type of accommodation, though he does
not say so expressly.
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be rung to indicate the beginning or ending of such periods; (4) The teachers'
only function during the exercise of such rights should be to keep discipline."' 8
The court also held that during the class day, historical documents may be
read, patriotic songs sung, and the pledge of allegiance recited on a voluntary
basis. 8 ' Judge Fox emphasized, however, that he was not making any final
disposition of the case and that he would consider the issuance of an injunction
if his proposals were not adhered to.
While the suggested accommodation in Reed scrupulously attempts to
circumvent the likelihood of indirect pressure being exerted upon children who
do not wish to join in the religious exercises of their classmates, it still relies upon
teachers to keep order and allows the use of public school property. Judge
Friendly suggested in Stein that such facts give rise to an inference of state
approval of the particular religious exercise. 9 However, one might just as
reasonably ask if the refusal to allow student-initiated prayers under the safe-
guards of the Reed plan does not just as readily give rise to an inference of state
hostility toward religion. 9' Schempp commands that the state refrain from
inhibiting or advancing religion, and to the Supreme Court, religion includes
what traditionally has been regarded as non-religion. Thus, in cases like Reed
and Stein, unless the religious freedom of non-participants can be protected
only by prohibiting the religious exercise that is challenged, the state must main-
tain a complete hands-off policy. Adopting .this approach, which it is submitted
is required by Engel and Schempp, only the results, not the reasoning, in Reed
and Stein can be reconciled.
In addition to refusing certiorari in Stein, in Lewis v. Allen 92 the Supreme
Court similarly rejected another opportunity to clarify the confusion engendered
by its School Prayer decisions. Lewis raised the problem of the extent to which
those decisions require the state to remain neutral between religion and non-
religion in matters other than prayers and Bible readings. Prior to Engel, the
plaintiff had challenged a regulation by the New York Commissioner of Edu-
cation authorizing the recitation of the pledge of allegiance in public schools.
The plaintiff contended that the inclusion of the words "under God" was a
violation of the establishment clause. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint without writing an opinion.
The Supreme Court's refusal to pass on this question has been interpreted
by some to mean that its holdings in Engel and Schempp will not be extended. 9 '
188 Reed v. Vanhoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 54-56 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
189 Cf., in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963),
the Court stated the following: "Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may
not be effected consistently with the First Amendment."
190 Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1966).
191 In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 '(1952), the Court stated the following: "But
we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile
to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence." Under Schempp, it is clear that not only can the government refrain from such
activities, but it is constitutionally obligated to do so.
192 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E.2d 767, 252 N.Y.S.2d 80, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 923 (1964).
193 Wall St. Journal, Nov. 24, 1964, p. 2, col. 2. This article began with the following
statement: "Although it didn't put anything in writing, the Supreme Court appears to have
signaled that there are limits to its demand for separation of church and state."
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It is clear, however, that the test in Schempp is violated by a congressional
enactment' ordering the inclusion of "under God" in a pledge of allegiance.
It cannot be seriously contended that such legislation had any purpose or effect
other than the advancement of religion. 9' Very possibly, realizing that its
previous decisions dictated a reversal of Lewis, the Court refused to review the
decision because of a sensitivity to the adverse reaction to Engel and Schempp.'9
On their particular facts, the decisions in Engel and Schempp were con-
sistent with the first amendment as it must be interpreted in light of the great
diversity of religious beliefs and non-beliefs in our present pluralistic society.' 9'
Unfortunately, the test in Schempp provides the basis for eliminating many,
if not all, of our public recognitions of man's dependence upon God. In his
concurring opinion in Engel, Justice Douglas listed numerous public manifesta-
tions of a belief in God and unequivocally stated that they all are prohibited
by the first amendment.' Concurring in Schempp, Justice Breunan denied
that such a conclusion necessarily follows.'99 However, applying the test embodied
in the majority opinion in Schempp, it seems clear that at least some of the prac-
tices enumerated by Justice Douglas are clearly proscribed under the Court's
present criterion of constitutionality.200 Nevertheless, in affording the guaran-
tees of the first amendment to non-theistic religions and philosophies, the Court
can and must avoid the extreme of completely secularizing American public
life.2 ' Not only would such a result prove unpalatable to the vast majority
194 68 Stat. 249 (1954), 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1964).
195 See text accompanying note 168 supra.
196 See notes 172-74 and accompanying text, supra.
197 There are presently over 83 different religious denominations in this country with a
membership in excess of 50,000. House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 3, at 2217.
198 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439-41 (1962).
199 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963).
200 E.g., the Act of Congress declaring "In God we trust" the national motto of the
United States, 70 Stat. 732 (1956), 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1964); the Act of Congress ordering
the President to set aside each year a National Day of Prayer "on which the people of the
United States may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as
individuals," 62 Stat. 64 '(1952), 36 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Justice Douglas even suggested that
the adoption of the Star Spangled Banner as our national anthem by Act of Congress, 46
Stat. 1508 (1931), 36 U.S.C. § 170 (1964), was among those activities that are unconstitutional
under the establishment clause, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441 n.5 (1962). New York
school officials recently banned the singing of the fourth stanza of "America" upon the com-
plaint that it abridged the religious freedom of a sixteen-year-old high school student. Chicago
Sun Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 4, col. 1. One legal brief submitted to the House Judiciary
Committee in support of a constitutional amendment went to the extreme of suggesting that
the logic of the School Prayer decisions requires that "we will have to abandon 'A.D.' appear-
ing on most of our legal documents for the simple reason that this recognizes that it is done
'in the year of our Lord.' " House Hearings on School Prayers, pt. 1, at 299.
201 While it is difficult to see upon what legal grounds the Court refused to review and
reverse Lewis v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E.2d 767, 252 N.Y.S.2d 80, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 923 (1964), attempts to invalidate the practices listed in nbte 200 supra present the
serious obstacle of establishing standing to sue. The Supreme Court no longer insists that
parties have some direct pecuniary interest in the litigation. House Hearings on School Prayers,
pt. 3, at 2768-69. In Schempp, however, the Court emphasized that the "parties here are
school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against
which their complaints are directed." [Emphasis added.] School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963). Thus, while the logic of the Court's
decisions does reach such activities, absent some contention that the enactments directly
infringe upon property rights or constitutionally guaranteed liberties, future attacks are likely
to be summarily dismissed by the Court. In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923),
the Court made the following statement:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that
they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justifica-
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of the nation," 2 but it would itself constitute the establishment of a religion
in violation of the first amendment.
2. Aid to Parochial Education - A New Era.
In 1960, the Survey discerned a "growing favoritism toward providing
the usual governmental services to . . . schools of ... religious institutions. 203
During the next four years, conflict over whether or not such aid should be
provided constituted the major obstacle to the passage of any federal legisla-
tion for the benefit of primary and secondary school children. 4 As a result,
the 1964 Survey concluded that "the present disposition of Congress, in light
of the constitutional uncertainty, is not conducive to a conclusive answer to
the major question of the federal government's role in assisting parochial edu-
cation."2 During the past two years, however, the recent shift in public opinion
toward favoring equal treatment of all children, regardless of the schools they
attend,0 ' has had an impact not only upon Congress but upon state legisla-
tures as well.20 7
a. State Legislation
Some important legislation has already been lobbied. Efforts to obtain
equal bus transportation have been the most successful. 0 8 In addition, New
tion for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is
made to rest upon such an act.... The party who invokes the power must be able
to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is im-
mediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.
The present vitality of this principle was recognized in Schempp wherein the Court distinguished
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), which dismissed an appeal to an attack
upon Bible reading because the plaintiffs no longer had children in the school. School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra at 224 n.9. Concurring in Engel, Justice
Douglas cited Frothingham as depriving taxpayers of standing to challenge certain religious
activities in federal courts. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441 n.6 (1962).
202 See notes 172-73 and accompanying text supra.
203 1958-60 Church-State Survey, part I, supra note 1, at 418.
204 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 453.
205 Id. at 457.
206 A 1961 Gallup Poll reported only 36% of the population in favor of federal aid to
children attending church-related schools. By 1963, 49% favored such aid with 7% expressing
no opinion. In the later poll, therefore, 53% of those expressing an opinion supported aid to
children in parochial schools. BLUM, FREEDOM IN EDUCATION: FEDERAL Am FOR ALL CHILDREN
197 (1965). A recent survey of principals and directors of Jewish day schools indicated that
90% favored federal aid for secular subjects taught in church-related schools. BLUM, op. cit.
supra at 203. For an indication of Protestant support for federal legislation that makes benefits
available to children in parochial schools, see 111 CONG. REC. 5565 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1965).
207 This transition in public opinion has been accompanied by the growth of organizations
devoted to obtaining state aid for nonpublic school children. The niost active and effective
of these organizations has been the Citizens for Educational Freedom (CEF), which has been
described as a "non-sectarian, non-partisan, non-profit civic organization whose purpose is to
achieve freedom in education through the democratic process." BLUM, op. cit. supra note
206, at 204. As of October, 1965, the beginning of a new membership drive, CEF had over
16 state federations and over 1000 local chapters. Freedom in Education, Sept.-Oct. 1965,
pp. 1, 3. Another organization with apparently the same basic philosophy is National Associa-
tion for Personal Rights in Education (NAPRE). School Prayer Hearings, pt. 3, at 2368-70.
Both of these groups are emphatic in their insistence that they do not seek governmental aid
for any parochial schools. They do demand that such aid go to all children, not just those
attending public institutions.
208 E.g., Pennsylvania enacted a statute providing bus transportation for nonpublic school
children along established routes to and from points most convenient to the schools they
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York enacted a law enabling private elementary and secondary school chil-
dren to borrow without charge textbooks approved for use in the public
schools of that state,"9 and Michigan passed a comprehensive "auxiliary services
bill" which insures the availability of a number of educational services to all
children in both public and private schools. 1 '
The constitutional validity of at least some of this legislation will not go
unchallenged.2 11 The governor of Delaware vetoed one bus transportation
bill'"' after an advisory opinion by the Delaware Supreme Court held the bill
violative of the state constitution,21' which specifically proscribes the use of
state funds to aid church, denominational or sectarian schools.'14 The effect
of this decision, however, is likely to be overruled by a constitutional amendment
that has already passed the Delaware legislature once by a substantial margin.'
The obvious intent of such legislation is not to aid parochial schools but
to guarantee that all school children are afforded a share in publicly financed
welfare and educational services. It is based upon the so-called "child benefit"
theory of Everson v. Board of Education".. and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board
of Educ."' In the former, the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute
providing bus transportation to public and parochial school children;".8 in the
latter, it upheld a Louisiana statute providing them with free textbooks."19 At
attend. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, art. XIII, § 1361, as amended, Act No. 91, H.B.
381, July 1, 1965. Ohio's new law provides bus transportation on an equal basis for all
children attending schools meeting state educational requirements. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
3327.01 (Page Supp. 1965).
209 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1965).
210 Among the benefits provided are the following: National Defense Education Act testing,
speech correction services, visiting teachers for delinquent and disturbed children, school
diagnostician and teacher counselor services for all mentally handicapped children, remedial
reading, and "such other services as may be determined by the legislature." MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.3622 (Supp. 1965). During the same session, Michigan also passed "AN ACT to protect
the public health of school children by providing health examinations and services on an equal
basis to children attending public and non-public elementary and secondary schools." Mxca.
STAT. ANN. § 14.379(1) (Supp. 1965).
211 Suits challenging the Pennsylvania bus transportation statute, Act of March 10, 1949,
P.L. 30, art. XIII, § 1361, as amended, Act No. 91, H.B. 381, July 1, 1965, have already been
instituted. Comment, The School Bus Law: Transportation of Parochial and Private School
Pupils in Pennsylvania, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 71, 73 (1965).
212 Wilmington Morning News, Feb. 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
213 Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966).
214 DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
215 The amendment passed both houses of the Delaware legislature by December, 1965, and
will become effective if approved by the General Assembly in 1967 or 1968. It provides that
the existing constitutional ban on aid to parochial schools "shall not prevent the General
Assembly from providing for the transportation of students of nonpublic elementary and
high schools not operated for profit." Wilmington Morning News, Dec. 3, 1965, p. 16, col. 2.
216 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
217 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
218 Speaking for the Court in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), Justice
Black stated the following: "[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey
against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious
beliefs."
219 In upholding the Lousiana statute in Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370,
374-75 (1930), the Court approvingly quoted the following statement of the Lousiana Supreme
Court:
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school books
for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their
benefit and the resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations were made.
True, these children attend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or
non-sectarian, and that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free of cost,
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present, these decisions represent the law regarding the constitutionality of aid
to nonpublic school children. However, as the Delaware decision demonstrates,
more formidable obstacles to such legislation are the provisions of many state
constitutions which impose more rigid limitations on church-state relations.220
Since Everson, only two state supreme courts passing on the validity of similar
legislation have rendered decisions favorable to nonpublic school children. 21
In contrast, six states have now invalidated such legislation on the basis of their
state constitutions. 2
b. Federal Legislation
By far the most significant recent development in the area of aid to non-
public school children was the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965.22' While there are numerous statutes authorizing federal
expenditures for private school students and the institutions they attend, 24
none has provided for such extensive and imaginative uses of federal funds,
nor has any placed so much emphasis on the elementary and secondary levels.
Under Title I of the Act,22 ' over one billion dollars has been made avail-
able to help local school districts broaden and strengthen public school pro-
grams where there are concentrations of educationally disadvantaged children.
The distribution of funds is based upon the percentage of low-income families
in the area in question. Though the Act does not detail the uses that can be
made of such funds, Congress has provided numerous suggestions.2 The fol-
lowing are a few: teacher aids and instructional materials; guidance services
whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of these
appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of a single
obligation, because of them.
220 "State Law Relating to Transportation and Textbooks for Parochial School Students, and
Constitutional Protection of Religious Freedom" and summary of state constitutions contained
therein. Hearings on H.R. 6074 Before the Ad Hoc Committee on Study of Shared-Time
Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 424 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Shared Time Hearings].
221 Snyder v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960); Quinn v. School
Conm'n, 332 Mass. 410, 125 N.E.2d 410 (1955).
222 Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); Opinion of the Justices, 216
A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Board of
Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist. No.
506, 33 Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis.2d
148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
223 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. Supp. 1965). Full
treatment of this statute is beyond the scope of this survey. Only the three titles most relevant
to church-state relations are herein considered. For a summary and explanation of all six
titles, see U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, "The First Work of These Times..
Description and Analysis of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [hereinafter
cited as Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare Summary].
224 E.g., special milk programs, 68 Stat. 899 (1954), 7 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1964); Na-
tional Defense Loan Program, 72 Stat. 1583 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 421 (1964);
loans for scientific and language equipment, 72 Stat. 1590 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C.
§ 445 (1964); language centers, 72 Stat. 1593 (1958), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 511(a),
(1964); national school lunch program, 60 Stat. 230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1964).
For a list of approximately 40 similar federal provisions, see Rafalko, The Federal Aid to
Private School Controversy; A Look, 3 DuQ. L. Rav. 211, 219-22 (1965). For a listing of
federal funds available to religious institutions generally, see Shared Time Hearings 32.
225 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A. Supp. 1965).
226 For a specification of over 40 possible programs that can be financed under this title,
see S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), republished in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1446, 1455-56 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as House Report on ESEA].
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for pupils and families; supplemental health, psychiatric, and food services;
provisions for books, shoes, and clothing where necessary; mobile learning cen-
ters; scheduling of concerts, dramas, lectures, and exhibits; school bus trans-
portation; and dual enrollment or shared time programs.2 27 Local educational
agencies may receive basic grants and special incentive grants to implement
such programs if their applications are approved by their state educational authori-
ties and if they meet certain conditions. One of these conditions is to insure
that children enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools will be
included in all special educational programs for which they are otherwise
qualified. At the same time, however, a guarantee must be received from the
local school authorities that all funds and title to all property derived there-
from will be kept in a public agency and will be administered by that agency.
To provide the incentive for meeting these requirements, the Commissioner of
Education is authorized to withhold funds from any state that fails to comply
with all conditions.
The authorization of one hundred million dollars to improve library resources
and to supply textbooks and other instructional materials is provided for in Title
II.22 The same establishment safeguards found in Title I are also contained
in this title. State agencies must retain ownership of all property purchased
with federal funds. They must also provide assurances that such materials will
be made available "on an equitable basis for the use of children and teachers
in private elementary and secondary schools .. .which comply with the com-
pulsory attendance laws of the State or are otherwise recognized by it through
some procedure customarily used in the State."220 This condition is qualified
to the extent that the distribution of such materials must be consistent with
state law. As has been noted, some state constitutions have been interpreted
to demand quite stringent prohibitions of any state assistance to nonpublic
school children.2 ' Nevertheless, after exhaustive study of the problem, the
House Report suggested that if the states employ central depositories for the
distribution of instructional materials, all states should be able to administer
this title in conformity with state law.22' If for some reason a state does not
make such materials available to all children, the Commissioner of Education
is authorized to take appropriate measures to guarantee their equitable dis-
tribution. The cost of such additional machinery is to be deducted from that
state's fiscal allotment.
Title III.2 provides one hundred million dollars for supplemental educa-
tional centers and services. A number of specific projects are suggested,"' but
227 For a list of over 60 programs suggested by local school superintendents of 8 selected
states, see Hearings on H.R. 2361 and H.R. 2362 before the General Subcommittee on Ed-
ucation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at
112-13 '(1965) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on ESEA].
228 79 Stat. 36 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821-827 (Supp. 1965).
229 79 Stat. 37 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 823(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1965).
230 See note 220 supra.
231 After stating that "the committee has taken care to assure that funds provided under this
title will not enure to the enrichment or benefit of any private institution," House Report on
ESEA 13, the committee suggested the establishment of such central depositories to be operated
on approximately the same basis as the typical public library.
232 79 Stat. 39 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-48 (Supp. 1965).
233 E.g., guidance and counseling services; remedial instructions; physical education and
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considerable flexibility is supplied by the authorization of "other specially de-
signed educational programs.' 2" Additional proposals of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare include offering specialized instruction in
advanced sciences, foreign languages, and other subjects, and employing such
community cultural resources as orchestras, theaters, museums, and plane-
tariums."3 5 A guarantee that all these services be made available to nonpublic
school children on an equal basis is required before the Commissioner of Edu-
cation can authorize any requested grant. Congress deliberately used the words
"services? and "centers" to enable local educational agencies to meet this require-
ment imaginatively and without allowing the furnishing of equipment and
personnel to "inure to the enrichment of any private institution."2 '
The intent of Congress to make the benefits of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965 available to all children is expressed quite un-
equivocally. Moreover, in a recent letter to Title I Coordinators, the Office
of Education made it clear that this intent must be implemented in substance
and not merely in form."' Initial reluctance of some local educational agencies
to provide the necessary assurances 8 should subside in at least some areas as
the growing drive to obtain welfare legislation for nonpublic school children
gains momentum."' Nevertheless, opponents of such measures, emboldened
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions24 0 which seem to add height to the
metaphorical wall separating church and state, are likely to challenge the Act
as prohibited by the establishment clause of the first amendment.24 While the
Act contains specific provisions prohibiting its unconstitutional application2 '
and while there appears to be a consensus that as written it does not violate
the establishment clause,243 constitutional attacks will probably be presented
recreational services; psychological and social work services; dual enrollment (shared time)
programs; modern educational equipment, including mobile services and television instruction.
79 Stat. 41 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 843 (Supp. 1965).
234 79 Stat. 41 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 843(b)(8) (Supp. 1965).
235 Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare Summary 6.
236 House Report on ESEA 17.
237 In this letter of February 14, 1966, on file in the Notre Dame Lawyer office, John F.
Hughes, Director of the Division of Programs Operations, advised Title I Coordinators that
proposals thus far submitted for approval lacked sufficiently detailed explanations of their
provisions for the participation of private school children. The Coordinators were informed that
such applications were to be treated as incomplete. In addition, they were instructed that
services must meet the "comparability" factor both as to the type of program and the
convenience of its availability.
238 Ibid. In late February, 1966, after a study of proposals submitted to the Office of
Education under Title I, CEF Assistant Director Edward L. Goldman concluded that they
completely lacked information as to what benefits will be available to nonpublic school children.
Letter to the Notre Dame Lawyer, March 2, 1966.
239 See notes 206 and 207 supra.
240 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 '(1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
241 Since the Michigan "auxiliary services bill" so closely parallels the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, a recently initiated suit in a federal district court challenging
the Michigan legislation solely on federal constitutional grounds has been interpreted as an
attempt to challenge the federal' statute as well. Letter from Edward L. Goldman to the
Notre Dame Lawyer, March 2, 1966.
242 In addition to those described herein, Title VI of the Act provides that "nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize the making of any -payment under this
Act, or under any Act amended by this Act, for religious worship or instruction." 79 Stat. 58
(1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 885 (Supp. 1965).
243 See S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), republished[ in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 1446; House Report on ESEA. Testimony by representatives of many
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in the context of particular programs initiated at the local level.2 44 That there
is a danger of unconstitutional application seems indisputable. State and local
educational authorities are granted broad discretion in the development of
plans to allocate the funds granted. The Act is unclear on such problems as
the extent to which public school teachers can conduct special classes on paro-
chial school premises24 and as to the manner in which equipment owned by
public agencies can be used in parochial schools on a loan basis. 246  The con-
stitutionality of such activities is suspect, but the act itself forbids its unconsti-
tutional application. Thus, it will be for the courts to determine, on a case
by case basis, which questionable programs result in institutional benefits, pro-
scribed by the act, and which in child benefits, constitutional under Everson
and Cochran.24
c. Shared Time
Of all the projects for which governmental funds have previously been
supplied, only shared time or dual enrollment programs have been received
with near universal approval by most opponents of state assistance to parochial
schools or their pupils. 4 Dual enrollment is specifically provided for in Title
III29 and is suggested under Title 1250 of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965. Such arrangements are not the same as released time
programs which enable public school pupils to take time from their regular
school day to receive religious instruction. Under some shared time programs,
nonpublic school children take no more than one course in their local public
leading professional and religious organizations manifested agreement that there was no
establishment problem, and the Justice Department advised that the Act is constitutional.
111 CONG. REo. 5558 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1965).
244 A state may seek judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit
in which the state is located if it is dissatisfied with the Commissioner of Education's final
action under Title I, 79 Stat. 33 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 241(k) (Supp. 1965) and under Title
II, 79 Stat. 39 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 827 (Supp. 1965). There is no provision for judicial
review under Title III.
245 Concerned about this possibility, Senator Dominick of Colorado proposed an amend-
ment to prevent the Act from being construed to authorize "the hiring of teachers wherever
there is religious worship or sectarian instruction." S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), republished in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1446, 1481. Compare the con-
fusion manifested in the House as to what courses under Title I could be taught under what
circumstances by public school teachers in private schools, Il1 CONG. REc. 5567-72 (daily ed.
Mar. 24, 1965), with the unequivocal statement of former Commissioner of Education Keppel
that public school districts could provide educational specialists to enter nonpublic schools to
offer their services to the children of low-income families, House Hearings on ESEA, pt. 1, at
153.
246 Senator Dominick's proposed amendment would have also specifically prohibited the
construction of facilities in any sectarian institution. S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), republished in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1446, 1481.
247 See notes 216-19 and accompanying text supra.
248 While strongly opposing any aid to parochial school children, Pfeffer, Federal Funds for
Parochial Schools? No. 37 NoTE DAME LAWYER 309 (1962), the General Counsel of The
American Jewish Congress made the following statement: "To the extent that shared time
involving parochial school children is constitutional, it is because it is a benefit given to the
children as children and not as students in the parochial school or as any aspect of the
parochial school system." Shared Time Hearings 381. See the views expressed by public school
administrators and religious leaders of the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant religions in a
symposium on shared time. Shared Time Hearings 590.
249 79 Stat. 41 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 843(b)(3) (Supp. 1965).
250 See text accompanying note 227 supra.
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schools." 1 Others involve the enrollment of students in sectarian institutions
only for courses in religion and other so-called "value-content" 2 52 subjects. The
rest of the day the students attend public schools in their area. While the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of voluntary released time programs
when the religious instructions are offered on a location other than public
school premises,2 5 the validity of shared time arrangements has not yet been
fully considered by the courts.254 The latter have been conducted on an experi-
mental basis by only a few school districts.255 Implementation of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, however, will undoubtedly engender greater
experimentation with such projects.
d. Tax Credits
Those who criticize shared time proposals as failing to provide for a truly
integrated education and who advocate equal educational benefits for all chil-
dren are more strongly than ever seeking legislation that will provide tax credits
for parents who send their children to nonpublic schools.256 The best-known
of these proposals, originally introduced by Senator Ribicoff of Connecti-
cut,25 has been defeated twice by very narrow margins. 5 This measure
would have permitted a direct tax credit up to a maximum of $325 to
persons paying tuition fees, and other expenses of college students.255 Other
proposals are far more revolutionary, calling for similar tax credits for parents
of children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.28 0 While it
is apparent that there is considerable support for such legislation, past failures
provide little hope for its passage in the near future.
e. Conclusion
The traditional obstacle confronting any proposal to provide assistance to
pupils of sectarian schools, or to the schools themselves, is the establishment
clause of the first amendment. Admittedly, any assistance to children attending
parochial schools provides some aid to the sectarian institutions operating the
251 Shared Time Hearings 322.
252 Most typically, these subjects include social studies, literature, art, and music.
253 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948), the Court held that the first amendment prohibited a board of education from
permitting religious teachers to hold classes in public school buildings on a released time basis.
254 In Morton v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2465 (Ill. App. Mar. 1, 1966),
the court upheld a shared time program allowing parochial school children to take all
their courses in public schools except English, social studies, music, and art. The court
found that the plan violated neither the establishment clause of the first amendment nor
the compulsory school attendance laws of Illinois.
255 As of February, 1964, only 3.8% of 7,410 responding school district superintendents
indicated that they offered some type of shared time program for parochial school children.
Shared Time Hearings 323.
256 See Educational Freedom, Spring 1965; BLUM, op. cit. supra note 206, at 202-03.
257 110 CONG. REC. 1699 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1964).
258 The Senate first rejected Senator Ribicoff's bill by a vote of 48 to 45. 110 CONG.
RIc. 1758 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1964). It was again defeated 47 to 37 earlier this year. 112
CONG. REC. at 5242 (daily ed. March 9, 1966). For an indication of continued support for
Senator Ribicoff's determination to secure such legislation, see the Hartford Times editorial
reprint. Id. at 5280 (daily ed. March 10, 1966).
259 For a detailed discussion of the plan, see 110 CONG. Rlc. at 1699-1709 (daily ed. Feb.
3, 1964).
260 E.g., H.R. Res. 6360, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See generally Educational Freedom,
supra note 256.
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schools. That is, to the extent that it encourages more parents to enroll their
children in such schools, assistance to parochial school children can be said to
be an advancement of religion. Whether bestowing benefits so circuitously con-
stitutes an establishment of religion within the meaning of the first amendment
is highly questionable. Nevertheless, that such aid, no matter how indirect, cannot
be tolerated under the establishment clause as interpreted in School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp26 ' has been suggested.262 However, it must be remem-
bered that the prohibition of the first amendment is twofold, and in Sherbert v.
Verner.. the Supreme Court held that public welfare benefits may not be denied
because of a person's religion or lack of it without violating the free exercise
clause.264 Not only does the exclusion of school children from the benefits of wel-
fare legislation because of their enrollment in religious schools contravene the
holding in Sherbert,26 5 to the extent that legislation enhances the attractiveness
of public schools and correspondingly detracts from the practicability of attending
parochial schools, it also imposes a financial burden, insuperable for some,266 on
the acknowledged right of parents and children to select the school of their choice,
free from the dictates of the State.26 This choice more clearly emerges as a con-
261 See notes 168-71 and accompanying text supra.
262 See the resolution of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) which contained
the following statement:
That in the interest of preserving the integrity of the public school system free
from religious or church control and preserving the rights of private schools to be
free from the control of the state, the National Association of Evangelicals strongly
opposes Federal aid to private elementary and secondary schools whether it is given
directly to the institution in the form of categorical aid to improve its facilities or
for the benefit of individuals for specific needs. [Emphasis added.]
Hearings on S. 370 Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2576 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on ESEA]. Also see the statement by the director of the Washington office of the
American Civil Liberties Union, Id. at 2893.
263 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
264 Id. at 410. The Court stated the following:
This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a half ago
[Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1964)], namely, that no State may
"exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists,
Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
265 Id. at 404. "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions [for the purposes of this discussion,
attendance at public schools] upon a benefit or privilege."
266 That this financial burden has inhibited the freedom of parents to send their children
to parochial schools is demonstrated by the recent closings of lower grades by some Catholic
school systems. In the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, dropping only the first grade shunted 10,000
pupils into the public schools. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1964, p. 1, col. 1. A more dramatic
illustration is the increasing decline in the enrollment in private colleges and universities. In
1950 approximately 50% of American college students attended private institutions. That
number has been reduced to 40% of the total and by 1985 is predicted to fall to 20% of all
college students. Canavan, Implications of the School Prayer and Bible Reading Decisions:
The Welfare State, 13 J. PUB. L. 439, 446 (1964).
267 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), in which the United
States Supreme Court held invalid an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public
schools. The law was found to be an unconsitutional abridgment of "the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." The
Ecumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church issued a "Decree on Education" that
included the following statement:
Its [civil society's] function is to promote the education of youth in many ways,
namely: to protect the duties and rights of parents and others who share in education
and to give them aid; according to the principle of subsidiarity, when the endeavors
of parents and other societies are lacking, to carry out the work of education in
accordance with the wishes of the parents. ... Parents who have the primary and
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stitutional right when it is considered that in some cases it is compelled not merely
by a deep religious conviction, but by a strict religious obligation as well.26
Moreover, to the extent that public schools are commanded to offer a secular
education only, totally devoid of theistic content, governmentally established
incentives to attend such institutions arguably constitute an establishment of
secularism, also in violation of the first amendment. 69 Thus, while indiscrim-
inately providing welfare benefits to all school children concededly inures to the
benefit of parochial institutions indirectly, refusing such assistance not only
inhibits the exercise of religious freedom by those possessing a fixed religious belief,
it also constitutes an establishment of secularism. The only escape from this
dilemma necessitates a balancing of the prohibitions of the establishment clause
with the guarantees of the free exercise clause. The former lacks a meaningful
purpose if it is not to buttress the latter. What other reason can there be for
proscribing an establishment of religion if it is not to guarantee religious freedom?
It is submitted, therefore, that governmental aid to nonpublic school children is
essential if the religious freedom of millions of school children is to be preserved
and if the establishment of secularism as a state supported religion is to be avoided.
III. FREE EXERCISE
A. Public Health, Safety and Welfare
The legitimacy of state action to protect the general health and welfare
of the citizenry has long been recognized. " ' To the extent that a compelling state
interest has been involved, governmental actions which admittedly interfere with
religious convictions have traditionally been upheld. One author has stated:
In this area of vital public interest there are to be found many illustrations
of the proposition that freedom of religion is not absolute, and that at some
point even though the act arises from religious principle or is regarded as a
religious right or duty, its religious character does not automatically put it
beyond control by the state.2"'
Hence, the critical issue to be discussed is: "to what extent does the guarantee
of the free exercise of religion require deference to religiously motivated ac-
inalienable right and duty to educate their children must enjoy true liberty in their
choice of schools. Consequently, the public power... must see to it... that public
subsidies are paid out in such a way that parents are truly free to choose according
to their conscience the schools they want for their children.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1965, p. 23, col 1.
268 CANONS 1372-74 of the Roman Catholic Church place Catholic parents under a "very
grave obligation" to procure a religious and moral education for their children and forbid them
to be sent to anti-Catholic or neutral schools except under unusual circumstances and ac-
companied by certain safeguards. Cortez, Religious Liberty-The Rights of Parents in the
Education of Their Children, 11 CATH. LAW. 285, 294 (1965).
269 See notes 168-71 and accompanying text supra.
270 ANTIEAU, CAROLL & BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONsTurioNs 65 '(1965).
See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FmEDOm 572-603 (1953).
271 FELLMAN, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 18 (1965). In Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), Mr. Justice Roberts stated: "Thus the [First] Amendment
embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society."
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tion?" '2 72 That a given religious practice is not merely desirable but obligatory
has not deterred state intervention once it has been determined that the public
interest necessitates regulation. One of the earliest of the landmark cases which
have upheld limitations on the free exercise of religion, Reynolds v. United
States,2 7 sustained the constitutionality of an act of Congress which, as applied
to Mormons, rendered their religiously constrained practice of polygamy illegal.
While taking cognizance of the Jeffersonian concept of a "wall of separation
between church and state," Mr. Chief Justice Waite stated: "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." '274
The passage of time since Reynolds has witnessed innumerable instances where
the religious scruples of some have been compelled to yield to the interest of pre-
serving public health, safety, welfare and morality. The scope of this section,
then, will be confined to a consideration of those cases reported since the last
Survey in which the courts have engaged in the delicate task of balancing legiti-
mate state regulation with the demands of the first amendment.
2 75
1. Vaccination
In Wright v. De Witt School Dist. No. I,"6 the appellants sought to enjoin
the enforcement of a state health regulation which required all students to be
vaccinated against smallpox as a prerequisite to attending school. It was con-
tended that compulsory vaccination contravened appellants' freedom of religion
and that an interference with their religious liberties could only be sustained
upon a showing that a situation of imminent danger existed. The Supreme Court
of Arkansas, citing the landmark decision in Prince v. Massachusetts,"' upheld
the regulation as a "valid exercise of the police power of the state."27 In Prince,
the Supreme Court sustained a Massachusetts child labor law over the objection
that it impinged upon the religious liberties of the appellants. The Court stated:
And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limita-
tion. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state
as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school at-
tendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other
ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.
272 TUSSMAN, SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE XXiV (1962). It is to be noted
that all of the states have constitutional provisions providing guarantees of freedom of religion.
Many are similar to the provision in the federal constitution; some expressly limit free exercise.
ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURXE, op. cit. supra note 270, at 66.
273 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
274 Id. at 164.
275 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. * . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
276 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965).
277 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
278 385 S.W.2d at 646. Appellants attempted to analogize their situation to those involved
in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the Court "accommodated" the religious beliefs of the appellants
after balancing the interest of the state and the religious liberties infringed upon. Wright v.
De Witt School Dist. No. 1, 385 S.W.2d at 648. Another recent decision, which upheld the
school board's authority to compel immunization, is State ex rel. Mack v. Board of Educ., 1
Ohio App.2d 143, 204 N.E.2d 86 (1963).
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Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child
more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.27 9
In another recent Arkansas decision,80 the authority of the courts to give a
court appointed guardian custody of children whose parents objected to their
being vaccinated was challenged on religious grounds. Specifically, the appel-
lants claimed that the Constitution of Arkansas"8' exempted them from the law.
The court held that this provision was not to be construed to mean that one
may "engage in religious practices inconsistent with the peace, safety and health
of the inhabitants of the State" or "that parents, on religious grounds, have the
right to deny their children an education. '282
A minister of the Miracle Revival Fellowship was convicted in State v.
Miday82 of failure to vaccinate his child and of failure to send him to school.
He contended that his religious beliefs qualified him for an exemption provided
in the State statute.2 4 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in reversing the
conviction and ordering a new trial, held: "[I]t is not necessary for a religious
organization to forbid vaccination in order for its teachings to come within the
meaning of the statute and to authorize the exclusion sought .... ,2 s5 In addition,
the court stated that it was for the jury to determine whether the evidence with
respect to the teachings of the Miracle Revival Fellowship justified the de-
fendant's position against vaccination.
It is submitted that the court erred in its latter conclusion. That the function
of the jury should be limited to a determination of the sincerity of the alleged
beliefs and should not extend to a consideration of dogma or to the truth or
falsity of religious doctrines has long been recognized.28 " To propose that the jury
consider the teaching of a given religion is to suggest that the views of twelve
men concerning the dogma at issue be pitted against the interpretation that a
member of a particular faith attaches to the doctrines of his religion. This result
clearly contravenes the "spirit" underlying the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard..7 and United States v. Seeger.8 s
279 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), where
the constitutionality of a statute prescribing the authority of communities to compel the vac-
cination of residents against smallpox was upheld. Although the statute was not attacked on
religious grounds, the Court, in Prince, cited Jacobson for the proposition that one may not
impose religious grounds to justify a refusal to submit to compulsory vaccination.
280 Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
281 ARx.' CoNsr. art. I, § 24:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be compelled to attend,
erect or support any place of worship; or to maintain any ministry against his consent.
No human authority can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere
with the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any
religious establishment, denomination or mode of worship above any other.
282 377 S.W.2d at 819.
283 263 N.C. 747, 140 S.E.2d 325 (1965).
284 140 S.E.2d at 326.
285 Id. at 328.
286 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 '(1944); Fellman, op. cit. supra note 271, at
25-29.
287 "Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right
to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views." United
States v. Ballard, .supra note 286, at 87.
288 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 1963-64 Church-State Surmey, supra note 1, at 483-85.
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In Kolbreck v. Kramer,2 89 plaintiff sought to compel Rutgers University
to classify him within the scope of a statutory exemption from vaccination re-
quirements. In ordering the State University to admit the plaintiff despite his
refusal to be vaccinated or subjected to other medical tests, the court held that
the state or an instrumentality thereof could not deny plaintiff an exemption on
the grounds that he was not a member of a recognized religious group.29 It
may also be argued that once a state has granted an exemption founded on reli-
gious convictions, the rationale of Seeger should compel the same result.
2. Blood Transfusions
The proposition that parents cannot exercise the power of life or death over
their children was upheld in Application of Brooklyn Hospital291 where the court
authorized transfusions of blood to treat a seriously burned five-year-old child.
The religious objections of the parents were superseded by the court's application
of the common law doctrine of parens patriae. "In this context, the Court has
paramount rights to decide what is best for the infant even over that of the
natural parents." '  Thus, the typical attitude of the courts with respect to the
administration of necessary medical care for children has reflected the oft-quoted
statement of Mr. Justice Rutledge: "Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and
legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 29 3
State authority over the activities of children has been, for the most part,
considerably broader than the control exercised over adults in analogous situa-
tions.29 4 It is submitted that the compelling state interest in the health and safety
of children should not be extended to require an adult to submit to an invol-
untary transfusion of blood.
Thus far, the recent cases surveyed have involved restrictions on the reli-
gious freedom of those persons entrusted with responsibility for the lives and
health of others. The determination of whether the state may constitutionally
exercise authority to restrain an individual's right to religious liberty in order to
protect that person's life or health presents a significantly different question.
Prior to 1962, litigation involving compulsory blood transfusions had been
confined to those cases in which parents had objected to medical treatment
rendered to their children. 9 5 However, in Erickson v. Dilgard,"' the superin-
289 84 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d 889 (Super. Ct. L. 1964), judgment modified and pre-
served for declaratory value to plaintiff, 46 N.J. 46, 214 A.2d 408 (1965).
290 202 A.2d at 893.
291 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Accord, State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
292 258 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
293 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
294 See Pfeffer, op. cit. supra note 270, at 578-80; Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions By
Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATHOLIc LAW. 212, 220 (1964); 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 342, 345-46
(1963.)
295 No "primary" authority dealing with whether or not it is an unconstitutional interference
with freedom of religion to compel an adult to accept blood transfusions over his religious
objections was discovered. The prevailing attitude was commensurate with a statement by
Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914):
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
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tendent of a hospital to which the patient had been voluntarily admitted applied
for a court order authorizing the administration of a blood transfusion to this
adult. The patient had refused to authorize an operation during which blood
would be administered, notwithstanding his awareness that the chances of success
without a transfusion were minimal. The court, knowing of "no precedent relat-
ing to adult patients,.2 7 denied the application in which it was argued that the
patient's refusal to accept blood could be equated to the taking of his own life.
The genesis of the state's prerogative to compel such transfusions is the
order of Judge J. Skelley Wright of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, Inc." " The decision, which many consider to have grave implications, has
inspired much commentary.299 Since Georgetown, three other decisions in which
similar questions of law and fact were presented have been reported."' 0 The
religious objection to blood transfusions was proffered in each of these recent
cases by Jehovah's Witnesses, who interpret certain passages of the Holy Bible
to obligate them to "abstain from blood." ''
The hospital's application in Georgetown sought a decree "in the nature
of an injunction and declaratory judgment" ' 2 on the grounds that the patient,
a 25-year-old mother of an infant son, in extremis, required immediate blood
transfusions to save her life. After conferring with the patient, her husband, and
physicians at the hospital, Judge Wright signed the order and the transfusion
was administered. To justify judicial intervention, the court analogized the
patient's condition to that of a "sick child"; accordingly it was argued that her
being in extremis and "hardly compos mentis" rendered her unable to decide
done with his own body...."
296 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
297 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
298 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing en bane denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 377
U.S 978 (1964).
299 E.g., Milhollin, The Refused Blood Transfusion: An Ultimate Challenge for Law and
Morals, 10 NATURAL L.F. 202 (1965); Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Med-
ical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. RBv. 860 (1965); Note, 9 UTAH L. Rav. 161 (1964); 10
CATHOLIC LAW. 260 (1964); 13 CATHOLIC U.L. Rav. 188 (1964); 77 HARv. L. RaV. 1539
(1964); 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 126 (1964); 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 399 (1965); N.Y. Times,
June 16, 1964, p. 33, col. 1.
300 United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, No. 30014, 2d
Cir., Oct. 5, 1965, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 IU.2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
301 WATCH ToWER BmLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF PA., BLOOD, MEDICINE AND THE LAW OF
GOD 5-8 (1961) specifies the following biblical passages:
Acts of the Apostles 15:28,29: "For the holy spirit and we ourselves have favored
adding no further burden to you, except these necessary things, to keep yourselves free
from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from
fornication. If you carefully keep yourselves from these things, you will prosper."
Leviticus 17:10: "As for any man of the house of Israel or some alien resident
who is residing as an alien in your midst who eats any sort of blood, I shall certainly
set my face against the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed cut him
off from among his people."
Genesis 9:3,4- "Only flesh with its soul-its blood-you must not eat."
Deuteronomy 12:23: "The blood is the soul."
See How, Religion, Medicine and Law, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 367-70 (1960).
302 331 F.2d 1000, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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for herself... 3 The state's concern, as parens patriae, also provided a second basis
for ordering the transfusion. Namely, the state has an interest in preserving the
life of the mother; to act otherwise would be to condone the abandonment
of a child.
In further support of the order, the refusal of lifesaving medical assistance
was likened to suicide. "Only quibbles about the distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance, or the specific intent necessary to be guilty of attempted suicide,
could be raised against this latter conclusion."3 °4 An additional consideration was
the possible liability of the hospital and doctors if they had failed to provide the
patient with proper treatment. The efficacy of the offered release, in these cir-
cumstances, was placed in serious doubt. To conclude, Judge Wright expressed
humanitarian concern and respect for the sanctity of life, stating:
The final, and compelling, reason for granting the emergency writ was that a
life hung in the balance. There was no time for research and reflection.
Death could have mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action were
not taken to preserve the status quo. To refuse to act, only to find later
that the law required action, was a risk I was unwilling to accept. I deter-
mined to act on the side of life.30
The decision in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Ander-
son, 3" authorizing "blood transfusions . .. if necessary to save her life or the
life of her child, as the physician in charge at the time may determine"3 7 was
handed down a short time after the petition for certiorari had been denied in
Georgetown."°8 The attending physicians, having diagnosed the complications
accompanying the patient's pregnancy, suggested the probable necessity of blood
transfusions to protect the lives of the mother and her unborn child. The fact
situation afforded the New Jersey Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify the
holding in Georgetown. The patient in Anderson was neither in extremis nor
non compos mentis; it appeared probable that the court would address itself
to the germinal issue of whether an adult may be compelled to submit to a
blood transfusion to save her own life. However, the court, having "no difficulty
in so deciding with respect to the infant child," found it unnecessary to answer
the "more difficult question" because "the welfare of the child and the mother
are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to
distinguish between them. .. .09 Serious doubts remain with respect to the
303 Id. at 1008. One author has suggested that it was not necessary for Judge Wright to
rely on the children's cases to justify compulsory treatment of a person non compos mentis.
Note, 9 UTAH L. REV. 161, 169 (1964).
304 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Life-
saving Medical Treatment, supra note 299, at 869. Contra, Ford, supra note 299, at 225;
Note, 9 UTAH L. REV. 161, 167 (1964).
305 331 F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
306 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). Anderson received
widespread newspaper coverage. The daily coverage of the New York Times is illustrative.
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1964, p. 1, col. 3; id., June 19, 1964, p. 33, col. 7; id., June 20, 1964,
p. 26, col. 2; id., June 26, 1964, p. 31, col. 1.
307 201 A.2d at 538.
308 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
309 201 A.2d at 538.
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court's success in attempting to avoid the "more difficult question." 1 ' If the
decision is interpreted as limiting the authority to compel blood transfusions
to those instances where necessary to preserve the life of the child, Anderson
can be classified as an extension of the state's parens patriae authority to protect
the health and welfare of children. However, if Anderson is construed to support
the legality of a transfusion to the mother after the child was born, the court, in
effect, has answered the "more difficult question" and has extended the applica-
tion of Georgetown.
In United States v. George,3 ' a case very similar on its facts to Georgetown,
the court added a factor to those which Judge Wright had considered. Judge
Zampano suggested that in deciding whether an order should issue, the "doctor's
conscience and professional oath" must be "added to the scale." ' 2 It is sub-
mitted that legal authority will not support the subordination of a patient's
religious beliefs to the conscience of his physician. 3 It was unnecessary to
further confuse the rationale of Georgetown to "justify" the transfusions in
George.
The Supreme Court of Illinois refused to extend the holding in George-
town to the authorization of transfusions to a competent adult, without minor
children, who had steadfastly asserted her religious objections. 4 The opinion
suggests that In re Brooks' Estate is "readily distinguishable" from George-
town."' It appears that the emphasis Brooks' placed on the fact that the patient
was neither in extremis nor the mother of minor children, in distinguishing the
case from Georgetown, was unwarranted by the weight assigned to those factors
in Judge Wright's opinion. The decision in Brooks', specifically restricted by the
court to the fact situation in issue, stated that no "overt or affirmative act" of
the appellant presented any "clear and present danger to society" which would
justify state "conduct offensive to appellant's religious principles."3 6
Any attempt to reconcile the decision in Brooks' with the three cases
upholding compulsory transfusions must consider the precious time factor in-
volved. To emphasize the distinctions in the abstract is to lose sight of the fact
that "lives hung in the balance" in each of the cases in which the transfusion
was ordered. In contrast, the relief sought in Brooks' was the expungement
310 It is to be noted that one pint of blood was administered to Mrs. Anderson after the
baby was born. This fact is certified in a letter from Mr. Eugene Landy, plaintiff's counsel,
on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer. For a detailed discussion of Raleigh Fitkin, see 40 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 126 (1964).
311 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, No. 30014, 2d Cir., Oct. 5, 1965, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966).
312 239 F. Supp. at 754. The opinion does not indicate the extent to which the Georgetown
rationale has been adopted.
313 Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Ford, supra
note 299, at 215-16; 34 GEo. WASir. L. Rnv. 159, 165-66 (1965). See generally How, supra
note 301, at 413-18.
314 In re Brooks' Estate, 32 IU.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 '(1965).
315 205 N.E.2d at 440.
316 Id. at 442. One author has suggested that Brooks is "constitutionally correct." 64 Mxci.
L. REv. 554 (1966). Another has stated: "If the mother of several children is to be saved,
then so must the childless individual." Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical
Treatment, supra note 299, at 872. It is questionable whether the "clear and present danger"
test should be the guiding principle in these freedom of religion cases. Compare 44 TEXAs L.
REV. 190, 191-93 (1965) with Milhollin, supra note 299. at 206.
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of the orders which had been levied in the conservatorship proceedings below
to effect the transfusion.
17
The opinions in Georgetown, Anderson and George clearly indicate that
the criteria set forth in these "radical departures from established doctrine""1 8
do not afford sufficient objectivity to define their limits as precedent. The
present state of the law suggests that the Jehovah's Witness who wishes to enter
a hospital or submit to medical care is met with a serious dilemma. If he fears
that his religious objections to the transfusion of blood will not be respected by
the hospital and the courts, it would seem that his only alternative, other than
violating his conscience, would be to refrain from voluntarily admitting himself
to a hospital
3 1 9
It is submitted that the decisions upholding a right in the state to compel
blood transfusions, notwithstanding the sincere religious objections of the patient,
are inconsistent with the spirit of "accommodation" which has pervaded the
thinking of the Supreme Court in recent years."' To require an individual to
submit to treatment which he considers a grave violation of his moral duties
is authority which the state should be most reluctant to assume, absent a clearly
compelled countervailing state interest. 2' The ultimate issue requiring resolution
is:
[W]hether one man, or even a group of men acting through a court, are
capable of deciding for another whether it is better to die at once and pos-
sibly go to heaven or to live a few additional years in what for the latter
is surely moral oblivion. To answer this in the affirmative is to say for cer-
tain mortal life is such that an individual cannot through moral conscience
rise above it.322
3. Religious Peculiarities - Miscellany
a. Peyote-Worshippers, Sabbatarians, and Black Muslims.
The delicate process of balancing the state's interest in the health, safety
and welfare of the populace and the rights of individuals to practice their reli-
gion freely was apparent in two recent California decisions concerned with the
practice of peyote worship. 2 3  Neither of these cases involved federal or state
317 34 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 159, 166 (1965) ; 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 126, 129 (1964).
318 40 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 126, 130 (1964). The casenote discusses Georgetown and
Anderson. It appears reasonable to classify George in the same category.
319 Jehovah's Witnesses do not reject surgery and other conventional medical treatment.
Their objections are limited to the use of blood. Hence, their beliefs are radically different
from groups commonly known as "faith healers" who reject all medical assistance. How, supra
note 301, at 367.
320 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) stating:
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe
to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal atti-
tudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here,
the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
321 See, Milhollin, supra note 299, at 211-14.
322 Id. at 214.
323 People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); In re Grady, 394 P.2d 728,
39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). Peyote is an intoxicating ingredient derived from a small, spine-
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interference with Indian tribal regulations; hence, they are not analytically
comparable to Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal
Council324 or Oliver v. Udall.5
In People v. Woody, 2 ' the Supreme Court of California reversed defen-
dants' convictions of illegal possession of peyote and held that the statute pro-
scribing the use of peyote could not be constitutionally applied to its use by
an Indian tribe as a sacramental symbol." 7 The defendants, a group of Navajos
who belonged to the Native American Church of -California, had been appre-
hended while performing a religions ceremony. The court found that the statu-
tory prohibition of peyote would result in virtually a total frustration of the
defendants' religion. "To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological
heart of Peyotism.""2 ' It is submitted that the court, in applying the balancing
test of Sherbert v. Verner,2 ' correctly decided in favor of accommodation.
On the basis of Woody, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus to the
defendants in In re Grady"' who were convicted of unlawful possession of
peyote. The cause was remanded, however, on the ground that it was not clear
whether defendants were, in good faith, using peyote in the practice of religion.3 3"
In situations involving different facts, limitations on asserted religious free-
dom were upheld in Andrews v. O'Grady..2 and Mohammad v. Sommers"'5
for the reason that the action taken by the municipality or instrumentality
thereof, in each instance, was necessary to implement a legitimate state interest.
In Andrews, the petitioner, a Seventh Day Adventist, sought an order directing
the chairman of the Transit Authority of New York City to reinstate his employ-
ment, alleging that his dismissal for refusing work assignments on his Sabbath
violated his constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion and the equal
protection of the law. The court sustained the validity of the seniority rules
with which he had refused to comply, stating: "These time-honored rules are
... most essential to the efficient and safe operation of the City transportation
less cactus, found in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and Northern Mexico, which plays
a central role in the ceremonies of many Indian tribes. The use of peyote produces halucina-
tory effects in differing degrees depending upon the user. People v. Woody, supra at 816-17.
324 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). See 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at
649, 715. It has been suggested that the decision in Native American Church posed a paradox
"where American citizens were not merely deprived of constitutional rights, but were held not
to have any such rights." Note, The Constitutional Rights of The American Tribal Indian, 51
VA. L. REv. 121, 137 (1965).
325 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
326 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
327 "We have concluded that since defendants used the peyote in a bona fide pursuit of a
religious faith, and since the practice does not frustrate a compelling interest of the state, the
application of the statute improperly defeated the immunity of the First Amendment
394 P.2d at 815.
328 Id. at 818. "Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine
in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an
object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost."
Id. at 817.
329 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See generally 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note, 1, at
479-81.
330 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
331 "As we said in Woody, 'the trier of fact need inquire only into the question of whether
the defendants' belief in Peyotism is honest and in good faith . . . or whether he seeks to
wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities.'" 394 P.2d at 729.
332 44 Misc. 2d 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
333 238 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
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system." ' 4 Conceding that the rules necessitated the petitioner to choose between
adherence to his faith and continued employment as a surface line operator, the
opinion concluded that the choice imposed upon him did not result in a denial
of free exercise. It is submitted that the lack of reasonable alternatives in
Andrews justifies a conclusion different from that in Sherbert.
Mohammad v. Sommers, an action for damages brought by the leader of
the Black Muslim movement, presents a rather clear case of one seeking "to
wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak." 3 5 Petitioner unsuc-
cessfully argued that police officers' refusal to disarm when present at a meeting
of "The Nation of Islam," whose tenets forbid holding meetings where weapons
are present, constituted grounds for relief. That public policy necessitates police
protection at gatherings which had, in the past, resulted in disorder and breaches
of the peace hardly seems questionable. 36
b. The Amish School Controversy.
The right of the state to enact legislation providing for compulsory school
attendance and prescribing minimum standards of education has long been
recognized.33 Although there have been numerous occasions where these laws
have been assailed on the grounds that they were violative of religious free-
dom,33 it has been concluded "that religion is seldom any defense to a failure
to comply with the education laws." ' 9
Members of the Amish religion have often been involved in litigation ques-
tioning the validity of education laws. At present, a controversy between Amish
farmers and local school authorities in Iowa is now in its fourth year. The
dispute, which has been the subject of widespread publicity,34 9 arose as a result
of the refusal of Amish parents to remove their children from non-accredited pri-
vate schools and send them to public schools. Religious opposition has stemmed
from the "worldliness" of urban schools and state-certified instructors.
Both the Governor and the Attorney General of Iowa have sympathized
with the plight of this minority sect, the latter stating that school authorities were
making "a very serious mistake in trying to force the Amish children into
public schools, which the Amish people consider worldly." '34 1 It is submitted
that whatever "danger" to society could possibly result from allowing the Amish
to preserve their way of life is minimal in comparison with the resulting setback
to cultural pluralism if public school attendance is compelled.
B. Test Oaths - Torcaso Revisited
The pervasiveness of the Supreme Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins.42
334 252 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
335 People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
336 Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Epley, 116 Ohio App. 245, 185 N.E.2d 483 (1962).
337 ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60-61
(1965).
338 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOm 594-97 (1953); 1960-62 Church-State
Survey, supra note 1, at 711-12.
339 ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, Op. cit. supra note 337, at 62.
340 E.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1965, p. 41, col. 2; id., Nov. 28, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; id., Dec.
1, 1965, p. 30, col. 4; id., Dec. 18, 1965, p. 24, col. 5; id., Dec. 21, 1965, p. 30, col. 4.
341 Id., Nov. 23, 1965, p. 41, col. 2.
342 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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has recently manifested itself in what Maryland Attorney General, Thomas B.
Finan, has called "the gravest crisis in the administration of criminal law in my
experience." '43 That Justice Black's "free wheeling definition ' '44 of religion,
accompanied by the interpretation given to the religious protection embodied
in the first amendment, would have widespread ramifications was recognized
soon after Torcaso was reported. 4 5
Torcaso held that Article 37 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 4"
which requires a candidate for public office to declare his belief in the existence
of God, unconstitutionally abridged the freedom of religion of one who was
denied his commission to the office of notary public because of his refusal to
so declare. In language approximating that which appeared in Everson v. Board
of Educ,347 the Court stated that neither the state nor the federal govern-
ment can "constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all reli-
gions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs."34 The fact that Roy Torcaso, an avowed atheist, was afforded con-
stitutional protection signified that thenceforth non-believers were within the
ambit of the first amendment. 4
The Torcaso rationale was the basis of the decision of the Maryland Court
of Appeals in Schowgurow v. State"'0 which precipitated the "crisis" that
"brought to a halt every current criminal case in the entire state." ' The court
reversed the first degree murder conviction of a Buddhist on the grounds that
the method of selecting the grand jury which indicated him and the petit jury
which convicted him was unconstitutional. Article 36 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights reads in part:
ior shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent
as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he
believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such
person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or
punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come.3 52 [Emphasis
added.]
The appellant, noting a footnote to the Torcaso opinion, 53 argued that the
343 Time, December 10, 1965, p. 67; U.S. News & World Report, October 25, 1965, p. 6.
344 Saladin, Relative Ranking of the Preferred Freedoms: Religion and Speech, in 1964
RmELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 163.
345 See Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and State, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 9 (1961);
1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 704-08.
346 "That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office
of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of
God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath
prescribed by this Constitution."
MD. CONST. art. 37.
347 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
348 367 U.S. at 495.
349 See Pfeffer, op. cit. supra note 345, at 30-33; Note, 1962 DUKE L.272.
350 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
351 Time, supra note 342.
352 MD. CoNsT. art. 36.
353 213 A.2d at 478 n.l. The Torcaso footnote states: "Among religions in this country
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." 367 U.S. at 495 n.1l.
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provision deprived him of due process and equal protection of the laws since
it is well established that the Buddhist religion does not teach a belief in God
or a Supreme Being.' The court, after taking judicial notice of the widespread
exclusion of jurors who did not state a belief in God, held that Torcaso compelled
the invalidation of the "existence of God" provision of Article 36."' Defendant's
position was analogized to that of a defendant who is tried by a jury from
which members of his race have been systematically excluded. The court stated:
"The class excluded by our Constitution is not limited to Buddhists. It includes
not only the various religious groups set forth in Torcaso, . . . whose members
do not believe in God, but also all atheists and agnostics.""' Since the system
of jury selection was discriminatory on its face, the defendant was not required
to show prejudice. "[I]t is the danger of abuse resulting from the method of
selection which renders it unconstitutional.""'
Several recent decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland have delimited
the Schowgurow holding. In State v. Madison,"5 a member of the Apostolic
faith who believed in the existence of a Supreme Being moved to dismiss an
indictment returned against him. The state contended that the defendant had
no standing to question the validity of the grand jury which indicted him, since
he was not a member of the class prejudiced by the unconstitutionality of Article
36. The court, dismissing the indictment, held: "Where, as here the uncon-
stitutional discrimination is an integral part of the governing law,""' defendant's
right to object required no more than a showing that he was indicted by the
invalid grand jury. It is submitted that the extension of Schowgurow to a
defendant who admittedly believes in the existence of God, though technically
consistent with the "unconstitutional on its face" line of reasoning, is not com-
pelled by the Torcaso rationale.
Excepting those convictions which had not become final prior to the
decision, Schowgurow held that the "proper administration of justice" required
that the holding only be prospectively applied.' The non-retroactivity of
Schowgurow was upheld by the Court of Appeals in Husk v. Warden,'.. Mary-
land Penitentiary and Hamm v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.6 ' In both
cases, post-conviction relief was denied to petitioners whose convictions had
become final prior to the rendition of the Schowgurow decision. However, in
Hays v. State,'6 ' the court enabled defendants to benefit from Schowgurow,
permitting them to challenge their pre-Schowgurow indictment and conviction
354 213 A.2d at 478; Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-8.
355 "If, as was held by the Supreme Court in Torcaso, a notary public cannot con-
stitutionally be required to demonstrate his belief in God as a condition to taking
office, it follows inevitably that the requirement is invalid as to grand and petit
jurors, whose responsibilities to the public and to the persons with whom they deal are
far greater."
Id. at 479.
356 Id. at 481.
357 Id. at 482.
358 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965).
359 213 A.2d at 882.
360 213 A.2d at 482.
361 240 Md. 353, 214 A.2d 139 '(1965).
362 240 Md. 725, 214 A.2d 141 (1965).
363 240 Md. 482, 214 A.2d 573 (1965).
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via timely appeals. In Smith v. State,364 the conviction of the defendant, who
contended that all indictments returned by unconstitutionally selected grand
juries were null and void, was affirmed. The court responded: "There is noth-
ing in our decisions in Schowgurow and Madison, nor in their legal effect, upon
which to predicate so catastrophic a conclusion.""" In a recent federal habeas
corpus proceeding, the Maryland prisoner sought to attack the constitutionality
of the holding that Schowgurow would not be applied retroactively. "6 ' The
district court, citing the recent Supreme Court decision in Linkletter v. Walker,""
held that the principles enunciated in Schowgurow and Madison with respect
to retroactivity were not violative of the fourteenth amendment or any other
constitutional provision. s8
Schowgurow places in doubt the validity of nonjury trials before judges
who are required to declare a belief in God upon assuming office"8 Similarly,
the constitutionality of that provision of Article 36 which requires witnesses to
express a belief in God is also subject to serious question."" One author, though
aware that such a result is unlikely, has contended that Torcaso requires the
amendment of all statutes prescribing oaths which contain the phrase "so help
me God." ' Recently, a California Superior Court judge ordered this phrase
stricken from all oaths administered in his courtroom." 2 It is clear, then, that
the boundaries of the potential implications of Torcaso and Schowgurow have
yet to be determined.
C. Conscientious Objection
Considerable attention has been focused on the conscientious objector
provision of the Universal Military Training & Service Act373 in the two-
year period under study. To be sure, the record levels of peacetime draft calls
and the serious misgivings of many citizens with respect to the war in Vietnam
have heightened this interest. Concomitantly, the decision of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Seeger.7 4 has occasioned widespread commentary."
364 240 Md. 464, 214 A.2d 563 (1965).
365 214 A.2d at 565.
366 Smith v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1965).
367 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
368 248 F. Supp. at 449.
369 Time, supra note 342.
370 12 CATHOLic LAw, 74, 77 (1966).
371 PSEFFER, supra note 345, at 33. (Mr. Pfeffer was counsel for the appellant in Torcaso
v. Watkins).
372 South Bend Tribune, December 12, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
373 62 Stat. 612-13 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958): "Nothing
contained in this title
... shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service in the armed forces of the United States, who by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious
training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.... ." [Emphasis added.]
374 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See Annot., 13 L. Ed. 2d 733.
375 See, e.g., Clancy & Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems In Con-
ceptual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 MAINz L. Rnv. 143 (1965); Tietz, Deity
Belief: Necessity for Draft Status, 38 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 529 (1965); Note, The Conscientious
Objector Exemption: Still Unsettled, 33 GO. WASH. L. REv. 1108 (1965); 34 FORDHAu L.
Rev. 129 (1965) ; 18 VArND. L. Remv. 1564 (1965) ; For newspaper coverage of Seeger's beliefs,
see N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1964, p. 1, col. 7, p. 26, cols. 1-4; id., May 5, 1964, p. 26, cols. 3-7.
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Congressional solicitude for those who conscientiously object to the bearing
of arms can be traced back to the Civil War."' Though the standards qualify-
ing one for an exemption have varied considerably, statutory recognition of the
scruples of the conscientious objector has consistently accompanied draft enact-
ments since then."'
The ultimate question in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of
the claimant's beliefs."' The exemption from military service has been tradi-
tionally considered a matter of legislative grace,7 9 and the burden of establish-
ing a right thereto is upon the selective service registrant.8 ' The need for
equitable and efficient administration of classification procedures prompted Con-
gress to delegate a wide range of discretion to the Selective Service System.3 '
Judicial review of Appeal Board decisions has been extremely limited. One
court has referred to the scope of review in cases of this type as "the narrowest
known to the law."3 2 Absent a denial of procedural fairness, a decision of the
Appeal Board will be reversed "only if there is no basis in fact for the classifi-
cation which it gave the registrant." ' 3
For the most part, the adjudication of conscientious objectors' claims has
involved the procedural aspects of classification. 4 Several recently reported
cases typify the procedural problems with which the courts have been concerned.
In United States v. Biesiada,"5 the district court refused to review the 1-A
classification of a registrant who had been indicted for refusing to submit to
induction. Despite having alleged his conscientious objection, the defendant
had "failed to avail himself of the administrative remedies open to him to obtain
review of this classification." ' Similarly, in Woo v. United States,"'7 defendant
was denied judicial review where he had failed to request a personal appearance
or to comply with the other administrative remedies afforded registrants.8
"To hold otherwise would create a shambles of this area of selective service
classification." ' 9 Likewise, in United States v. Taylor,39 ° defendant was denied
376 For a discussion of the history of conscientious objector provisions, see Conklin, Con-
scientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252,
256-63 (1963); Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the
Current Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service, 13 J. PuB. L. 16, 25-38
(1964) ; Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States,
20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409, 412-29; Comment, Constitutionality of Requiring Belief In
Supreme Being for Draft Exemption as Conscientious Objector, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 938, 941-44
(1964). U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 15 1965, p. 12 answers many of the questions
frequently posed concerning conscientious objector classification.
377 Ibid.
378 See United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960);
Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927, rehearing
denied, 356 U.S. 964 (1958).
379 Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 915 (10th Cir. 1965); Keefer v. United States,
313 F.2d 773,776 (9th Cir. 1963).
380 Fleming v. United States, supra note 379, at 915.
381 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1946).
382 Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957).
383 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1946).
384 Donnici, supra note 376, at 28.
385 247 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
386 Id. at 602.
387 350 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1965).
388 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624, 1625, 1626 and 1627.
389 350 F.2d at 995.
390 351 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1965).
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the right to claim conscientious objector status after he had received notice of
induction.
The exemption granted to conscientious objectors who, "by reason of reli-
gious training and belief ... in a relation to a Supreme Being," are opposed
to participation in war is embodied in Section 456(j) of the Universal Mili-
tary Training & Service Act of 1948." 9' Until the Supreme Court's recent
interpretation of the "relation to a Supreme Being" requirement, serious doubts
as to the constitutionality of this statutory language had existed. 92 One author,
referring to this section as "the most flagrant of current governmental preferences
of religious, vis-a-vis secular, ideology," 9 ' concluded that the statutory scheme
effected an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
3 94
The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Seeger was predicated
upon the conflicting opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuits as to the consti-
tutionality of the congressional classification limiting military exemptions to
those who expressed a belief in a Supreme Being. 95 The Second Circuit, in
United States v. Seeger,39 held: "a requirement of belief in a Supreme Being,
no matter how broadly defined, cannot embrace all those faiths which can validly
claim to be called 'religious.' ""' Similarly, in United States v. Jakobson,95
Judge Friendly avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting "religion' "as
broadly as the words permit," '39 9 thereby classifying defendant's "total affirma-
tion of the basic blessedness of the fact of being' within the statutory exemp-
tion. The Ninth Circuit, however, in Peter v. United States,4"' adopted the
rationale of one of its earlier opinions0 2 that "no matter how pure and admirable
his standard may be ... [it] cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that
term as it is used in the statute."4 Hence, the stage was set for the Supreme
Court's resolution of the issue; Seeger, Jakobson and Peter were consolidated
for oral argument.1
4
391 Universal Military Training & Service Act § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13 (1948), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1958). See text quoted supra note 373.
392 See Donnici, supra note 376, at 32-38.
393 Id. at 44.
394 Ibid.
395 Compare Donnici, supra note 376 with Conklin, supra note 376.
396 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
397 326 F.2d at 852.
398 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
399 325 F.2d at 415.
400 Id. at 413.
401 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
402 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
403 156 F.2d at 380.404 Seeger declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form by reason of his "religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to
his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than answer 'yes' or 'no' "; that his
"skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God" did "not necessarily mean lack of faith
in anything whatsoever"; that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue
for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."
380 U.S. at 166.
Jakobson believed
in a "Supreme Being" who was the "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately
responsible for the existence of" man and who was "the Supreme Reality" of which
"the existence of man is the result." . . . H6 had concluded that man must be "partly
spiritual" and, therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality"; and that his "most
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Mr. Justice Clark, whose opinion in Seeger reads "like a short course in
theology,"4 ° did not interpret the exemption clause in the same manner as the
Second Circuit had. Instead, he was able to avoid the necessity of holding the
statute unconstitutional by interpreting congressional intent in referring to
"Supreme Being" rather than "God" as a deliberate attempt to expand the
scope of the exemption beyond that which would normally accompany the
appellation "God."
This vast panoply of beliefs [the numerous denominations which have
opposed war] reveals the magnitude of the problem which faced the Con-
gress when it set about providing an exemption from armed service. It
also emphasizes the care that Congress realized was necessary in the
fashioning of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long-
established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs.400
An appreciation of Seeger's contribution to the "new dynamism"4 ' of
free exercise can best be illustrated by quoting the Court's holding:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being"
rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of
religious belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this
construction, the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether
a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel
positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not.40
°
Albeit the product of a somewhat strained definition of the term "Supreme
Being," Mr. Justice Clark's opinion paves the way for administrative and judi-
cial recognition of the "broad spectrum of religious beliefs among us" and "the
diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their pos-
sessors, may be articulated."4 9
It is to be noted that the Court painstakingly avoided addressing itself to
the effect of Seeger on the status of atheists who demonstrate a sincere revulsion
important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another
man's life as a means to any other end ... 
380 U.S. at 167-68.
Peter appended a statement that
he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life and that he considered
this belief superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his conviction was
religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John Haynes Holmes' definition of
religion as "the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in
the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands ... [;it] is the supreme expression
of human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling his deepest, and living his
best."
380 U.S. at 169.
405 N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
406 380 U.S. at 175.
407 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 483.
408 380 U.S. at 165-66.
409 N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1965, p. 15, col. 1.
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for war."' In so doing, it is submitted, the Court has inexpediently postponed
the inevitable task of reconciling Section 456(j) with Torcaso v. Watkins.4"1
The sophistries which the Court might employ to exclude sincere atheists from
the statutory exemption, while at the same time upholding the establishment
rationale of Torcaso, are somewhat inconceivable." 2 It is submitted that Seeger
effects a mere semantic distinction between objection which is "religiously"
inspired and that which is "philosophically," "sociologically," or "morally"
motivated, absent the registrant's blatant admission that his opposition to mili-
tary service is not "religious." In those instances where the claimant is fool-
hardy enough to insist upon his "non-religious" motivation, it would seem that
Torcaso will protect him from the invidious discrimination resulting from such
an establishment. Thus, it is submitted that the Seeger test is neither as "objec-
tive" nor as "simple" as the Court indicates.1'
The difficulties besetting courts as a result of Seeger were ilustrated in
two recent post-Seeger decisions. In Fleming v. United States,1 4 the Tenth
Circuit reversed the conviction of one whose conscientious objection appeared
to be sociologically or philosophically inspired. The defendant was able to
present some evidence of a religious background which enabled the court to
hold that the hearing examiner's denial of the military exemption had no basis
in fact. It appears that the court interpreted Seeger as requiring the exemption
whenever there is some evidence of religion in the files of the registrant. It is
submitted that this approach tends to emasculate the role of administrative
fact-finders in this area.
The extent to which courts, under the guise of Seeger, are willing to dis-
regard the recommendations of the administrative branch was rather clearly
indicated by United States v. Stolberg.15 Although the defendant had returned
the conscientious objector form as not applicable to him, the Chief of the Con-
scientious Objector Section of the Department of Justice had recommended
that defendant's claim not be sustained, and the court found it "difficult to
state just what Stolberg's religious beliefs were,"4 " the decision stated that Seeger
"forced [the court] to conclude that Stolberg's beliefs qualified him for the
classification of conscientious objector."41"
Classification problems similar to those concerning conscientious objection
have arisen as a result of the provision exempting ministers from military ser-
vice.418 The ministerial exemption has also involved the courts in the per-
plexing task of defining statutory scope. The major difficulty has stemmed
from the attempt to ascertain which individuals qualify as ministers. Since the
410 "We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party
claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this ground. The question is not,
therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with or intimate
any decision on that situation in these cases."
380 U.S. at 173-74.
411 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
412 See notes 342-49 and accompanying text supra.
413 380 U.S. at 184.
414 344 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1965).
415 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1965).
416 Id. at 364.
417 Id. at 365.
418 62 Stat. 611 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(g) (1958).
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exemption has been granted sparingly, it has not been afforded to all members
of those sects who "by reason of their membership . . . each is a minister."4 19
Typically, Jehovah's Witnesses, who claim that every member of the sect is a
minister of religion, have been involved in litigation in this area.
In Fitts v. United States,420 a Jehovah's Witness who was denied a min-
isterial exemption was convicted of failing to report for civilian work assigned
to him as a conscientious objector. The defendant had admitted that he was
primarily engaged in farming and that his ministerial work totalled forty-eight
hours a month. The Fifth Circuit referred to three basic considerations which
have guided the courts when reviewing the status of Jehovah's Witnesses:
First, the registrant must have the ministry as a vocation rather than as
an avocation .... Second, religious affairs must occupy a substantial part
of the registrant's time and they must be carried on with regularity....
Finally, and most important, in order to obtain an exemption a registrant
must stand in the relation of a minister to a congregation or in an equiva-
lent relation as a recognized leader of a group of lesser members of his
faith. One of the basic purposes of the exemption is to guard against a
flock being left without its shepherd.42'
In similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Norri
4 2
upheld the Appeal Board's denial of the exemption to the defendant who had
not sustained the burden of showing that "this work was his vocation and not
his avocation."42 3
In contrast, United States v. Hestad24 held it an abuse of discretion for
the local board to refuse to reopen the classification of a registrant who offered
evidence that he was spending more than 200 hours per month in his religious
work. The court found that the board's decision to ignore this uncontroverted
evidence constituted a violation of due process. In another recent case, the
defendant whose claim to the ministerial exemption had been denied was acquit-
ted of violating the draft law on the grounds that he had been denied his right
to an Appeal Board review of his classification." 5
Despite the rather frequent litigation in this area, the decisions have yet
to consider the impact of Torcaso on the ministerial exemption. It is submitted
that a broad reading of Torcaso casts considerable doubt on the constitutionality
of this provision of the Act."'
D. Prisoners' Freedom to Practice Religion
The attempts to balance the exigencies of prison discipline and the con-
stitutional protections afforded those who are lawfully incarcerated have pre-
419 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389,394 (1953).
420 334 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1964).
421 Id. at 421.
422 341 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1965). Accord, United States v. Stidham, 248 F.Supp. 822
(W.D. Mo. 1965).
423 341 F.2d at 530.
424 248 F.Supp. 650 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
425 United States v. Olkowski, 248 F.Supp. 660 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
426 Compare Donnici, supra note 376, with 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1,
at 484.
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sented "a fascinating arena for the refinement of our conceptions of religious
liberty versus society's interest."42 Given the very real need to maintain prison
discipline, which necessitates the imposition of practical limitations on the
constitutional rights of inmates, a theoretical discussion of religious freedom
in this context would be sheer folly. For the delicate balancing process to lean
in the direction of protecting free exercise, the societal interest in maintaining
order at penal institutions must be clearly overshadowed. The categorization
of prison administration as an "executive function" 2' has prompted courts to
be extremely reluctant to interfere with the enforcement of prison rules, regula-
tions and discipline." Absent a rather clear indication of arbitrary and capri-
cious conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion on the part of prison adminis-
trators, the judicial branch has yielded to the administrative. 30
As in previous years, a majority of the cases arising in this area have
involved claims of religious persecution by inmates adhering to the beliefs of
the Black Muslim sect.43" ' To a large extent, many of the difficulties have
resulted from the strikingly unconventional tenets of "The Nation of Islam"432
and the refusal of many prison administrators to view the Muslim movement
as anything more than a sham. 3 Suffice it to say that the broad definition
of religion in United States v. Seeger434 appears to have settled the question of
whether the Muslim sect is to be considered "religious."
The recent decisions rather clearly indicate that in the future, a suppres-
sion of Black Muslim activities within the prison "subsociety" '435 will require
prison administrators to justify their actions with something more than peremp-
toriness. In Sostre v. McGinnis,43 several Black Muslim inmates of a "maxi-
mum security prison"43 in New York brought an action to compel prison authori-
ties to recognize their rights to worship collectively, to obtain religious literature,
and to confer and correspond with ministers of their sect. The Second Circuit
accepted the district court's finding that the Muslims constitute a "religion." At
the same time, the court recognized that the peculiar doctrines of plaintiffs'
religion could quite understandably require more serious restrictions upon their
religious activities. Concluding that plaintiffs' demands be honored "insofar
as possible within the limits of prison discipline,"4 the court ordered the dis-
427 Frankino, The Manacles and the Messenger: A Short Study in Religious Freedom in
the Prison Community, 14 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 30, 31 (1965).
428 Id. at 37.
429 See Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
430 See, e.g., State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 564 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965).
431 See generally LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS IN AMERICA (1961); Brown, Black
Muslims and the Police, 56 J. Cnme. L., 0. & P.S. 119 (1965);. Comment, Black Muslims in
Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, 62 COLUM. L. Rav. 1488 (1962).
432 "Although the Black Muslims call their Movement a religion, religious values are of
secondary importance. They are not part of the Movement's basic appeal except to the extent
that they foster and strengthen the sense of group solidarity." LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 431,
at 27 "The core of this dogma, then, is hatred of the white man and the supremacy of the
Black Man.' Frankino, supra note 427, at 34.
433 See, e.g., Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
434 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See text accompanying notes 391-413, supra.
435 Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, supra
note 431.
436 334 F.2d 906, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
437 Id. at 908.
438 Id. at 912.
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trict court to retain jurisdiction pending the implementation of this decision
by the state courts.4" In Bryant v. Wilkins,"' the Commissioner of Correc-
tion's refusal to recognize the Muslim sect as a religion was held to constitute
a denial of free exercise and equal protection violative of the Supreme Court's
decision in Seeger. The court, holding that the commissioner's refusal exceeded
the scope of his legislative authority, stated:
[I]f the exercise of any particular religion, as opposed to the actions of
individual members of a sect, is shown by convincing evidence to pose a
clear and present danger to proper discipline and management of the
prison, then those exercises and practices may be prohibited . . . so long
as the danger, in fact, exists.441
Analogously, State v. Cubbage442 held an allegation of "potential danger '"44
insufficient to justify the imposition of restrictions on the petitioner's right to
practice religion and to wear religious insignia. Furthermore, the free exercise
of religion was held to encompass "the right to select the clergy and to deter-
mine their essential qualifications. ' 4 4 Banks v. Havener441 was another sig-
nificant case arising as a result of alleged religious oppression in the penal insti-
tutions maintained by the District of Columbia.4 ' The court held that neither
the antipathy of other inmates resulting from Muslim adherence to a doctrine
of black supremacy nor the speculation that future riots would be instigated
by Muslims satisfied the prison officials' burden of proving a clear and present
danger.4 One author has suggested that the clear and present danger test
constitutes "the best standard for testing the limitations which can be placed
on religious practices in prisons." 4
Two recent decisions have upheld prison authorities' denials of Black
Muslim requests. In Cooke v. Tramburg,4 9 Muslim inmates were denied the
right to worship collectively and be preached to by ministers of their own
choosing. The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting the "sensitive and explo-
sive" 450 nature of prison society, upheld the reasonableness of the denial on the
grounds that previous experiences and occurrences involving Black Muslim
439 The state courts had ordered the Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York
to promulgate administrative rules and regulations implementing N.Y. Co.RcToN LAW § 610
which provides:
All persons who may have been or may hereafter be committed to or taken charge
of by any of the institutions mentioned in this section, are hereby declared to be
and entitled to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference ....
Cf., Casey v. Fay, 22 App. Div. 2d 941, 256 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1964); Blazic v. Fay, 21 App. Div.
2d 817, 251 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1964).
440 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
441 258 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
442 210 A.2d 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965).
443 Id. at 568.
444 Ibid.
445 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
446 See, Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196(4th Cir. 1961); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
447 234 F. Supp. at 30.
448 Frankino, supra note 427, at 58.
449 43 N.J. 514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964). Accord, Jones v. Willingham, 248 F.Supp. 791 (D.
Kan. 1965).
450 205 A.2d at 894.
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inmates were sufficient to negate the contention of arbitrary or capricious con-
duct. Although the objective evidence submitted by the prison authorities
militated against a finding that their fears were merely speculative, it remains
questionable whether granting plaintiff's demands would have resulted in the
clear and present danger deemed necessary to justify interference with the
"preferred"45 right to freedom of religion. The justification for denying peti-
tioner's claims was considerably less dubious in Coleman v. United States,5 2
where the district court upheld a prison regulation restricting the inmates' right
to confer with Muslim ministers to designated times and places.
In Cleggett v. Pate,5 a case not involving a member of the Black Muslims,
a plaintiff confined to a maximum security unit claimed that the warden's refusal
to allow him the opportunity to participate in corporate worship infringed upon
his constitutional right to exercise his religious beliefs. The court analogized
the situation to McBride v. McCorkle 54 where a Roman Catholic assigned
to solitary confinement was not permitted to attend Mass on Sundays or other
holy days on the grounds that "the interest of an orderly society that required
his imprisonment insists only that he be privileged to worship God to the extent
that his conduct in prison permits." '455 Similarly, the court in Cleggett suggested
that granting such permission to a prisoner confined to a segregation unit "might
endanger the remainder of the prison population."45
It is submitted that recent decisions in this area evidence an increasing
tendency on the part of the judiciary to require considerably more than mere
administrative distaste or convenience to justify an interference with or sup-
pression of the religious practices of prisoners. Clearly, however, where the
practice of any religion is likely to be inimical to the prison welfare, regulations
should be upheld. That the spirit of accommodation has been extended to the
prison population is indeed a tribute to the "new dynamism" ' of free exercise.
E. Sunday Closing Laws
Statutes compelling the observance of Sunday as a uniform day of rest have
been a focal point of widespread disagreement for several decades. The religious
character of Sunday closing laws enacted prior to the turn of this century is an
accepted fact.45 For the most part, however, the rationale underlying the enact-
ment of comparatively recent Sunday legislation has been articulated in terms
of the state's interest in providing for the health and welfare of the populace.
As early as 1904, a noted legal scholar recognized the secular undercurrents of
Sunday legislation and stated:
It is well established that the character of Sunday legislation is secular and
not religious, and under the principle of separation of church and state it
451 See e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
452 234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964).
453 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
454 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1957).
455 130 A.2d at 887.
456 229 F. Supp. at 821.
457 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 483.
458 AN=IAt, CAnROLL & BtuxE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTrruTIONS 73 (1965).
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could not be otherwise. The enforced abstention from work has been held
to be justified by the experience that periods of rest from ordinary pursuits
are requisite to the moral and physical well-being of the people.... [T]he
legislation regarding it . .. may then be looked upon as a measure for the
protection of the good order and comfort of the community established and
recognised by common custom and convention.
459
Objections to the constitutionality of specific Sunday legislation have been
upheld in several instances. Not infrequently, statutes have been invalidated
because of vagueness, unreasonable and arbitrary classification, or discriminatory
application and enforcement. It is apparent that these objections to Sunday
laws are, at most, tangential to church-state interrelationships. However, a sense
of perspective necessitates a discussion of the latest decisions involving non-
religious attacks on Sunday laws.
The classification scheme embodied in a recently enacted Sunday closing
statute was declared unconstitutional in Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of
Grand Island."' Similarly, a North Carolina statute proscribing the sale of
merchandise on Sundays, which exempted forty-eight counties from its operation,
was held in violation of a state constitutional provision prohibiting local laws.461
Divergent opinions were rendered by the highest courts of Maine and Nebraska
with respect to the constitutionality of exempting small retailers from the ambit
of Sunday prohibition. In response to questions propounded by the state legisla-
ture, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held it reasonable to exempt small
stores from the scope of the statute because their transaction of business would
not interfere with the atmosphere of rest and leisure sought to be attained.46 "
Antithetically, the Supreme Court of Nebraska invalidated a statute exempting
retailers employing not more than two employees on the grounds that it denied
the plaintiff equal protection and due process. The court was "unable to per-
ceive how it can possibly be promotive of the health and welfare of the people
... to prohibit the operation of retail outlets having more than two employees...
while permitting those with two employees to operate ... .",3 A concurring
opinion, which indicated serious doubts as to the propriety of Sunday legisla-
tion, stated:
We are now in a position where we must face the facts that now exist in
our more complex social and economic society. The real purpose of Sunday
closing laws is not to protect religious worship, or to provide a uniform
day of rest, or to provide family unity. Its real purpose is to enlist the
power of the state to protect narrow commercial interests, influenced by
the fierce competition between the discount store and the downtown
merchants.4"4
459 FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 185, at 169 (1904). For an interesting comparison of
the underlying rationale of Sunday laws in the United States and Canada see Barron, Sunday
in North America, 79 HARv. L. REv. 42 (1965).
460 176 Neb. 169, 125 N.W.2d 529 (1964). The ordinance, which proscribed some retail and
wholesale activities but permitted many others to sell the same commodities, was declared
arbitrary and discriminatory.
461 High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
462 Opinion of the Justices, 159 Me. 410, 191 A.2d 637 (1963).
463 Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (1964).
464 129 N.W.2d at 483. See ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, Op. cit. supra note 458, at 75;
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When Sunday laws are assailed as unconstitutionally vague, the attack is often
directed at the broad language that typically appears in exculpatory clauses." 5
A recent New York decision,. 6 in which the court broadly construed the words
"conducts trade," exemplified the problems of interpretation in this area. In
other recent cases, statutes prohibiting the sale of "building supply materials,""'
"wearing apparel,"46  and "housewares,"469 without further definition, were
upheld over allegations of vagueness.
The Supreme Court, in 1961, addressed itself to the constitutionality of
Sunday closing laws.4"' These decisions, covering 222 pages in the official report,
marked the earliest adjudication by the Court of the first amendment objections
to Sunday laws.471 Statutes of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts were
deemed consistent with the establishment clause and the free exercise protection
afforded by the Constitution. The "rejuvenation given the Sunday statutes 472
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, has withstood widespread
criticism. 3
The decision in McGowan v. Maryland474 did not preclude the possibility
of a given state statute constituting an establishment:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the "Estab-
lishment" Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced
either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history,
or in its operative effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion.
45
In light of the pronouncement above, the constitutionality of statutes not pur-
porting to be secular in purpose and effect must be seriously questioned. Al-
though "the better view would appear to be that the Sunday Blue Laws do not
respect an establishment of religion,"476 a decision such as Smith v. State7
presents serious obstacles to a reconciliation with McGowan. In Smith, judicial
acts performed on Sunday were vitiated on the grounds that they conflicted with
Comment, 43 N.C.L. REv. 123 (1964). For a rather graphic example of economic interests
motivating the proponents of Sabbath Laws, see People v. Paine Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d 824,
241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct. 1963), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 156, 254 N.Y.S.2d
492 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 503, 208 N.E.2d 176, 260 N.Y.S.2d 444, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
838 (1965). In Paine a small group of merchants initiated criminal proceedings for the sole
purpose of preventing competition. See also N.Y. Times, May 23, 1963, p. 59, col. 1.
465 See, e.g., Arlan's Dep't Store v. Commonwealth, 369 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1963), appeal dis-
missed, 376 U.S. 186 (1964). Compare State v. Katz Drug Co., 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1961),
with State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
466 People v. Schwebel, 44 Misc. 2d 1035, 255 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
467 State v. Deutch, 245 La. 819, 161 So. 2d 730 (1964).
468 State v. Wiener, 245 La. 889, 161 So. 2d 755 (1964).
469 State v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1964).
470 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see
1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 680-86; Comment, 30 TENN. L. REv. 249
(1963).
471 50 GEo. L.J. 161,162-63 (1961); 50 ILL. B.J. 792 '(1962).
472 8 N.Y.L.F. 403,409 (1962).
473 See, e.g., Mann and Garfinkel, The Sunday Closing Laws Decisions-A Critique, 37
NoTRE DAME LAWYER 323 (1962) ; 35 CONN. B.J. 523 (1961); 50 GEO. L.J. 161 (1961).
474 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
475 Id. at 453.
476 35 CONN. B.J. 523, 528'(1961).
477 385 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1965).
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a state statute recognizing "the sanctity of the Lord's Day."""8 The Tennessee
court declared: "In fact, the Sunday laws of our State tend to strengthen the
policy of sanctity of the Sabbath, as espoused by the common law, and prevent
the exercise of any unnecessary secular labor on the Sabbath." ' 9 The more
typical approach" to such legislation was reflected in State v. Rogers,48 ' where
the secular rather than the religious rationale was propounded. Recognizing the
legislature's emphasis on secular considerations, the court held that the Sunday
legislation regulating work and sales, despite the presence of "religiously associated
language," bore no relationship to the concept of establishment." 2
Many states, recognizing the religious genesis of their Sunday closing laws,
have afforded exemptions to those whose religious scruples require them to ob-
serve a day other than Sunday as their Sabbath.483 The constitutionality of the
Sunday statutes of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, which did not provide for
the exemption of Sabbatarians, 8 4 was upheld in Braunfeld v. Brown48 and
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market.486 The Supreme Court, conceding
that the effect of not providing an exemption was "to make the practice of...
religious beliefs more expensive," ' sustained the validity of the Sunday legisla-
tion "despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." '488 In a
separate opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that none of the decisions con-
cerning the effect of Sunday closing laws on Sabbatarians concluded that the
free exercise of religion had been infringed.489 The dissents of Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Stewart recognized the majority's utter lack of sensitivity to the plight
of minority sects; the state's interest in a uniform day of rest can hardly justify
requiring an individual to choose between his religious beliefs and impending
economic disaster. Criticism of the Court's holding in Braunfeld and Gallagher
has been widespread and vociferous. 9 '
Questions concerning the constitutionality of Sabbatarian exemptions have
been very much alive in the two-year period since the last Survey. In State v.
Gates, 4 ' a statute providing an exemption for those faiths observing Saturday
as the Sabbath, but not extending to Friday Sabbatarians, was declared con-
stitutional. The petitioners, members of the Druse and Moslem faiths, assailed
the West Virginia statute on numerous grounds. The court, quoting Braunfeld
extensively, held that the exemption restricted to Saturday worshippers consti-
tuted neither an establishment of religion nor a denial of free exercise. It is
478 Id. at 750.
479 Ibid.
480 ANTInEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, op. cit. supra note 458, at 77.
481 105 N.H. 366, 200 A.2d 740 (1964).
482 200 A.2d at 743.
483 8 N.Y.L.F. 403 (1962).
484 "Sabbatarians," for purposes of this discussion, includes all those persons who observe a
day other than Sunday as their Sabbath.
485 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
486 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
487 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 605.
488 Id. at 607.
489 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 522 (1961).
490 See authorities cited note 473 supra.
491 141 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1965).
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submitted that this decision effects a rather hollow application of Braunfeld in
the sense that the court failed to perceive the very basic distinction between Gates
and Braunfeld. It is one thing to say that a Sabbatarian exemption is not con-
stitutionally compelled. It is quite another to declare that the legislature may
grant immunity to one religious group and withhold it from others. To effect
this distinction is to run afoul of the broad definition of establishment propounded
by the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins492 and succeeding decisions.49
In State v. Solomon,49 4 an Orthodox Jew who did not open his general
merchandise store on Saturdays was convicted of operating his business in viola-
tion of the South Carolina Sunday closing law. The defendant's argument
paralleled that which was put forward in Braunfeld and Gallagher, i.e., the
statute violated the establishment and free exercise clauses since it placed an
undue economic burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs.49 The court
sustained the enactment under the police power of the state, utilizing the con-
ventional rhetoric: "[The statute] serves a strong state interest in providing
one uniform day of rest for its citizens . ,, ." Defendant's contention that
Sherbert v. Verner497 required a different conclusion was negated by the court's
adoption of the Supreme Court's rationale in distinguishing Sherbert from
Braunfeld.9 5 It is submitted that the Supreme Court, in dismissing the defendant's
appeal in Solomon,49 bypassed a fateful opportunity to efface the "unfortunate
teaching of Brauneld." °0
The harshness of the Court's Sabbatarian doctrine was graphically depicted
in People v. Finkelstein50 1 in which a "scrupulously religious" ' Orthodox Jewish
storekeeper was convicted of violating New York's Sunday law.0" A majority
of New York City's Criminal Court, after finding as a fact "that this defendant
cannot survive economically without conducting business on Saturday after
sundown and Sunday,"5 4 declared themselves "powerless to question""0 the
constitutionality of the Sunday closing statute. A penetratingly exhaustive dissent
by Judge Shalleck, 0 6 the sentiments of which were subscribed to by the ma-
492 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
493 E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See Kurland, Of Church and State
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. R EV. 1 (1961); Note, The Constitutionality of Sab-
batarian Exemptions, 43 B.U.L. Rmv. 386 (1963).
494 141 S.E.2d 818, appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 204 (1965).
495 141 S.E.2d at 827.
496 Id. at 828.
497 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Supreme Court declared that a South Carolina
unemployment compensation statute, which denied appellant relief because of her religiously
inspired refusal to work on Saturdays, infringed upon appellant's freedom of religion.
498 To reconcile Sherbert and Braunfeld the majority held that the state interest in the
former case was less compelling than in the latter. Also, the alternatives available in Sherbert
were not found to be available in Braunfeld.
499 382 U.S. 204 (1965).
500 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 480.
501 38 Misc. 2d 791, 239 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.), aff'd, 41 Misc. 2d 35, 244
N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 608, 198 N.E.2d 265, 248 N.Y.S.2d 889, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1006 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
502 239 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
503 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 2147.
504 239 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
505 Ibid.
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jority, °' urged that precedent established in the Sunday closing cases did not
conclusively require the defendant's conviction. The dissent contended that the
free exercise clause of the first amendment requires an exemption when a Sunday
statute imposes a choice of either violating religious scruples or going into bank-
ruptcy and on relief. Judge Shalleck stated:
The claim of the defendant raises an interesting and fundamental question
involving the dignity of man. If the alternative to a religious man-not
necessarily of Christian faith-wanting to believe in and to practice, his
religion (as here, without hinderance [sic] or interference to others practicing
theirs or enjoying the leisurely comforts of a Sunday) is the total loss of his
business enterprise and the receiving of public relief for himself and his
family, then it well becomes a Court to hesitate and ponder whether it
would force each alternative upon him. For our country has grown civilly
strong on the foundation of the dignity of each one of its inhabitants; and
it has become economically great on the right of each man to make his own
destiny by his own hands and not to suffer the prideless ignominy of avoid-
ably living off the public's bounty. °50
It is deemed unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not choose this opportunity
to "graciously accept an invitation to reexamine"50 9 its decisions in the Sunday
closing cases.51
Some state legislatures, however, have responded to the increasing pres-
sures to obviate the burdens placed upon Sabbatarians. A state statute author-
ized the City of New York to enact legislation that would exempt Sabbatarians
who operated small stores.511 The Mayor of New York City, after signing
the bill, stated: "This is the end of a long road of effort . . . to work out a
law that takes cognizance of the religious sensibilities of all . . ,""' Massa-
chusetts has also responded to the plight of Sabbatarians by enacting an "effec-
tive exemption."51
The decisions rendered in the two-year period under study have certainly
not dampened the prospect that Sunday laws are likely to remain in force for
some time to come. 14 Nonetheless, Sunday laws have been assailed on many
grounds. It has been argued that "Sunday legislation is contrary not only to the
principles of American law but to the principles and precepts of Christianity
itself." '515 Solutions to the dilemmas occasioned by Sunday laws have ranged from
507 Id. at 837.
508 Id. at 842.
509 Id. at 840.
510 The Court elected to deny defendant's petition for certiorari. 377 U.S. 1006 (1964).
511 This Sabbatarian exemption has since been extended to the entire state. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 2154 (McKinney Supp. 1965).
512 N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1963, p. 1, col. 1. For additional newspaper coverage of the New
York Sunday laws, see N.Y. Times, April 5, 1963, p. 1, col. 5; id., April 8, 1963, p. 1, col. 2;
id., April 26, 1963, p. 20, col. 2; id., June 19, 1963, p. 74, col. 7; id., June 27, 1963, p. 27, col.
4; id., Sept. 13, 1963, p. 30, col. 2; id., Sept. 18, 1963, p. 1, col. 6; id., Oct. 7, 1963, p. 25,
col. 1; id., Oct. 7, 1963, p. 1, col. 3; id., Oct. 15, 1963, p. 38, col. 5.
513 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 270.
514 ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78-79
(1965); 8 N.Y.L.F. 403, 409 (1962).
515 JOHNSON & YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITES STATES 255
(1948).
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outright abolition to the adoption of "one-in-seven laws" as a means of effecting
the compelling state interest to provide a day of rest.51"
The recent legislative responses to hardships imposed upon Sabbatarians
have resulted in a victory for cultural pluralism. Yet, the Supreme Court has
not seen fit to reevaluate the Sunday closing cases decided in 1961. It is sub-
mitted that Braunfeld and Gallagher are contrary to the spirit of accommodation
which has pervaded several of the Court's recent pronouncements.517 Supreme
Court review of the Sabbatarian exemption is also deemed necessary to reconcile
the existence of these exemptions with the broad view of the establishment clause.
The constitutional objection of a non-Sabbatarian in a jurisdiction where an
exemption has been granted appears to be analogous to the issue underlying
the unanswered question in Seeger.51 Both the atheist seeking an exemption
under the Universal Military Training & Service Act and the non-Sabbatarian
desiring to transact business on Sunday would appear to be justified in relying
on the language of Torcaso which prohibits the state from enacting legislation
which aids religion, i.e., extending benefits to those professing religious beliefs but
not to non-believers.1 9
IV. RELIGIOUS VALUES
This section will focus on the basic Church-State tension by exploring two
aspects of the burden-benefit question: the extent to which "religion" is employed
as a determinant legal fact; and the extent to which the rule of law reflects the
thrust of "religious values." The categories drawn in this survey are purposeful
primarily as methodological tools with which to approach the whole area. Al-
though the aspects considered all adhere in one social phenomenon, they are
separable and not separate. Religion, then, will simultaneously be institution,
right and value, for the attempt is to achieve as comprehensive a survey as possible
by taking different perspectives of the core object: the inter-play of church and
state.
A. Religion as Value: Determinant of Decisions
1. "Religion"
As something more abstract than institution, "religion" is seldom made a
conscious part of the materials of decision, nor is it usually acknowledged as
having intruded into the legal process. In the normal course of events, the law
does not turn to a man's religious activities as easily as to the whole gamut of his
other actions to decide guilt or innocence, liability or immunity. It is suggested
that this is the result of something more than a finding that religion is factually
irrelevant; it marks a studied judicial reluctance to admit religion to the status
of legal relevancy, an inhibition traceable to an acute deference for the sensitivities
516 ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BURKE, op. cit. supra note 514, at 76-77.
517 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
518 See text accompanying note 410 supra.
519 See text accompanying note 348 supra.
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of the first amendment. However, there are occasions when the law does notice
religion and makes it a part of the decisional fabric.
2. Religion and Family Law
As indicated in past Surveys,52 ° the area of domestic relations is one in which
religion has been made a part of the legal picture and has been the object of
efforts to make it a decisive factor.
a. Divorce
Divorce looms large in American society, with approximately 400,000
couples severing their marital bonds each year.521 In the past, divorce laws have
met with opposition from various church groups; yet there appears to be a
greater willingness on the part of churchmen to live with less restrictive divorce
laws. Illustrative is the relaxing of Catholic opposition to reform of the presently
stringent New York law.2 2
Conjunctively, if the churches are now much less concerned with molding
the law to help reinforce the values they hold dear, the law in turn no longer
makes religion an integral consideration in the granting of a divorce decree.
There has been no legal activity in the past two years that would indicate the
courts have been inclined to change their settled position - namely, that reli-
gious differences standing alone are not a sufficient basis for the granting of a
divorce or separation. Religion only enters into such a proceeding incidentally.52
b. Ante-Nuptial Agreements Regarding Religious Training
While scholars continue to debate the issue,524 the general rule remains
unchanged: The courts will not enforce agreements to raise children in a given
religion. 25 The question is not simply one of contract law; insofar as enforce-
ment is in aid of a given religion's membership, it raises serious problems as
to the extent of the first amendment's prohibition against the establishment of
religion by the state. If the rationale of Shelley v. Kraemer526 is applied here,
the courts may have no choice but to abstain from enforcement.2
The shape of the present law is manifested in O'Neill v. O'Neill.28 The
parents had signed the standard form provided by the New York Catholic
Archdiocese, agreeing to raise the children of the union in the Roman Catholic
religion. A child was born and baptized in the Catholic faith, but from the
time of her parents' separation until the present action, she was brought up by
her mother in the Jewish religion. The court curtly put aside any reliance on
520 Church-State Surveys cited note 1 supra.
521 Time, Feb. 11, 1966, p. 26.
522 Id. at 27.
523 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 461.
524 Compare Gans, Enforceability of Antenuptial Agreements Providing for the Religious
Education of Children, 1 J. FAMILY L. 227 '(1961) with Rakes, Equity and the Antenuptial
Agreement to Raise Children in a Particular Religion, 4 J. FAMILY L. 53 (1964).
525 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 463.
526 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The proposition is that judicial enforcement of a contract entered
into by private parties constitutes state action.
527 Gans, supra note 524.
528 45 Misc.2d 1, 255 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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contractual considerations and instead concerned itself with the welfare of the
child. This it found to be best served by leaving the choice of religious training
to the discretion of the custodial parent- here the mother.
Although the general pattern of refusing to enforce ante-nuptial agreements
seems set despite occasional questioning of its legality, these argreements may
still have some tangential impact on judicial decision. Occasionally, their terms
have been incorporated into divorce decrees;.. one court has suggested that
this type of contract would permit the religious factor to determine custody."'
c. Child-Custody
While the enforcement of an ante-nuptial agreement relating to religious
training could conceivably dominate the granting of custody, the general rule
is that custody will determine religion. Religion is at most one of a myriad
of factors that will be regarded in making the initial award of custody.
Adoption proceedings have been a major source of judicial inquiry into
religion. Here, there would seem to be a rather widespread public policy behind
matching the religion of the child with that of the adoptive parents. Apart from
the activities of child welfare agencies, which guide their placements by reli-
gious considerations, this policy has found expression in many state statutes.5"'
However, the roots of the public policy - at least in some states - run
back to the private right of the natural parents to determine the religion of
their children. Thus, where the adoption is by consent, such private consent
will be sufficient sanction to encompass a change in religion." 2 This consent
can even eliminate the proposed change as a bar to the adoption, though the
adoption may be prohibited for other reasons. 3
The greatest judicial activity centers around a custody determination sub-
sequent to a divorce or separation terminating a mixed marriage. This is not
to say that religion is given more weight here than in an adoption proceeding,
but only that the question arises more frequently, as the case law indicates.
While, as noted above, pre-nuptial agreements have had some influence here,
the rule once more is that religious considerations will not be the sole basis for
the decision. 3" If there is any bias in the law, it is in favor of awarding custody
to the mother; but again it devolves into an inquiry into the child's "best
interests." '535
529 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 463.
530 Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. 403, 205 A.2d 49, 51 (1964) (dictum).
531 Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the Adoption of
Children, 4 J. FAMILY L. 7 (1964).
532 The practice in New York, contrary to Massachusetts, is that if a natural mother
wants her child to be adopted by a parent of another faith and the court is convinced,
first, that the mother knows what she is doing, that she is not acting in haste but
is fully aware of the consequences of her action, and, secondly, if, as in all other
cases, the adoption is required by the best interests of the child, then the New York
courts almost uniformly will allow the adoption notwithstanding the difference in
religion.
THE INSTITUTE OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE JURIDcAL STATUS
Ol CHURCHES; RELIGION IN ADOPTION AND CUSTODY CASES 78 (1957).
533 In re Adoption of Anonymous, 46 Misc.2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Farn. Ct. 1965).
534 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 461.
535 For a general discussion of factors and theories underlying custody determinations, see
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Having decided that religion alone will not be the courts' sole guide, the
more meaningful question is the extent to which the religious factor will be
examined. Quite obviously, the courts will wish to avoid any comparison of
the merits of different faiths."' Yet, the inadequacy of clear parental mandates
and the lack of overriding concerns as to the child's best interests53. may force
the courts into coming perilously close to just that.
The matter is complicated since the courts must listen not only to the
contentions of the parties, but also to the admonitions of the first amendment.
Thus, in Welker v. Welker,5"8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a lower
court decision that had based a custody award in part on the belief that a reli-
gious home was to be preferred to an irreligious one. The higher court said:
"When custody of a child is in issue, this court has a narrow scope of inquiry
regarding the religious concepts of the parents: Does the prospective custodian
hold views which might reasonably be considered dangerous to the child's health
or morals?"53 Relying on the statement of Engel v. Vitale,54 the court not
only refrained from evaluating religions but also from preferring religion in
general to non-religion. It read Engel as permitting an inquiry into religious
beliefs only when their exercise endangered the rights of others.54 Should the
Engel rationale of "conscious" neutrality be further extended- as it was in
Welker- it is conceivable that religious considerations will disappear altogether
from family law.
3. Religion and the FCC:
If the predictions of pundits are reliable, the future may see litigation over
the constitutionality of FCC requirements requesting information regarding the
types and frequency of religious programming proposed by prospective radio
and television broadcasters. One commentator has suggested that such pro-
cedures may be unconstitutional,5 42 basing his argument on an application of the
Schempp5 3 interpretation of the first amendment, which requires the Govern-
ment to maintain a posture of "strict neutrality" towards religion. These com-
ments have sparked journalistic rebuttals544 but as yet no cases.
B. Religious Values: Law as Moral Implement
The distinction between the Church-State conflicts of the preceding section
and those developed here is more one of the level on which the basic problem
is approached than of substance. Here the battle is usually not consciously
argued as one involving religion - at least not in the courtroom. The friction
evidencing the underlying conflict is more obvious in political attempts to inter-
Note, Religion in Custody Proceedings, 38 N.D.L. REv. 87 (1962); Comment, Child Custody:
Considerations in Granting the Award Between Adversely Claiming Parents, 36 So. CAL. L.
REv. 255 (1963).
536 Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. 403, 205 A.2d 49, 51 (1964).
537 Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 211 A.2d 323 (1965).
538 24 Wisc.2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 '(1964).
539 129 N.W.2d at 138.
540 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
541 See generally text accompanying note 163 supra.
542 Cohn, Religion and the FCC, The Reporter, Jan. 14, 1965, p. 32.
543 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
544 E.g., Fitzgerald, Religious TV and the Constitution, U.S. Catholic, Oct. 1965, p. 51.
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ject religious values into legal determinations. If the legal battle in these areas
is more clandestine, the tension is probably more acute. There is more dis-
cretion left to the courts with less "legal" censure, except where the guarantees
of free speech are concerned. The interaction not being clearly delineated in
terms of the basic tension, the balance can more freely swing against religious
values. The issue, then, is the degree to which the direction of the law has been
in accord with religious precepts.
1. Birth Control
Birth control has been an obvious source of strife in the political sphere;
its working-out in the legal is now considered.
a. Artificial Insemination
Speculation as to the problems artificial insemination poses for the law
has been rife; but there have been far too few cases upon which to project the
development of the law. The practice, when it entails the sperm of a third-
party donor, raises knotty moral questions; its reception by various religious
groups has been varied, ranging from "outright condemnation, to an unexpressed
sanction." '45 Legally, there have been no cases foreclosing any of the vexatious
questions 4 . posed by the technique. In the only case to deal with the subject
in the last two years, the husband's duty to pay alimony sufficient to cover the
support of two daughters conceived by the process with his consent was at
issue.5 " The husband defended on the ground that the children were illegiti-
mate, the sperm having been supplied by a stranger. Relying on an earlier
New York case, Gursky v. Gursky,"4 s the court sidestepped the legitimacy ques-
tion and found that the specific consent of the husband constituted an implied
contract to support the children.
While the insubstantial number of decisions in this area serve only to tan-
talize the legal appetite at present, there are indications that many potential cases
are now in the process of gestation. Some 150,000 Americans are purported to
have been conceived by artificial insemination;545 250 more a year are said to
come into the world by this method in Los Angeles alone.5 Increasing utiliza-
tion of this process should inevitably have an impact on the law.
b. Contraception
The controversy between Church and State centering on the promotion of
contraception hardly needs documentation. The Catholic Church in particular
has been noted for its opposition to birth-control programs, whether privately
or publicly sponsored. Due to their opposition, Catholics have been credited
545 Note, Artificial Insemination, 30 BROO.LYN L. REV. 302, 311 n.28 (1964).
546 Does it constitute adultery? Are the children legitimate? For a general discussion of
the specific problems raised, see Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemina-
tion, 5 J. FAImLY L. 39 (1965); Note, Artificial Insemination, 30 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 302(1964).
547 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc.2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
548 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See generally 1963-64 Church-
State Survey, supra note 1, at 464.
549 Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 48.
550 Newsweek, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 81.
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in the past with the destruction of a government-inaugurated program in Puerto
Rico 5. and with sparking the "cautious approach" adopted by the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) towards birth-control. 52 Thus, the pace of
proposed governmental expansion in this area s may hinge on the attitudes and
tolerances of the Catholic Church. 4
The development of the Catholic position is an old and convoluted one,
culminating in adamant rigidity, 5 ' but there are indications that the stand
may be eased somewhat. The reaction of the Catholic laity to government birth-
control projects no longer seems to differ significantly from the rest of the Ameri-
can population;56 there have even been predictions that a possible change in
the official policy of the Church may be forthcoming.5 7 The speculation is
strengthened by one of the schematas adopted at the last session of the Vatican
Council. The document supplies the basis for an inference that the matter
may be treated as a disciplinary rule which the Church could relax rather than
as an immutable dictate of the natural law.55 8
But, however sensitive the political realities, the law has not waited for
the Church. In Griswold v. Connecticut,5" the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional a Connecticut law prohibiting, inter alia, the use of contraceptive
devices. 6 The Court was some time in reaching this issue, rejecting an attempt
to have the statute invalidated-as late as 1961."' When it finally did face the
question, it did so notably.
The case confronting the Court involved an affirmance of the conviction
of the Director of the Planned Parenthood League and a clinical physician as
accessories to a violation of the prohibitory statute.2 Permitting the appellants
to assert the rights of the married couples they had counseled, the Court struck
down the statute. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found a "right to
551 Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 27.
552 Evans-Novak, Birth-Control Shackles on Poverty War, Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 16,
1965, p. 108, col. 4. But see The National Catholic Reporter, Nov. 10, 1965, p. 3, col. 6
'(reporting the first OEO birth-control information program outside urban areas).
553 James, Birth-Control Push, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1965, p. 1, col. 6.
554 A great deal turns on Pope Paul's commission on the birth control issue. There
have been reports, including the Pope's interpolation in his UN speech, of a more
conservative attitude based on past church teachings. But the position of the church,
which sanctions only the rhythm method of birth control, is unchanged. And if the
forthcoming report stands on past teachings the likelihood of any action by Congress
will be, to say the least, remote.
Childs, Birth Control Issue Ahead for Congress, Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 22, col. 2.
555 See generally NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION (1965), undeniably the most comprehensive
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556 Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 25.
557 Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 40, col. 1.
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privacy" lurking in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. This right would
be violated by permitting enforcement of the statute: "Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives?" 3
While Justice Douglas wove together the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments to establish this "right to marital privacy," the Chief Justice and
Justices Brennan and Goldberg preferred to ground it in the ninth amendment,
finding it a right not to be disparaged although unenumerated. 5" Justice Harlan
concurred in a separate opinion in which he predicated the right on "due process"
and "ordered liberty," ' as did Mr. Justice White in his opinion.56 Only
Justices Stewart and Black dissented - not because they agreed with the policy
of the law567 - but because they did not find such a right in the body of the
Bill of Rights to be transmuted by the fourteenth amendment from a restric-
tion on the federal government to one binding the states.
The decision is nothing less than novel. Admirably, perhaps, the Court
confined itself to the narrowest grounds possible and did not go so far as to
hold that all state regulation of contraceptives was violative of constitutional
guarantees. Indeed, insofar as it was directed at a law forbidding the use of
such devices, it has little direct impact. Only the Connecticut law, of all those
adopted by the various states, had such a prohibition; most of the others are
restricted to controlling the sale of contraceptives.5 6 It is hard to see how the
rationale of this decision could be extended to cover this latter category of
statutes.
569
In one sense, then, the decision completely failed to achieve the full poten-
tial of the constitutional attack: appellants were unquestionably interested in
eliminating all bars to their work. The ban on use was the least of these, as the
years the statute was on the books did not disclose a single attempt to enforce
this particular aspect of the provision.57 Yet this was no illusory victory. Appel-
lants did succeed in invalidating this law; thus, the educative function of the
opinion is not to be overlooked. Perhaps as a result of Griswold, both as argued
and decided, 1965 has seen a movement by the states to modify or repeal their
birth control laws.57' Even more importantly, the case is significant for its
employment of the ninth amendment as a decisional base - an apparent first
in constitutional law - and may foreshadow future explication of further
rights.57 2
563 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 '(1965).
564 Id. at 486 (concurring opinion).
565 Id. at 499 (concurring opinion).
566 Id. at 502 (concurring opinion).
567 Id. at 527 (dissenting opinion) ("I think this is an uncommonly silly law").
568 The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 162 n.4 (1965).
569 One court refused to hold that Griswold applied to the New York law making it a mis-
demeanor to sell contraceptive devices. People v. Baird, 47 Misc.2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947
(Sup. Ct. 1965). The case came up after passage but before the effective date of the amend-
ment noted note 571 infra.
570 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) '(Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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§ 1142 (Supp. 1965).
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2. Anti-Miscegenation
Despite changes in the level of racial sophistication in this country, some
states still maintain laws prohibiting a man and a woman of differing races
from marrying or cohabiting. Although the ramifications of such laws are mani-
fold, particularly the psychological if not the practical, they have been largely
ignored by Civil Rights leaders. 73 Attacks on these statutes have been sporadic,
probably due to a scarcity of test cases. While they stand, however, they sym-
bolize a state posture opposed to religious beliefs in the innate and inviolable
dignity of all men. And to the extent that they prevent not only civil marriages
within the state but also participation in attendant religious rights, they bespeak
an unwarranted governmental interference with the free exercise of religion."'
The significance of these laws is not relegated solely to the symbolic; they
lay hard upon the lives of those who would run counter to them, as demon-
strated by the recent attempt of a Caucasian and a Malay to wed in Baltimore,
which was thwarted by the Maryland statute.5"' The couple had to leave the
state to be married. 76
As deplorable as such occurrences are, the legislation spawning them is
still viable. Eradication of these acts has been slow. In 1962, there were twenty-
four states with such statutes and/or constitutional provisions;57 in 1964,
twenty;57 and, at the beginning of 1966, seventeen.7 Yet the trend is there,
and the decision of the Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. Florida..0 has placed
these statutes under a cloud. McLaughlin called for a constitutional testing
of the Florida statute prohibiting nocturnal occupancy of a room by a Negro
and white of different sexes.5 ' Mr. Justice White spoke for the Court and
struck down the provision as a violation of the fourteenth amendment's "equal
protection" clause. Going beyond the Pace v. Alabama.8 approach which
limited judicial review to the question of equal applicability to the members of
the class covered, the Court went on to ask whether there was a rational basis
for the classification established by the statute. Finding no "overriding statu-
tory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct [only] when
engaged in by a white person and a Negro," ' the Court reversed.
The Court voted unanimously in McLaughlin. Although not touching
upon anti-miscegenation statutes per se, this opinion points to the conclusion
that this Court will not be partial to arguments that the fourteenth amendment
573 Zabel, Interracial Marriage and the Law, The Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1965, p. 75, 79.
574 See 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 697.
575 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957).
576 Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 25.
577 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 697 n.396.
578 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 464 n.298.
579 Indiana, Nebraska and Wyoming are the latest to have eliminated such provisions.
580 379 U.S. 184 "(1964).
581 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (1965).
582 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
583 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Douglas, concurred separately, rejecting the majority's suggestion that there could be any state
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v. Florida, supra at 198 (concurring opinion).
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is any less applicable to such legislation.584 It appears inevitable that these pro-
visions will not find constitutional approbation if and when they are tried."'s
3. Obscenity
Obscenity regulation is one area where the tension between the legal
process and religious values is most noticeable. Rarely in the Church-State
field is there a nexus as fraught with conflict as is this, yet as little recognized
as such. Acknowledgement of this fact has been limited almost exclusively to
these biennial Surveys.5 6 While the interests of the churches in controlling
obscenity have been manifest, 87 they are not elsewhere grouped with the multi-
plicity of concerns covered in these Surveys. The standard treatise on Church-
State relations will not discuss the problem of obscenity." 8 Yet the involvement
of the Christian Church in particular, either directly or as the inspiration of
reformers, is an old one marked by early Fourth Century prohibitions against
the possession or distribution of pagan works; 89 the establishment of the Cath-
olic Church's Index Librorum Prohibitorum in the Sixteenth Century; 5. the
antics of Anthony ("Morals, Not Art or Literature") Comstock in the Nine-
teenth;59 and groups in the Twentieth such as "Operation Yorkville." '92 The
extent of this involvement has been such as to prompt St. John-Stevas to remark:
"The Christian Church has always paid books a high compliment by taking
them seriously. Unfortunately this concern for literature has not always been
regulated by counsels of prudence."59
An awareness of this religiously-based concern and of the present meta-
morphosis in the law dictates that any proper cognizance of the dynamics of
Church-State include an acquaintance with the field of obscenity. The move-
ment of the law in this area will reflect the extent to which legal machinery
can be counted on to promote or retard the impact of religious values and the
degree to which religion must rely on nonlegal modes of value reinforcement.59
If the response of the law to the obscene coincided with religious formulations,
584 E.g., Pittman, The Fourteenth Amendment: Its Intended Effect on Anti-Miscegenation
Laws, 43 N.C.L. Rtv. 92 (1964).
585 This assumes, obviously, that no "overriding statutory purpose" can be shown to justify
the classification.
586 E.g., 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1.
587 Representative statements of concern with the problem of obscenity by spokesmen of
various religious bodies and affiliates may be found in Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of
the House Committee on the judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 10 (1958).
588 E.g., ANTIEAU, CARROLL & BurixE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(1965); BETH, THE AMERICAN THEORY OF CHURCH AND STATE (1958); FELLMAN, RELI-
GION IN AMERICAN PUnLIC LAw (1965); McGRATH, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN LAW
(1962); ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW "(1917).
589 St. John-Stevas, The Church and Censorship, in To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT 89
(Chandos ed. 1962).
590 CRAIG, SUPPRESSED BOOKS 18 (1963).
591 This interesting crusader, whom St. John-Stevas termed a "Protestant zealot," St. John-
Stevas, supra note 589, at 105, led a forty-year drive which resulted in, ampng other things,
the federal anti-obscenity legislation that is now 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) - the prototype
"Comstock law."
592 Recently formed and supported by clergymen of the three major faiths, this group has
attacked the Supreme Court for recent decisions which it feels reflect an undue libertinism
towards obscenity. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1964, p. 37, col. 8.
593 St. John-Stevas, supra note 589, at 91.
594 See 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 466.
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there would be no problem. That there is no such coincidence as a matter of fact
has prompted religious institutions to seek nonlegal controls. Dean John Cornelius
Hayes, " ' a legal consultant to the National Office for Decent Literature (NODL)
of the Catholic Bishops of the United States, has summed up the position of
the morally motivated:
1) Obscene publications exert a substantial adverse effect on public
morality and must, therefore, be controlled - either legally by the state,
or extra-legally but not illegally by private agencies of society.
2) Legal control by the state is, and can reasonably be, only minimal.
3) For that very reason, extra-legal control by private agencies of
society which are non-officiously concerned with the public welfare and
which themselves act only within the law is necessary for the common
good.598
The gap between Church and State is widened further by the freer associa-
tion of sexual discussions with the category of the obscene in the moral order
than in the legal. As Mr. Justice Brennan has noted:
Clearly enough, sex and obscenity are not [legally] synonymous. The por-
trayal of sex, for example, in art, literature, and scientific works is not
itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press. Thus the moral judgments made by theo-
logians of what constitutes obscenity, if embodied in laws, might well trans-
gress constitutional limits. In other words, the social norm is not neces-
sarily congruent with a religiously held sexual ethic.5 9 7
The vacillation of the law in bearing the burden of obscenity control will mark
the increments by which the American Church will measure its need to seek
other supports.
a. The Present Law
There is an old adage, "He who sups with the Devil needs a long spoon."
If, as some moralists would have it, the obscene is the province of the Devil,
to deal with it requires certain precautionary measures. The question is the
adequacy of the law's utensils when entering this area.
So much has been written about obscenity within the last few years that
it has begun to develop its own genre. 9 But be that as it may, there is such
a plethora of judicially unanswered questions that one author was prompted
to say that "the criminal law of obscenity has become such a jungle of verbiage
that no one could clearly set forth its rules of conduct."5 99 Whether recent
developments warrant acceptance of such a pessimistic conclusion remains to
be seen.
595 Dean of the Loyola University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
596 Hayes, A Position on the Control of Obscenity, 51 Ky. L.J. 641 (1963).
597 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 IHRv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1965).
598 E.g., Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REy. 5 (1960). This is, if not the best, the most frequently cited
article in the field.
599 Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 834
(1964).
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(i) The Standard -Roth Revisited
The rule in Regina v. Hicklin00 was long the most popular in American
and English law. Said Lord Chief Justice Cockburn: "I think the test of
obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged'as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." ' (Emphasis added.)
The rule was first accepted into American federal jurisprudence in United States
v. Bennett.°2 and over the years gained weight if not admirers. While feeling
obliged to employ the rule, Judge Learned Hand said in 1913:
While, therefore, the demurrer must be overruled, I hope it is not
improper for me to say that the rule as laid down, however consonant it
may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me to answer to the
understanding and morality of the present time .... I question whether
in the end men will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to
the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will not
believe that truth and beauty are too precious to society at large to be
mutilated in the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base
uses.
603
It was some twenty years later that there came a challenge to the supremacy
of the Hicklin rule and a presentiment of future patterns. The historic case of
United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses"0 4 saw Judge Woolsey leave behind
the test of the most susceptible person to embrace the standard of the "person
with average sex instincts."6 ' The test was still somewhat crude -"tending
to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts" -
but the threshold of reaction was raised to a higher level. In addition, convic-
tion by bowdlerization was rejected for an approach that purported to take the
material as a whole."'
While the Hicklin test is still a viable force in England,0 3 the present law
600 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
601 Id. at 371.
602 24 Fed. Gas. 1093 (No. 14,571) "(S.D.N.Y. 1879).
603 United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). The judge went
on to say:
If there be no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should not the word
"obscene" be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise be-
tween candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now?
If letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of what is
right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish the standard much as
they do in cases of negligence.
United States v. Kennerley, supra at 121.
604 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
605 Id. at 184.
606 Ibid.
607 Harrington, The Evolution of Obscenity Control Statutes, 3 WILLIAM & MARY L. R v.
302, 303 (1962).
608 The definition of obscenity set out in section 1 of the Obscene Publications Act,
1959, is substantially that adhered to at common law. An article is deemed to be
obscene if, subject to certain safeguards, its tendency is to deprave and corrupt those
who are likely to read, see or hear it.
Williams, The Control of Obscenity-I, 1965 Gim. L. Rav. (Eng.) 522, 528. The inclusion
of the Hicklin test was quite studied and not without modification. See Select Committee on
Obscene Publications, Report (1959). Significantly, the statute provides for a "defense of
public good": S(1) A person shall not be convicted. . . if it is proved that publication of the
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of obscenity in America, for the most part, begins and ends with Roth v. United
States.4 9 Actually two cases heard and decided together,"'0 this historic decision
upheld the constitutionality of both a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of
obscene publications.11 and a California statute prohibiting the sale or adver-
tising of such material. 1 2 Employing what has been styled the "two-level free-
speech theory,"6 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, held that "ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." '14
Justice Brennan rejected the Hicklin test outright and, relying heavily on history
for his constitutional conclusion, stated what has come to be regarded as the
constitutionally required test: "[W]hether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest" '615 and is "utterly without redeeming social
importance."61
From 1957 to early 1966, the Court decided some seventeen cases deal-
ing with the law of obscenity and censorship."1 7 Since they were all decided
either on procedural points,1 ' by per curiam order, 9 or in a paroxysm of
opinions in none of which a majority of the Court concurred,62 they let Roth's
substantive statement stand in pristine purity. Inherent in the Roth definition,
however, were ambiguities which plagued the courts. A major substantive prob-
lem was the question: "[A]ppeal to whose prurient interest? judged by whom?
on what basis?"62 This is a fair summation of the substantive problems left
unsettled by the Court in those nine years.
One of the latest decisions by the Court in this area continued the lack of
article in question is justified as being for the public good on the ground that it is
in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general
concern.
'(2) It is hereby declared that the opinion of experts as to the literary, artistic,
scientific or other merits of an article may be admitted in any proceedings under this
Act either to establish or to negative the said ground.
Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4.
609 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
610 The other case involved was Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
611 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
612 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.
613 At one level there are communications which, even though odious to the majority
opinion of the day, even though expressive of the thought we hate, are entitled to
be measured against the clear-and-present-danger criterion. At another level are
communications apparently so worthless as not to require any extensive judicial effort
to determine whether they can be prohibited.
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME CT. REV. 1, 11.
614 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
615 Id. at 489.
616 Id. at 484. But see text accompanying note 701 infra.
617 Chronologically, Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180
"(1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U.S. 372 (1958); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478 (1962); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 '(1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378
U.S. 576 (1964); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965); Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965).
618 E.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra note 617.
619 E.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
620 E.g., Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
621 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 1965).
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consensus that too-often characterized its obscenity determinations. In Jacobellis
v. Ohio,22 the conviction of an Ohio theater owner was reversed amid a shower
of opinions and a hail of verbiage. Six opinions were written, indicating the
division of the Court. 2 ' In none did a majority concur.
Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion in which he construed
Roth as directing its force solely against "hard-core pornography." Admitting
difficulty in defining that term, he said, "I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that."62 4 This statement gave judicial sup-
port to Professors Lockhart and McClure's assertion that the concept of obscenity
held by most members of the Court was that of "hard-core pornography." 25
In addition to concurring in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, Justice Gold-
berg wrote an opinion of his own in which he emphasized that the "fleeting"
nature of the most objectional scene was such as to pass unnoticed were it not
for the censor's concern. 26 Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion,
joined by Justice Douglas, on the basis of an absolutist approach to the first
amendment which rejected both the Roth test and any attempt to regulate
obscenity.627 Justice White simply concurred in the judgment and did not join
any of the opinions of his Brothers.
The Chief Justice dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Clark, not
on the grounds that the film was obscene, but more in deference to a judicial
restraint which would accord the findings of the lower courts more weight.62
Justice Harlan dissented with an eye toward giving the states greater freedom
to suppress than the federal government, making his test for the states "one
of rationality" encompassing the regulation of sex treated "in a fundamentally
offensive manner."62
By far the most important of the opinions was that of Justice Brennan.
In it, he emphasized that the Roth standard required an initial finding that the
material at issue "goes substantially beyond the customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters."6 ' This test was the second part
622 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The movie involved, Les Amants, "depicted the facial expres-
sions of a woman during orgasm, induced, suggested off-screen, by cunnilingus." Note, Obscen-
ity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1079(1964).
623 Analysis of the opinions in Jacobellis has led to differing numerical judgments as to
the separate stands taken by the Justices. Compare Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. Rxv. 655, 679 (1964) (five) with Port, Standards of Judging Obscenity---Who?
What? Where? 46 CHCAGO B. RECoRD 405 (1965) (two).
624 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) "(concurring opinion). Justice Stewart
has subsequently attempted to delineate what he meant. See Ginzburg v. United States, 86
Sup. Ct. 942, 957, n.3 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
625 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 598, at 60. But this conclusion has been since called
into question. Speaking for the Court later on, Justice Brennan said: "The New York courts
have interpreted 'obscenity' in § 1141 to cover only so-called 'hard-core pornography.' . . .
Since that definition of 'obscenity' is more stringent than the Roth definition, the judgment
that the constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in the application of § 1141 below."
Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 963 (1966).
626 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
627 Id. at 196 (concurring opinion).
628 Id. at 199 (dissenting opinion).
629 Id. at 204 '(dissenting opinion). This echoes his "patent offensiveness" test. See text
accompanying note 649 infra.
630 Id. at 191 (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
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of the American Law Institute's definition of obscenity6 ' which Justice Brennan
had utilized in a footnote in Roth to explain the term "prurient interest." '6 32
Perhaps his most crucial statements in Jacobellis were that "the constitutional
status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national
standard," ' and that the issue of obscenity "must ultimately be decided by this
Court."" 4 Criticized though these remarks have been,3 ' the fact that they did
not represent the reasoning of a majority of the Court has been often overlooked;
they have been taken by courts.. and commentators.. alike as definitive pro-
nouncements.
It is difficult to state categorically exactly what it is that Jacobellis does
stand for. It is not even valid to say that the Court determined that the film
was not legally obscene since, of the six Justices concurring in the judgment, two
of them, Justices Douglas and Black, did not base their decision on an appli-
cation of Roth but on their belief that the first amendment forbids any impinge-
ment whatever on speech.63
The confusion was heightened with the reversals in the Tralins3 9 and
Grove Press40 cases. Both were per curiam decisions. In both, the majority
was again fragmented, each Justice citing his stand in Jacobellis. In both, Mr.
Justice White left the ranks of the Jacobellis majority and cast his vote with
the minority who felt that certiorari should be denied.
The Grove Press decision was particularly unsatisfying. Involved was the
enjoining of the sale and distribution of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer in the
State of Florida. The District Court of Appeals of Florida had granted the
requested injunction after a jury had found the book was obscene under the
631 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2), (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) : "A thing is obscene if,
considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." [Emphasis added.]
632 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
633 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.). In this case,
he very questionably reads Judge Hand in Kennerley to intend a national standard.
634 Id. at 188. For this point, he cites Justice Harlan's opinion in Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962). The evolution of Justice Brennan's thought on this
point is interesting. In his dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
448 (1957), he said:
The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a special aptitude
for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury trial of obscenity therefore pro-
vides a peculiarly competent application of the standard for judging obscenity which,
by its definition, calls for an appraisal of material according to the average person's
application of contemporary community standards.
Considering the local character of the jury, this would suggest he then had in mind something
less than a national community.
635 E.g., O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1 (1964).
636 E.g., United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965); City of Chicago v.
Kimmel, 31 Il. 2d 202, 201 N.E.2d 386 (1964).
637 E.g., Comment, Obscenity: Roth Goes to the Movies, 14 BUFrALO L. REv. 512 (1965).
638 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion). The consistency
of these Justices on this point can be seen by an examination of their positions in: A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964) '(concurring opinion); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 155 & 167 (1959) (concurring opinions); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684, 690 & 697 (1959) (concurring opinions); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508
(1957) (dissenting opinion). Much of the confusion in this area is due to this stand. By
refusing to apply the Roth test, they are actually taking a third position which obscures the
meaning of a given decision.
639 Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
640 Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
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Roth test.6"1 Other jurisdictions that had considered the book had found it not
obscene.6 42 Thus, it was the national status of the book that was at issue. How-
ever, the summary reversal, solely by reference to Jacobellis, settled nothing as
to the Court's view of the nature of the material.643 Indeed, with regard given
to the afore-mentioned switching of sides by Justice White, it can be fairly said
that three justices did not think the book obscene,6" four did not wish to review
the conviction, 45 and two believed the first amendment barted any obscenity
conviction.6 "
The impact of Jacobellis upon the Roth standard has been similar to the
impact of the earlier Manual Enterprises case.647 Like Jacobellis, Manual Enter-
prises had no opinion of the Court. Likewise, concurrence of the justices was
on different grounds. Justice Brennan, for example, believed that the declara-
tion being reviewed was an ultra vires act; 643 Justice Harlan, on the other hand,
read Roth as requiring proscribable material to have a certain "patent offen-
siveness"64 which was lacking in the magazines under consideration. Yet, lower
courts were quick to seize upon the language of Justice Harlan's opinion as an
addendum to the Roth test although it was his and not the Court's. Exemplative
are the words of one court: "[M]aterial is proscribable 'obscenity,' or hard-
core pornography, if it has the requisite prurient appeal, and if it so exceeds
customary candor as to be patently offensive, unless it has any redeeming social
importance." The last requirement is part of the broad protective mantle of
the first amendment."'
It is the probabilistic import -the belief that this is an impliedly accurate
or constitutionally safer guess as to the Court's real position -that gives Jaco-
bells, like Manual Enterprises and others, 6 ' its legal impetus. Thus, for example,
the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded:
The word "obscene" began to take a fixed legal meaning with the inter-
pretation given in Roth .... This was followed by Manual Enterprises
... holding the publication of photographs of nude male figures designed
to appeal to homosexuals not to be so obscene as to lose the protection
of the First Amendment. Then, in Grove Press . . . the United States
Supreme Court held Tropic of Cancer to be within the protection of the
641 Grove Press, Inc. v. State, 156 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1963).
642 E.g., Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963). Arguably, this
case may have applied a stricter test since the statute under which the action was brought was
construed as encompassing only "hard-core pornography." But then it has been said that that
is exactly what the Court had in mind when it wrote Roth. Lockhart & McClure, supra note
598, at 60. But see note 406 supra.
643 Contra, State v. Martin, 3 Conn. Cir. 309, 213 A.2d 459 '(App. Div. 1965); People v.
Cohen, 22 App. Div. 2d 932, 255 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Both of these cases applied
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). The former came to its holding
only after discussing the differing meanings that had been given by various courts to explain
the reversal. State v. Martin, supra, 213 A.2d at 462.
644 Justices Brennan, Goldberg and Stewart.
645 Chief Justice Warren, Justices Clark, Harlan and White.
646 Justices Douglas and Black.
647 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
648 Id. at 495 (concurring opinion). The case involved review of a Post Office Department
ruling that the matter in question was nonmailable because obscene. Justice Brennan did not
find there was legislative authority for such an order.
649 Id. at 486 (Opinion of Harlan, J.).
650 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 1965).
651 E.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (no opinion of the Court).
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First Amendment, and, at the same time, in Tralins ... held Pleasure
Was My Business not to be obscene. Up to this time, there was some
confusion as to whether the community standards were local or national.
This was put at rest in Jacobellis ... which held The Lovers . .. not to
be obscene. 652
Despite such statements, the signification of these post-Roth cases remains essen-
tially connotative rather than denominative.
The most obvious result of these decisions was to leave the lower courts
-both state and federal- in a state of confusion. Judge Moore has summed
up the situation with his statement that "the judiciary in our tormented modem
civilization are also lost in a wilderness."65 From 1957 to 1966, the Supreme
Court decided cases; it did little to facilitate perception of the rule of law. There
was, in short, an abnegation by the Court of its instructional role.5 The sui
generis nature of obscenity regulation did not make such an approach prac-
tical. Many courts appeared to have unarticulated doubts as to the constitution-
ality of obscenity control - an area characterized by a vagueness accepted out
of history, a sanction arising more from fear of a "thing" than of a person.
The result of this abdication has been the development of a "play it safe" atti-
tude on the part of the lower courts. They were inclined to fill the interstices
of the legal fabric with the above-noted "probabilistic import" rather than with
the more traditional legal implements of analysis, analogy and reason.
Attributable to this reaction -and not to the holdings of the Supreme
Court - were the following conclusions as to the substantive requirements for
a declaration of obscenity: (1) the appeal must be to the prurient interest of
the average man and not to such interest in a person of peculiar susceptibilities
or to deviant attractions, such as brutality or sadism; (2) the matter in ques-
tion must be patently offensive, surpassing customary limits of candor; (3) the
material must be without any social importance whatever; (4) national com-
munity standards are to be employed; (5) final determination is subject to
de novo judicial review. This, then, was the safest route. However, the extent
to which these principles have been accepted and the questions which are still
unforeclosed are yet to be considered.
(a) Prurient Appeal -What and Whose?
When Justice Brennan articulated the Roth test, he explained the meaning
of "appeal to prurient interest" by referring, in a footnote of his opinion, to
the American Law Institute's definition of prurient interest as "a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion." '655 A vexing question is the extent
to which this definition can be expanded to include appeals to other aberrational
652 State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949, 951 (1964). The court held the state
obscenity statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the examined decisional law indicated
that the term "obscene" was unconstitutionally vague. 397 P.2d at 952.
653 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 '(2d Cir. 1965).
654 This Court hears cases such as the instant one not merely to rule upon the
alleged obscenity of a specific film or book but to establish principles for the guidance
of lower courts and legislatures. Yet most of our decisions since Roth have been
given without opinion and have thus failed to furnish such guidance.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
655 Authority cited note 631 supra.
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interests, such as brutality or sadism. A recent case, United States v. One Carton
Positive Motion Picture Film, 65 6 expressly rejected such inclusion when passing
on the allegedly obscene nature of an impounded foreign film. Certainly, there
is a strong analogy between these appeals; but as this decision indicates, present
sensitivities to the need for as much specificity as possible remain strong, and
expansion of the category of the obscene is not easily tolerated.
Related to the question of the nature of the interest to which an appeal
is being made is the question of the legitimacy of regulating appeals to the
prurient interest of other than the "average man."65  Is an appeal to the
prurient interest of a homosexual forbidden? The Court in Manual Enterprises
never reached this question, though the magazines involved were considered to
be so directed.65
The question was still open when the court in United States v. Klaw659
reviewed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which prohibited the mailing
of obscene matter. The exhibits were described by the Court of Appeals as
"sado-masochistic." Apparently accepting -at least for the sake of argument
- the possibility that appeal to the prurient interest of a deviate might be the
basis for a finding of obscenity, the court reversed the conviction for lack of
evidence showing appeal to the prurient interest of anyone.6
9
When a New Jersey court confronted the problem, a conviction under an
obscenity ordinance was reversed although photographs on which the convic-
tion was based were regarded as appealing to homosexual prurient interests.66'
Constrained by a previous holding of the state's supreme court,662 which had
"approved the frame of reference of the 'average member of society' rather
than the 'weakest,' and of 'society at large' rather than 'some local geographical
area,' " the intermediate court expressly rejected the "effect solely upon homo-
sexuals in applying the 'prurient appeal' aspect of the obscenity test."66 That
this type of result may have been more due to the inadvertence of the court and
an eagerness to disapprove of Hicklin, rather than due to an analysis of Roth,
has been suggested by Lockhart and McClure. 64 Certainly it was not clearly
compelled by the Roth test, which could be construed to mean that the "average
man" was to determine if there was a prurient appeal to the audience to which
the material was directed.665
This was the situation when the Supreme Court addressed itself to the
question in Mishkin v. New York.666 Appellant had been sentenced to three
years in prison for, inter alia, publishing obscene books in violation of a New
656 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
657 See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rnv. 5, 70 (1960); Wilson, California's New Obscenity Statute:
The Meaning of "Obscene" and the Problem of Scienter, 36 So. CAr.. L. REv. 513, 523 (1963).
658 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 468.
659 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
660 Id. at 168.
661 Newark v. Licht, 83 N.J. Super. 499, 200 A.2d 508 (Super. Ct. 1964).
662 State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
663 Newark v. Licht, 83 N.J. Super. 499, 200 A.2d 508, 510 '(Super. Ct. 1964).
664 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 657, at, 73.
665 See Wilson, supra note 657.
666 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
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York statute.66  The books were concededly "sado-masochistic." The main
argument before the Court was that the definitional limits of obscenity-as
spelled out by the Court-did not encompass material that was "merely
sadistic or masochistic." By a vote of six to three, the Court affirmed the con-
victions. Justice Brennan, writing the first "opinion of the Court" since Roth
to deal with a substantive obscenity question, 6 ' answered quite succinctly:
We reject this argument as being founded on an unrealistic interpretation
of the prurient-appeal requirement.
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the
prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in
sex of the members of that group. The reference to the "average" or
"normal" person in Roth . . . does not foreclose this holding. . . . We
adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual
interests of its intended and probable recipient group; and since our
holding requires that the recipient group be defined with more specificity
than in terms of sexually immature persons, it also avoids the inadequacy
of the most-susceptible-person facet of the Hicklin test.66 9
Justice Harlan concurred separately on the basis of his views in his dissent
in the Fanny Hill case, discussed below, which would permit the states to employ
"reasonable" tests for dealing with obscenity. 7 ' Justices Black, Douglas and
Stewart dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black maintained his stance of
total opposition to any restraint on speech,' as did Justice Douglas in an
opinion written to express his dissension in both this case and another decided
the same day.' 2 Justice Stewart dissented in the belief that the material was
not "hard-core" pornography, the test he has favored for some years now.'
Despite such differing views, the mustering of a clear-though minimal
-- majority behind an opinion meeting the question head-on should serve to
end the debate here. The Court has stepped in to moderate what was fast
becoming an extreme reaction to the equally extreme Hicklin rule.
(b) Patent Offensiveness - Customary Limits of Candor
As Mishkin would suggest, a possible resolution of many problems in this
area would entail a shift in emphasis to an examination of the intent of the
creator or disseminator. To a great degree, however, the courts are primarily
667 N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 1141.
668 Only five justices joined in the opinion of the Court. Justice Harlan concurred sepa-
rately. See note 670 infra.
669 Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 963-64 '(1966).
670 Id. at 968 (concurring opinion).
671 Id. at 968 (dissenting opinion). Justice Black noted that he had not read any of the
material in question.
672 Id. at 969 (dissenting opinion).
673 Id. at 969 (dissenting opinion). Interestingly enough, the New York Court of Appeals
had applied a "hard-core" pornography test of its own to a different consequence. Of this
Justice Stewart said: "This case makes abundantly clear that the phrase has by no means been
limited in New York to the clearly identifiable and distinct class of material I have de-
scribed ... ." Mishkin v. New York, supra, at 969, footnote (dissenting opinion).
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concerned 4 with the effect of the material in the light of community mores; for
it would be anomalous to outlaw that which is tolerated by society in general.
This is why Justice Brennan felt compelled to emphasize that obscenity exceeds
"customary limits of candor," ' and why Justice Harlan interjected the term
"patent offensiveness."67 Yet, while sensing the rationale of this aspect of the
test, the lower courts have been somewhat muddled in their approach to it. In
the last two years, at least one court has ignored "patent offensiveness";.77 at
least one other has used the term in lieu of "customary limits of candor";6.
and a third has used both terms, recognizing the intended equation between
them.6 7 9 Oddly enough, however, other lower courts have accepted "patent
offensiveness" and "exceeding customary limits of candor" as part of the defi-
nition of obscenity, but as separate tests in name if not in application."' The
sum of this activity evidences what may be a totally unprecedented judicial
regard for a footnote. The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this question.
(c) Social Importance
In Roth, the Court noted that:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance -
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more impor-
tant interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscentiy as utterly without redeeming social importance.681
(Emphasis added.)
Roth has thus been considered to have established a treble standard: appeal to
prurient interest; exceeding customary limits of candor so as to be patently offen-
sive; lack of redeeming social importance. This last aspect has developed its
own unique brand of confusion; namely, did the Court intend to permit a
balancing of social importance against prurient appeal and patent offensive-
ness.
6 8 2
In Jacobellis, Justice Brennan stated:
It follows that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas,
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, or that has literary
or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may
not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection.
674 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 470.
675 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
676 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (Opinion of Harlan, J.).
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), cited by Justice Bren-
nan, with MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), cited by Justice
Harlan and which gives greater emphasis to the dual nature of the proposed test.
677 City of Chicago v. Kimmel, 31 Ill. 2d 202, 201 N.E.2d 386 (1964).
678 People v. Kaplan, 44 Misc. 2d 110, 252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Crim. Ct. 1964).
679 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
680 E.g., United States v. One Carton Positive Film, 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Dale Book Co. v. Leary, 233 F. Supp. 754 (E. D. Pa. 1964).
681 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
682 See generally Note, Obscenity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept 'of Immunity,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063 (1964).
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Nor may the constitutional status of the material be made to turn on a
"weighing of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for a work
cannot be proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social importance."6 3
Application of this principle was made by the Tenth Circuit in Haldeman v.
United States.684 The defendant had mailed booklets which were found on
trial to be obscene. Purportedly written by a doctor, they followed a question-
and-answer format by which information and details regarding sexual experiences
and practices, primarily abnormal, were related. Relying on the above statement
of Justice Brennan and on Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents,6"5 the ap-
pellate court reversed on a finding of social importance.
In People v. Bruce,6"' the Supreme Court of Illinois overturned a decision
which had found night-club entertainer Lenny Bruce guilty of an obscene per-
formance. The court had originally affirmed the conviction on the basis of a
"balancing test" which found the offensive nature of the act was such as to
outweigh its value as social commentary. This judgment and opinion were
vacated and the case was re-argued in the light of Jacobellis. The court then
concluded that since some of the performance had social importance as satire,
the whole was immunized." 7 Justice Schaefer, in a separate opinion, concurred
in the result, but disagreed with the notion that a modicum of social importance
would protect the totality.68 8
Justice Schaefer's comment highlights the problem on this point and focuses
on the balancing question. He is not alone in his approach. In G. P. Putnam's
Sons v. Calissi, s9 a New Jersey court was called upon to review a decision finding
the book Fanny Hill to be obscene. The court rejected the notion that social
value to a certain select group of experts would fulfill the demands of the test.
It found that if there was no "social, literary or historical" value to the average
man, the material would be "utterly without redeeming social import." It would
appear that this was at heart a balancing test. Significantly, the court noted
that: "A book may be well-written but still obscene."68'
The Fanny Hill book has had a long history in American courts and has
been accorded rather disparate treatment. In one of the first obscenity cases in
this country, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had held against it. 91 Shortly
before the above New Jersey decision, it had nonetheless been cleared by the
New York Court of Appeals. 2 In the most recent Massachusetts case dealing
with Fanny Hill, a decree declaring it to be obscene was affirmed by the state's
highest court. 93 In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court said:
683 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 '(1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
684 340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965).
685 360 U.S. 684 (1959). See generally text accompanying note 772 infra.
686 31 Ill.2d 459, 202 N.E.2d 497 (1964).
687 202 N.E.2d at 498.
688 202 N.E.2d at 498 (concurring opinion).
689 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1964).
690 205 A.2d at 922.
691 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
692 Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1964).
693 Attorney General v. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,"
206 N.E.2d 403 (Mass. 1965).
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But the fact that the testimony may indicate this book has some minimal
literary value does not mean it is of any social importance. We do not
interpret the "social importance' test as requiring that a book which
appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must be unqualifiedly
worthless before it can be deemed obscene.
694
Quite obviously, the court had accepted the concept of a balancing test as con-
stitutionally permissible in this area.
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court which reversed
in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attor-
ney General (hereinafter Fanny Hill).69 The Court divided six to three and
once again failed to produce a majority opinion. Justice Brennan announced the
judgment of the Court and wrote the initial opinion which was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Fortas. Citing the above passage from the lower court's
opinion, he said:
[R]eversal is required because the court misinterpreted the social value
criterion.... A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly
without redeeming social value. This is so even though the book is found
to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each
of the three federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently;
the social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled
by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.6 9 6 (Latter emphasis added.)
Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion in which he persisted in his
contention that "the First Amendment does not permit the censorship of ex-
pression not brigaded 'with illegal action."6 7 He also agreed with Justice Brennan
that Fanny Hill was not obscene under the Roth standard, as the record dis-
closed that the prosecution failed to prove lack of "social importance." This
appears to be the first time he has chosen to make any application of Roth,"'
but his opinion focused primarily on the integrity of the first amendment. He
made the striking suggestion that the adjudication of first amendment cases by
a majority vote of the justices constituted the type of majority domination against
which the Bill of Rights was designed to protect: "To outlaw the book on such
a voting record would be to let majorities rule where minorities were thought
to be supreme." '699
The other justices who voted for reversal, Black and Stewart, did so for
the reasons given in their respective dissenting opinions in the Ginzburg and
Mishkin cases."' ° The three justices in the minority each wrote a dissenting
opinion which went off on different grounds. Justice Clark first attacked the
statement that the Roth test envisioned a finding of lack of social importance.
Raising the issue for the first time, he felt that the three justices who had joined
694 Id. at 406.
695 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
696 Id. at 977-78 '(Opinion of Brennan, J.).
697 Id. at 981 (concurring opinion).
698 See cases cited note 638 supra.
699 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 982 (1966) (concurring opinion).
700 Id. at 979 (concurring opinion).
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in the initial opinion had interjected "a new test into that laid down in Roth."'"
Turning from that issue, he went on to criticize the application of the "social
importance" test by his Brothers. He pointed out that the statement of the
Supreme Judicial Court was "casual" insofar as the trial court had specifically
found the book to be without any value.
Justice Harlan abstained from commenting on the necessity of requiring
evidence of lack of social importance. °2 Alluding to the diversity of approaches
taken by the other justices, he dissented on the basis of his frequently stated
contention that the constitutional limits on state regulation of obscenity were
not as stringent as those on federal regulation: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
requires of a State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted
notion of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step with current
American standards."7 (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice White was the third dissenter. Like Justice Clark, he took issue
with the employment of the "social importance" test in Justice Brennan's opinion.
He recognized the usage of the terminology in Roth, but construed it as being
"not an independent test of obscenity but ... relevant only to determining the
predominant prurient interest of the material, a determination which the court
or the jury will make based on the material itself and all the evidence in the
case, expert or otherwise."7"4
What does this decision portend? If deference is paid to the "no-majority-
opinion" principle, the spate of opinions is merely "sound and fury, signifying
nothing." The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was
reversed, and that was all. On the other hand, should "probabilistic import"
come into play here -as it did with the Jacobellis and Manual Enterprises
cases"' s -the lower courts can be expected to seize upon Justice Brennan's
opinion as the word of the Court and use it to reject any "balancing" in this
area, although such a result would be due to less than a careful reading of the
decision. The opinion will almost certainly be used to buttress the application
of "social importance" as a separate and necessary test for obscenity. If recent
history is any teacher, the fact that this reading of Roth was strongly objected
to by two justices and assented to by only three will probably be overlooked by
the lower courts as they turn to this decision.
The division of the Justices over this point marks the fullest discussion yet
given to "social importance" by the Court. The Roth explication had included
the acceptance of "social importance" as a constituent test without any clear
analysis of it. Now, however, members of the Court have themselves called its
significance into question. At essence, the controversy centers around the "inde-
pendence" of the test. Is lack of social importance a conclusion flowing from
a finding of obscenity, or is it itself a premise essential to such a finding? Framed
another way, does Roth permit a "balancing" test?
The Roth majority opinion does not clearly answer the question. Its criti-
701 Id. at 989 (dissenting opinion).
702 Id. at 996 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
703 Id. at 997. See text accompanying note 629 supra.
704 Id. at 999 (dissenting opinion).
705 See text accompanying note 651 supra.
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cal statement that obscenity was rejected as being "utterly without redeeming
social importance" can be read fairly either way. However, the remark was
immediately followed by a quotation from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"'8
which denoted obscene utterances as being of "such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality."'7 ' Reliance on this statement would
tend to substantiate the position that Roth treated lack of "social importance"
as a concomitant of obscenity and not as a necessary factor in its determination.
This was the basis for the dissents of Justices Clark and White.
Justice Brennan's approach may be more palatable, as it prevents a holding
that matter which has even the slightest social worth may be nonetheless out-
lawed. At the same time, the Brennan approach - if accepted by the judiciary
- might lead to a total emasculation of Roth in situations where (1) the
material is not clearly "hard-core" pornography, or (2) where there is no
evidence of any "pandering."708 Justice White noted the potential reach of
this position:
To say that material within the Roth definition of obscenity is never-
theless not obscene if it has some redeeming social value is to reject one
of the basic propositions of the Roth case - that such material is not
protected because it is inherently and utterly without social value.
If "social importance" is to be used as the prevailing opinion uses
it today, obscene material, however far beyond customary limits of candor,
is immune if it has any literary style, if it contains any historical references
or language characteristic of a bygone day, or even if it is printed or bound
in an interesting way. Well written, especially effective obscenity is pro-
tected; the poorly written is vulnerable. And why shouldn't the fact that
some people buy and read such material prove its "social value"? 70 9
It may be that the impact of Justice Brennan's opinion will not be great.
Lower courts may well reject it as not being the law of the land or, while pur-
porting to accept it, they may in fact covertly employ Justice White's meth-
odology in the guise of Justice Brennan's terminology. Should, however, the
Brennan approach gain full acceptance - either in future decisions of the
Court or by virtue of its "probabilistic import" in the instant case -the char-
acter of obscenity regulation will assuredly be affected. Carried to its extreme,
it would go far to eliminate cases in which the prosecution places major reliance
on the character of the material alone. Some sort of case could probably be
made out in favor of the "social importance" of nearly all objectionable material.
Furthermore, adoption of the Brennan approach would require delineation of
"social value." But what is "social importance"? What constitutes "literary"
or "artistic" value? This conundrum would have provided ample sport for a
medieval debate. Given an aesthetics concerned with form, that which would
be "artistic" would be that which is done well. Prescinding from content as
706 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
707 Id. at 572.
708 See text accompanying note 731 infra.
709 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 999 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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such a theory does, well-wrought pornography or obscenity- that which would
best appeal to prurient interest -could be considered "artistic."
Such a conclusion is not a merely theoretical reductio ad absurdum. The
description of an unidentified Cook County, Illinois, obscenity prosecution in-
cluded the following: "Prosecutor Joseph R. Gill said, 'I asked Prof. Cosbey
[of the American Literature Department of Roosevelt University, testifying for
the defense] his definition of literary merit. He said a book has to have a plot,
a beginning, and an end, and continuity.' "710 This is probably as minimal a
definition of "literary merit" as can be conceived. If "literary merit" such as
this would substantiate a finding of non-obscenity, there would be almost total
emasculation of any meaningful legal control. If this is an example of what the
courts will be confronted with by way of "literary merit," and if a balancing test
be denied them, they may have to utilize other devices, such as "pandering"; 1
for, despite Justice Brennan's statement to the contrary,"1 2 he would seem in
fact to limit Roth to "hard-core" pornography.
A concomitant problem is whether or not to evolve different tests for dif-
ferent media. This has already been done in the procedural area as will be seen
below.7"' But what of a film vis-i-vis a book? Should it have the same standard
applied to it? Must a film which is innocuous but for a brief segment be taken
as a whole? What if that segment were to be a depiction of an act of sexual
intercourse? The film, Les Amants, which was the subject of Jacobellis, was
apparently close to that, but the question was not reached."1
Such an issue may prove difficult to handle insofar as it would entail a
modification of the "taken as a whole" aspect of Roth. 5 Possibly, entirely dif-
ferent grounds for the decision might be allowed: finding that the portrayal is
close enough to actual conduct as to be regulated in the same way that the state
could regulate such an act in the street.716 In any event, the answer must once
again wait upon the courts.
(d) The Relevant Community
Of greatest acceptance has been the notion that obscenity control requires
the application of national rather than local community standards. As stated
by one court:
[T]he phrase "contemporary community standards" refers to the entire
nation and not the geographic boundaries of any state or subdivision there-
of. To limit "contemporary community standards" to the standards of an
area less than the entire nation would conflict with the First Amendment.
Jacobellis v. Ohio .... 717
710 Mabley, Jury Vetoes Another Smut "Masterpiece," Chicago's American, Dec. 20, 1965,
p. 3, col. 1. The jury went on to convict.
711 See text accompanying note 731 infra.
712 See note 625 supra.
713 See text following note 769 infra.
714 Justice Goldberg came close to this problem when he noted the "fleeting" aspect of the
passage, but the manner of his acknowledgment was by way of dismissal. JacobelHis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
715 See generally Comment, Obscenity: Roth Goes to the Movies, 14 BUFFALO L. Ruv.
512 (1965).
716 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242, 245
(1964), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 259 (1965).
717 State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949, 951 (1964).
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Courts taking this position in reliance on statements made in Jacobellis and/or
Manual Enterprises are manifold. 18 Despite criticism of the wisdom of such a
holding 19 and a questionable analytical basis for regarding this point as con-
clusively settled by the Supreme Court,7 2 this stands forth as the rule at the
present time.
(e) De Novo Review
The treatment given by the courts to the question of the proper scope of
review on appeal has been summed up in one opinion:
[W]e accept the now prevailing view that in obscenity cases the issue for
determination is subject to constitutional limitations and the courts are
faced with an obligation to make an independent determination of the
constitutional issue which cannot be avoided by considering "obscenity"
as a fact question only.7
2
'
In case after case,7 22 this pattern is firmed and established. With little discussion
other than a reference to Jacobellis, the matter is being settled. 22 Again, the
value of Jacobellis as a precedent may be questioned, but for all practical pur-
poses, the only point to be settled may be whether or not the trial judge himself
is under an obligation to make an independent judgment as to the nature of
the material. 24
(ii) Blue Ball to Intercourse to Middlesex - The Ginzburg Gloss
During the course of the writing of this Survey, the United States Supreme
Court decided three cases which lend a new dimension to the law of obscenity
and which will set the pattern for some time to come. Two of the cases -
Mishkin and Fanny Hill - have already been considered in relation to different
aspects of the Roth standard. The third is set off here to emphasize its significance.
Unlike the two other cases, it does not just clarify Roth: it amplifies it to propor-
tions heretofore unrealized.
In 1963, Ralph Ginzburg set out to secure mailing privileges for three of
his publications.725 His trek took him from the postoffices in Blue Ball- and
Intercourse, Pennsylvania, to that in Middlesex, New Jersey. It was there that
he was permitted to mail his publications. Subsequently, he was, like Mr. Roth,
indicted and tried for violating the federal obscenity statute.72 Upon trial, he
and the three corporations he controlled were convicted upon 28 separate
718 E.g., United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
719 E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 '(1964) (dissenting opinion).
720 Text accompanying note 635 supra.
721 State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20, 28 (Mo. 1965).
722 E.g., United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965); City of Chicago v.
Kimmel, 31 Ill.2d 202, 201 N.E.2d 386 (1964).
723 But see Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213
A.2d 235 (1965) where the court recognized the division in Jacobellis but did not reach the
question itself.
724 See United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
725 EROS, a magazine; Liaison, a biweekly newsletter; and The Housewife's Handbook on
Selective Promiscuity, a short book.
726 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).,
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counts. 2 7 When an appeal to the Third Circuit failed to result in a reversal, 2 '
he took his case to the Supreme Court. By a vote of five to four, the Court
affirmed his conviction in Ginzburg v. United States.28
Justice Brennan wrote for a majority consisting of the Chief Justice and
Justices Clark, White and Fortas. Relying heavily on what he styled "a back-
ground of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient
appeal," ' he held that "in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative
with respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth
test."7' ' The Court did not pass on the status of the material apart from the
context of Ginzburg's activities but coupled it with his conduct to condemn him:
[B]y animating sensual detail to give the publication a salacious cast, peti-
tioners reinforced what is conceded by the Government to be an otherwise
debatable conclusion. . . . [They deliberately emphasized the sexually
provocative aspects of the work, in order to catch the salaciously disposed.
They proclaimed its obscenity; and we cannot conclude that the court
below erred in taking their own evaluation at its face value and declaring
the book as a whole obscene despite the other evidence.7 3 2
The decision precipitated four strong dissents by the minority, all along
lines now long familiar. In two separate opinions, Justices Douglas and Black
said that the first amendment called for an end to governmental censorship." 3
Justice Stewart voted to reverse on the grounds that the material before the
Court did not constitute "hard-core" pornography."3 Justice Harlan, who had
been with the majority in Mishkin, here found that the books did not meet a
"hard-core" pornography test and disagreed with the notion that a "pandering"
test could be read into the federal statute.3 5
The Ginzburg codicil represents the realization of Chief Justice Warren's
wish that the law of obscenity be changed so that "it is not the book that is on
trial; it is a person.""3 6 Embraced in the opinion of the Court is the "variable
obscenity" concept, which is basically a relative standard taking into account
such factors as intent, conduct and the primary audience. 7 The opinion also
included the "commercial exploitation" rationale exemplified by the ALI Model
Penal Code.7"'
Justice Brennan insisted that he was merely explicating the Roth standard:
727 United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
728 United States v. Ginzburg, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964).
729 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
730 Id. at 945.
731 Id. at 949.
732 Id. at 948.
733 Id. at 969 and 950 respectively (dissenting opinions).
734 Id. at 956 (dissenting opinion).
735 Id. at 953 (dissenting opinion). In line with his distinction between the powers of the
state and federal governments in this area, he employs the more stringent "hard-core" pornog-
raphy test for evaluating the conduct of the federal government.
736 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion).
737 See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 68 (1960); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle
of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 834, 847 (1964).
738 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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All that will have been determined is that questionable publications are
obscene in a context which brands them as obscene as that term is defined
in Roth-a use inconsistent with any claim to the shelter of the First
Amendment.... It is important to stress that this analysis simply elaborates
the test by which the obscenity vel non of the material must be judged.73 9
This will be true to the extent that the test of "pandering" is reserved for "close
cases" and "questionable publications" -that is, to the degree that Roth must
first be applied to establish "closeness" or "questionableness" before Ginzburg
comes into play. While Ginzburg would primarily be an adjunct to Roth, it is
likely that the tail will begin to wag the dog.
In the first place, as Justice Brennan himself noted, the Court had previously
"regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for the determination of the
question.""4 0 But now the "close case" can be swung by other considerations.
In his opinion in Fanny Hill, Justice Brennan suggested that evidence of "pan-
dering" could have brought about a different result in that case, specifically
negating the finding of social value. 4 Yet, what is a "close case"? Is it one
in which (adopting Justice Brennan's position) only two of the three Roth
standards are met? Would meeting one of the standards produce a "close case"?
Moreover, are the standards to have different weight in terms of "closeness"?
Would a finding of appeal to prurient interest always be necessary before ele-
ments of "pandering" could come in? If the "close case" is liberally construed
and evidence of "pandering" is freely admitted, it is conceivable that even a
sale of the Bible could be proscribed." 2 Essentially, it would be a matter of
convicting on the basis of a mere representation of obscenity. 43
But irrespective of the attainment of such an interpretation, Ginzburg will
certainly permit Roth to be applied with more certainty in formerly dubious
situations. Far more importantly, Ginzburg - along with Fanny Hill and
Mishkin - may signal the beginning of the end of obscenity regulation premised
on the nature of the material alone. The overriding concern of the majority in
Ginzburg was the conduct of the defendant. In Mishkin, it was pointed out
that "appellant was not prosecuted for anything he said or believed, but for
what he did, for his dominant role.., in producing and selling allegedly obscene
books. 17 44 (Emphasis added.) And insofar as Mishkin adjusted Roth to con-
sider the audience to which the material was directed, it moved to a consideration
of the activity of the purveyor.
The tenor of the Court in these opinions is certainly much different from that
739 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 949-50 (1966).
740 Id. at 944.
741 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General,
86 Sup. Ct. 975,-978 (1966) (Opinion of Brennan, J.). He indicated, however, that there
would have to be a finding of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness.
742 Justice Douglas suggested this possibility:
A book should stand on its own, irrespective of the reasons why it was written or
the wiles used in selling it. I cannot imagine any promotional effort that would make
chapters 7 and 8 of the Song of Solomon any the less or any more worthy of First
Amendment protection than does its unostentatious inclusion in the average edition
of the Bible.
Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 969-70 '(1966) (dissenting opinion).
743 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(2) (e) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
744 Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 961 (1966).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
in Roth where Chief Justice Warren's was a solitary voice. Should Justice
Brennan's reading of Roth in Fanny Hill be accepted - a reading which could
go far toward narrowing Roth's application 5 - the concurrence of the two
themes could pitch obscenity control, for all intent and purposes, completely on
conduct.
The prospects for the future are multifarious. The Ginzburg decision should
do much to resolve the "inherent residual vagueness of the Roth test." 7" The
balance it strikes between the conflicting policies of free speech and obscenity
control should still many rumblings of both the censorious and the libertarian.
And in reverting to an emphasis on conduct, it goes far toward bringing obscenity
regulation into line with the traditional concerns of the criminal law. The
judicial custom of focusing on activity is not one to be easily abandoned.
Concomitantly, the increased concentration on conduct that these decisions
will surely bring may well presage the end of the controversy over the scope of
the standards to be employed and the limits of judicial review. "Pandering"
would appear to be a rather relative concept that would vary almost of neces--
sity with the locale. "Commercial exploitation" in Oskaloosa, Iowa, might well
differ from a like activity in New York, but such a variance could well be within
constitutional tolerances. At the same time, it would be based on concrete facts
that would be solidly within the province of the jury.
The decision will certainly create new questions to be answered. As was
asked above, how "close" need a case be before the "pandering" test can be
employed? How much reliance can be put on "pandering" alone; and more
importantly, how necessary will evidence of "pandering" be to a conviction?
These questions, however, should prove easier to answer. The whole character
of obscenity regulation appears to be on the verge of a change that would release
many tensions now underlying it. Should the Ginzburg rationale temper the
debate over governmental intervention in this area, the substantive side of ob-
scenity law should work itself out as well as the procedural has.
(iii) The Procedures-A Stirring of the Waters
The problems accompanying obscenity regulation are not relegated solely
to the definitional order. To a great extent, the procedural discussion presup-
poses the substantive, but adds the additional nebulous problem of prior restraint.
The procedures used must not impinge upon the right to freely disseminate non-
regulable matter."
The landmark case of Near v. Minnesota74 recognized freedom of the
press as meaning "principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or censorship." 4 ' The modem Court has built upon this foundation
in the course of several decisions. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,50 decided
the same day as the Roth case, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, upheld
745 See text accompanying note 708 supra.
746 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 950 n.19 (1966).
747 See generally CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); CHENERY,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS '(1955); THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS (1962).
748 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
749 Id. at 716.
750 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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a New York statute which provided for the issuance of an injunction pendente
lite and restricted the distribution of allegedly obscene booklets prior to a full
judicial hearing on the merits. The proceeding was a civil one, seeking both
a final injunction against distribution and the destruction of the books already
published. Justice Frankfurter distinguished Near on the grounds that the pro-
ceeding in question did not involve yet-to-be-published material, but rather came
after publication. Significantly, he stated: "The phrase 'prior restraint' is not
a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.""'
Four years later, Justice Brennan clarified the meaning of Kingsley Books
in Marcus v. Search Warrant."' At issue was the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute providing for the ex parte granting of a search warrant which empowered
a city police officer to seize all "obscene" materials preliminary to a court
adjudication as to their nature. The procedure was struck down. Kingsley Books
was distinguished since: (1) the proceeding in the New York case was initiated
against a named publication, a copy of which was annexed to the complaint;
(2) the restraints there were not "catch-alls"; and (3) the distributor there
could still disseminate the books in the face of the injunction and could raise
the issue of non-obscenity by way of defense.758
If Marcus represented something of a withdrawal from the position in
Kingsley Books and a strengthening of the mandate against prior restraints,
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan..4 furthered the trend. In something of a variant
approach, the Rhode Island legislature purported to create a "Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth" which, among other things, circulated lists of
"objectionable" material. Justice Brennan, once more speaking for the Court,
found this method of informal censorship to be a manner of state regulation
which, "obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions ... at the same time
eliminated the safeguards of the criminal process" and was, therefore, procedurally
defective.7 5
It was against this background that the Court undertook the task of demon-
strating that Delphic obfuscation based on its tripartition would not be denied
its treatment of the procedural. 5 6 The Attorney General of Kansas, acting
under a statute providing a procedure similar to that involved in Marcus,
filed an information as the first step in a proceeding to have certain books
declared obscene and destroyed. Apparently aware of the ramifications of
Marcus, he went further than demanded by the statute by identifying the
material he was after by title and by submitting copies of certain of the titles
to the judge for his perusal. Upon the basis of this ex parte inquiry, the judge
issued a warrant authorizing the seizure of the titles named in the information.
All copies of the books found were seized. Over the objection of the distributor
that the procedure was defective, a final hearing was held; the books were
751 Id. at 441.
752 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
753 Id. at 735-36.
754 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
755 Id. at 69.
756 See text accompanying note 638 supra. Unlike too many of the substantive cases, Near,
Kingsley Books, Marcus'and Bantam Books each had what has become a rarity in this area, a
majority opinion.
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found obscene and ordered to be burned. The decision was upheld on appeal.
On the same day that the Court handed down its decision in Jacobellis,
it reversed the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court in A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas."'7 Perhaps as a spill-over from the Jacobellis decision, there was once
more no opinion of the Court. Decision was had amidst a welter of views. Mr.
Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and wrote the initial
opinion concurred in by the Chief Justice, Justice White and Justice Goldberg.
His opinion distinguished Kingsley and objected to the Kansas procedure on
two grounds: that all the books were seized and that there was no adversary
proceeding on the question of obscenity prior to the issuance of the warrant. 58
Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion, joined by Justice Douglas,
which reiterated his conviction that any regulation of the press was in violation
of the dictates of the first amendment.759 Justice Stewart concurred separately
and made an interesting distinction based on a "hard-core pornography" classi-
fication. If the initial scrutiny of the judge led him to believe that the material
was "hard-core," the Justice would uphold the procedures as to the material
inspected. He voted to reverse in this case since he found that the books did
not fall into this category. ° This attitude would seem to be similar to the
"contraband" argument- that obscenity is not entitled to procedural safe-
guards relating to searches and seizures since it is outside the law- expressly
rejected by Justice Brennan in his opinion." 1
The decision concluded with a dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Clark. Referring to his views in Jacobellis regarding the constitutional
acceptability of "rational" state procedures," 2 he took issue with the conclusion
that the Kansas procedure was unconstitutional. He particularly directed his
attention to Justice Brennan's two objections. Taking what he believed to be
the four points used by Justice Brennan in Marcus to distinguish Kingsley, he
considered them one by one and found them to be satisfied. The thrust of his
argument was directed against the question of the imposition of extensive
restraints prior to an adversary proceeding and the expeditious initiation of such
proceeding. Prescinding from factual distinctions in the procedures, he empha-
sized that the practical effects would be no worse than Kingsley: (1) the
Kingsley procedure did not really allow adequate time to make a meaningful
defense prior to the hearing on the temporary injunction; (2) the "chilling
effect" of such an order would be substantially the same as the procedure here;
and (3) there was in fact no unreasonable delay in bringing the final hearing.
In summation, he attacked what he considered a possibly "unarticulated premise"
of the majority - that the procedure was struck down per se as a prior restraint
- by referring back to a consideration of the policies prohibiting such a re-
straint. Such policies he found satisfied."'
Fortunately, the strong tradition of judicial unanimity when dealing with
757 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
758 Id. at 210 (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
759 Id. at 213 (concurring opinion).
760 Id. at 214 (concurring opinion).
761 Id. at 211 '(Opinion of Brennan, J.).
762 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
763 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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procedural questions has not been severely impaired by the no-majority-opinion
approach of A Quantity of Books. Lower courts approach such issues more
confidently when raised, and settle them without stirring the deep dusts of
judicial precedents. The impact of clarity may well explain the comparatively
few cases that have arisen centering procedural questions. Given perceptible
edges, enforcement officials are less apt to stray from the path of constitutionality.
Illustrative of the juridical facility in this area is the case of Evergreen
Review, Inc. v. Cahn,"" decided two weeks prior to A Quantity of Books.
Upon affidavit to a county judge, a search warrant was issued to seize pur-
portedly pornographic materials. Two copies of the magazines were seized,
brought to the judge, and read by him ex parte. This resulted in the authoriza-
tion of an information against the printers and further warrants for their arrests.
At the time of their arrests, some 21,000 copies of the magazine, the entire
printing of the issue, were seized under the initial search warrant. Criminal
actions based upon these transactions were pending when the defendants brought
an action seeking a stay of the state proceeding and the return of the magazines.
Finding the Marcus decision very much on point, the court granted the injunc-
tion on the basis of the mass seizure, the lack of an adversary proceeding, and
the absence of judicial supervision.765
Two additional cases worth mentioning have risen subsequent to A Quantity
of Books. In the first, United States v. 18 Packages of Magazines,166 the pro-
cedures provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1305 to prevent the importation of obscene
or immoral articles were held unconstitutional, as they permitted seizure prior
to any adversary determination.6 ' The district court relied on Justice Brennan's
opinion in A Quantity of Books to settle the issue. Oddly enough, while recog-
nizing the lack of a majority opinion, it still found Justice Brennan to be speak-
ing for the Court; it also read Justice Black's opinion as demonstrating complete
agreement with Justice Brennan's reasoning - a far from self-demonstrable
proposition.
The other case referring to A Quantity of Books readily distinguished it
since the seizure at issue was subsequent to a valid arrest.768 It is interesting,
however, as another example of a lower court failing to recognize the no-
majority-opinion principle in the course of its decision. "
A rather remarkable feature of the procedural side of obscenity law is the
recognition that has been accorded motion pictures by applying slightly different
rules to them. Here, the Court has distinguished between media in a way
unknown to its substantive activity. The Court has maintained a rather low
level of tolerance with respect to prior restraints on books, magazines and other
like material. Judicial indignation is not encountered quite as early by those
wishing to impose such restraints on motion pictures. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
764 230 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
765 Id. at 504.
766 238 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
767 But see, United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same procedures later held constitutional); text accompanying note 786
infra.
768 State v. Volimar, 389 S.W.2d 20 *(Mo. 1965).
769 Id. at 26.
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Wilson77 quite unequivocally established that motion pictures were entitled to
the same basic protections accorded other media, but indicated that they were
not "necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method
of expression." '' The Court did not decide to proceed further, however, in its
intimation that a constitutionally sound system for licensing movies could be
evolved.
The next major case that caused the Court to consider the banning of a
film was Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents."2 The film involved, Lady Chat-
lerly's Lover, was concededly not obscene, but had been denied a license for
advocation of "sexual immorality." Rejecting the notion that a state could
prohibit the presentation of an idea, the Court reversed without reaching the
procedural question left unsettled in Burstyn.
The Court first touched upon this question in Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago."3 By the vote of a single judge, the Court held that a Chicago
ordinance requiring the licensing of films prior to exhibition was not void on its
face. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, refused to delve further into the
constitutionality of the procedures used. The Chief Justice, who had dissented
in Kingsley Books in the belief that to proceed against a "thing" and to ignore
the "personal element" in the criminal law was an invalid prior restraint,"'
again dissented. This time he based his protest on an abhorrence of licensing
generally and, more specifically, on the lack of even the minimal safeguards of
the Kingsley Books statute."' Foreshadowing later occurrences, he noted that:
"[1]n Kingsley Books.. . the Court turned a corner from the landmark opinion
in Near and from one of the bases of the First Amendment. Today it falls into
full retreat." '776 Subsequent ascendancy of this view explains the retrenchment
in Marcus and Bantam Books,777 and set the stage for the Court's latest pro-
nouncement respecting movie licensing.
A Baltimore theater owner decided to test the constitutionality of Mary-
land's motion picture censorship law. He exhibited a concededly innocuous
picture without first submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors.
Convicted of violating the statute, he found no relief in the state courts and
took an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Speaking for the Court in
Freedman v. Maryland."' Justice Brennan struck down the Maryland statute
as not providing adequate procedural safeguards. Although the Justice had
been one of the dissenters in Times Film, which had involved similar procedures,
his opinion did not overrule that decision. Rather, he reaffirmed Times Film
by distinction, accepting it as simply stating that all such prior restraints are
770 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
771 Id. at 503. See generally 1955-57 Church-State Survey supra note 1, at 447.
772 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
773 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
774 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957) (dissenting opinion). Justices
Douglas, Black and Brennan also dissented.
775 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961) '(dissenting opinion).
Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan again sided with the Chief Justice, this time joining in
his opinion.
776 Id. at 54 (dissenting opinion).
777 Text accompanying notes 752-54 supra.
778 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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not per se unconstitutional. He went on to set out the tests that a permissible
procedure would have to meet: (1) the burden of proving the film obscene
must be on the censor; (2) the decision of the censor must be supported by a
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding; (3) the procedure, from
submission to judicial decision, must be as expeditious as possible."
Whether or not Times Film meaningfully survives Freedman is open to
debate. The Chicago ordinance probably would not meet the Freedman stan-
dards.78 0 To that extent, the Times Film dissenters have had their day, though
not to the extent of barring all pre-exhibition licensing. The qualified char-
acter of the victory is evidenced by the fact that the more stringent Douglas
and Black concurred separately in Freedman, again stating that no form of
censorship is permissible."" This would seem to indicate that the Chief Justice
and Justice Brennan have either modified their view somewhat or were never
as quite as adamant as the Times Film dissents would seem to indicate. The
former alternative is most likely the truer one with regard to the Chief Justice.
Two weeks later, this decision was utilized by the Court to reverse sum-
marily a New York Court of Appeals case upholding a refusal to license a movie
found by the Board of Regents of that state to be obscene." 2 Other actions were
not long in coming. Not six weeks had passed from the date of decision before
Maryland enacted a new licensing act.7"3 In quick succession, a case arose to
challenge its validity. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Trans-Lux Distrib.
Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors,"4 cited Freedman in approving the
new procedures, although it reversed the lower court on a finding of non-
obscenity ss
Freedman was also relied on in United States v. One Carton Positive Motion
Picture Films"' to justify the procedures authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1305
to accomplish forfeiture of an imported foreign film on the grounds of obscenity.
Oddly enough, in United States v. 18 Packages of Magazines,7 the same
procedures had been invalidated earlier as unconstitutional when applied to a
shipment of magazines - the court relying on A Quantity of Books. The One
Carton court noted the earlier decision but dismissed it as one having been ren-
dered prior to the guidance of Freedman."" This may be a sufficient explana-
tion of the differing results, but perhaps they could be reconciled in terms of the
779 Id. at 58-59.
780 Id. at 61, footnote (concurring opinion).
781 Id. at 61 (concurring opinion).
782 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965), reversing 14
N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964). The Court did, therefore, reach the
substantive questions raised by the case. See text accompanying note 716 supra.
783 Md. Acts 1965, ch. 598.
784 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235 (1965).
785 Both this case and Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965),
reversing 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 '(1964) involved the same film,
A Stranger Knocks. The opinions of the Maryland and of the New York Courts of Appeals
are worthy of comparison. They represent an intriguing study in the art of marshalling de-
scriptive facts in such a way as to force the reader to agree with the writer's conclusion. At
the same time, they bring the substantive "questions into full focus and demonstrate the insolu-
ble differences in opinion that are bound to arise.
786 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
787 238 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
788 United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450, 462
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
different procedures evolving for the different media. If so, they represent the
most extreme divergence as yet displayed in this regard.
Such curiosities aside, the Freedman decision has given lower courts a rela-
tively easy means with which to determine the constitutionality of pre-exhibition
restraints."' Prescinding from a discussion of the wisdom of tolerating any or
all such procedures, the procedural experience indicates that clarity on the part
of the Court breeds facility if not felicity.
(iv) Proof Thereof
Evidentiary decisions bespeak still further the breadth of the task remain-
ing to be finished by the Court.
(a) Scienter
Although "intent" has not been of great consequence in the field of
obscenity until recently, 90 a quantum of knowledge has been of some moment.
In Smith v. California,79 ' the Court indicated that proof of the disseminator's
knowledge of the contents of the material in question was necessary for an
obscenity conviction. At issue was a Los Angeles city ordinance making it
a criminal offense to possess an obscene book in a bookstore. The ordinance
-either on its face or by construction -did not require any mens rea, but
rather imposed a strict liability. Evidencing a concern for the deleterious effect
such an ordinance would have on the dissemination of non-obscene literature,
insofar as the bookseller would feel constrained to limit his inventory solely to
books he had inspected, the Court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional in an
opinion of Justice Brennan.79 2 The Court refrained from determining the
nature of the necessary knowledge, noting only that "eyewitness testimony of
a bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving
his awareness of its contents. 7 9 3 Justice Frankfurter suggested that this lack
of specificity arose out of a "regard for the State's interest" in regulating
obscenity, 94 which had been recognized in Roth.
Such absence of a standard has not been without analytical difficulty, par-
ticularly in determining whether a defendant need only be aware of a book's
content or whether he must come to the judgment that it is obscene.9 ' A
sampling of the decisions of the last two years, however, would tend to show
that the courts have not been particularly troubled by the matter of scienter,
intimating that their experience with scienter elsewhere stands them in good
789 See, e.g., Embassy Pictures Corp. v. Hudson, 242 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Tenn. 1965),
where the court was able to determine with ease the unconstitutionality of a Memphis ordi-
nance requiring pre-exhibition licensing.
790 1963-64 Church-State Survey supra note 1, at 470.
791 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
792 Id. at 153. This concern that the public interest in having access to the non-obscene be
unimpaired has become the touchstone in dealing with prior restraints. See, e.g., A Quantity
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
793 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 '(1959).
794 Id. at 164 (concurring opinion).
795 See, e.g., Wilson, California's New Obscenity Statute: The Meaning of "Obscene" and
the Problem of Scienter, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 513, 539-43 (1963).
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stead here. Thus, the vending of books with lurid covers and titles,"' the pre-
paring of descriptive advertisements, 97 and the publishing of allegedly obscene
books 98 have served as a basis for a finding of scienter short of actual proof
that the defendants had read the material.
An interesting variation was seen in Kirby v. Municipal Court,799 wherein
a writ of prohibition against certain further criminal proceedings was denied.
The petitioner had sought the writ on the grounds that the statute under which
he had been convicted was unconstitutional. The statute made it a misdemeanor
to advertise material represented by the advertiser as obscene."' When peti-
tioner raised the issue of scienter under Smith, the court found he was estopped
from denying either that he actually knew the contents of what he advertised
or that the material was in fact as he had represented it. In this instance, the
purveyor's purported intent, rather than knowledge, weighed against him.
This approach was later approximated by the Court in the Ginzburg
case,80' even though Ginzburg, Mishkin and Fanny Hill did not speak to scienter.
In Fanny Hill, the question was not discussed; in Ginzburg, it had been stipu-
lated prior to trial.0 2 There was some discussion of scienter in Mishkin, but it
consisted solely of the Court's approving the New York requirement that a
defendant be aware of the "character" of the material -apparently meaning
that he have a knowledge of the contents of the material."' Unfortunately,
the Court refrained from indicating if any less knowledge would suffice.
This continued reluctance to define the limits of scienter may be due to
the nature of the decisions themselves. Should they develop an expectedly
greater concern with conduct and intent, questions as to the nature of the
scienter may become academic. The debate will probably shift to the question
of what evidentiary factors will establish "pandering." It will be less the knowl-
edge of the material than the thought behind the act that will be crucial.
Peripherally to the above considerations, the Supreme Court of Arizona
reiterated its position that a scienter requirement was implicit in its state
obscenity statute,0 4 while the Supreme Court of Tennessee curtly refused to
make such a finding with respect to its state statute. 0 5 The Tennessee decision
may be said to be exceptional since it runs counter to the general trend to
"discover" such a requirement; s certainly the court did not manifest the
characteristically juristic penchant of responding to "implications."
796 State v. Onorato, 2 Conn. Cir. 428, 199 A.2d 715 (1963); State v. Jungdlaus, 176
Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
797 People v. Sikora, 32 IU.2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
798 People v. Aday, 226 Cal. App. 2d 520, 38 Cal. Rptr. 199 '(Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1965).
799 46 Cal. Rptr. 844 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
800 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.5: "Every person who writes or creates advertising or solicits
anyone to publish such advertising or otherwise promote the sale or distribution of matter
represented or held out by him to be obscene, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
801 See text accompanying note 732 supra.
802 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 946 n.8 (1966).
803 Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 964 & n.9 (1966).
804 State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949 (1964). Ironically, however, the court, after
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made the statute unconstitutionally vague. 397 P.2d at 952.
805 Ellenburg v. State, 384 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1964).
806 Id. at 33 (dissenting opinion).
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(b) Expert Testimony
Outside the substantive area, there is no greater locus of confusion in
obscenity law than the position of the expert. The role of the expert here is
one that underscores the effect of poor direction on the part of the Supreme
Court, as it has not as yet made any definitive statement as to the expert's status.
What utterances have been made have been confined to concurring and dissent-
ing opinions, and have dealt solely with the need for expert testimony on con-
temporary community standards. Justice Brennan has at one point stated that
the jury has a "special aptitude" for determining questions of obscenity.0 7 This
might indicate that he would not require expert testimony on the issue of
contemporary community standards; yet, such a conclusion might be rash in
the light of his opinion in Jacobellis.0 8
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter have also spoken on the place of the
expert in determining these standards: the former being ambivalent, leaving
the requirement of such testimony to the discretion of the states;.. 9 the latter
apparently raising the admission of expert testimony to the level of a constitu-
tional mandate."' Justice Frankfurter would not, however, make such testi-
mony conclusive as to the ultimate question.81'
Confronted with the silence of the Court, other benches have done the
best they can, but the decisions constitute something more akin to tin than
"boiler-plate." ' Judicial confusion in developing substantive formulae has
carried over quite naturally to these evidentiary questions since it is over testi-
mony as to the elements of the standard that the controversy rages. The three
most discussed matters for expert testimony have been "prurient appeal," "con-
temporary community standards," and "literary merit or social importance."
With respect to expert testimony as to "prurient appeal," two courts have
required it,"' two have permitted it,8"4 and two have expressly denied it.81'
Similar division is recorded relating to attestation as to "contemporary com-
munity standards," with at least three courts allowing it, 16 one court excluding
807 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
808 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.) '(calling for a national
standard and de novo review). See text accompanying note 824 infra.
809 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 (1959) (dissenting and concurring opinions).
810 Id. at 164 (concurring opinion).
811 Id. at 165 (concurring opinion).
812 For a general discussion of the problems in this area, see Note, The Use of Expert
Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113.
813 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. One Carton
Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In the former case, the
material involved was described as "sado-masochistic" and alleged to appeal to deviant prurient
interest. As the reviewing court found that the jury was not able to properly determine such
appeal, the case was reversed for lack of evidence on this point. The One Carton court re-
ferred to Klaw although the material it had before it appeared to appeal to the prurient
interest of the average man.
814 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235
(1965); State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
815 United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964); G. P.
Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (Ch. 1964).
816 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d
235 (1965); G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, supra note 815; People v. Aday, 38 Cal. Rptr.
199 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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it, 81 and two not finding it necessary."" A consensus has been reached only
on the introduction of testimony as to "literary merit or social importance," with
most, if not all, of the courts permitting it. " But even here, there has been
no definitive statement as to the weight to be given such testimony or its relevancy
in meeting the burden of proof. Some courts have held testimony showing
literary merit to be nonconclusive; 2 others have allowed the mere autoptical
evidence of the allegedly obscene material to sustain the burden without requiring
any other evidence as to the lack of "social importance." '21
For the most part, the opinions have not dealt extensively with the ques-
tions raised by expert testimony. One that did, United States v. West Coast
News Co., 22 stands out conspicuously and is certainly worth reading for its
exhaustive commentary. Most fascinating is the unique viewpoint the report
affords: the final opinion of the court is preceded at appropriate junctures by
the original trial opinion. This provides an enlightening comparison between
the feeling of the court when it made its orders and its comments on them
after the events of the trial. Of singular interest are the misgivings the court had,
after having admitted expert testimony on the issue of community standards at
the request of the defendants, upon finding that the experts turned out to be
"ardent advocates for their chosen causes" and did not reflect true community
standards. 2
Resolution of the role of the expert will have to await, in part, greater
analysis and settlement of substantive questions. The scope of the relevant
community, for example, may markedly affect the need for expert testimony as
to the standards currently prevailing therein. A local jury might plausibly be
found inadequate to determine the breadth of national standards if such are
held to be constitutionally required. 24
(c) Comparative Evidence
In attempting to demonstrate "contemporary community standards" and
"customary limits of candor," efforts have been made to introduce into evi-
dence other works - either accepted or rejected ones - to indicate community
levels of tolerance. The difficulties inherent in such a procedure are almost
self-evident. May the court forbear admission until it has first determined that
the material is not obscene per se? What will constitute a proper foundation
establishing similarity between the materials? Will judicial decisions as to the
obscene or non-obscene nature of questionable material have a bearing on other
decisions?
817 State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965).
818 City of Chicago v. Kimmel, 31 I1.2d 202, 201 N.E.2d 386 (1964); City of Chicago v.
Doe, 471 Il. App. 2d 134, 197 N.E.2d 711 (1964).
819 E.g., United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 '(W.D. Mich.
1964); State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965); G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J.
Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1964).
820 E.g., G. P. Putnam's v. Calissi, supra note 819.
821 E.g., cases cited note 818 supra.
822 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
823 Id. at 190.
824 Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, supra note 812, at 120.
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Some courts have rejected outright any proffered comparisons."" Yet
others have felt compelled to permit comparison to satisfy the demands of due
process.82 Again, the limits of constitutional dictates are not delineated; again,
questions of judicial expediency and practicality arise as the waters of decision
run shallow.
(v) In the Alternative
Undoubtedly, one of the gravest concerns of the censorious is that salacious
material may deprave youth. However, that which might have a harmful in-
fluence on youth will be generally conceded to encompass more than that which
might have such effect on an adult. Consequently, as the limits of the obscene
have shrunk, greater attention has been given to protecting the young by specific
legislation. Drafting such legislation has led to its own brand of problems.
In Butler v. Michigan,82 the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear
that any such attempt must not operate in such a way as to deny to the adult
population material not otherwise regulable as to them. To do so would be
"to burn the house to roast the pig" by limiting "the adult population . .. to
reading only what is fit for children." '828 The implication was that properly
drafted statutes or ordinances proscribing the supplying of objectionable material
would not run counter to first amendment guarantees even if not confined
to the obscene.829
"How-to" is another matter. The Bantam Books case, considered above,2
exemplifies one attempt that ended in procedural invalidation. Two recent New
York cases82' bear on the substantive problem. Both cases dealt with a New
York statute making it unlawful to knowingly sell to a minor: "any book . . .
which exploits [or] is devoted to . . . descriptions of illicit sex or sexual im-
morality ... [or any publication] which contains pictures of nude or partially
de-nuded figures, posed or presented in a manner to provoke or arouse lust or
passion . . . for commercial gain." '32 Both the descriptive and the pictorial
sections were held to be unconstitutionally vague in their terminology, forcing
the state legislature to pass a new act setting out in specific language exactly
what was prohibited.2 '
Drafting problems have also thwarted attempts to amend the federal "Com-
stock" law 4 to penalize the use of the mails to send offensive matter to minors.
Numerous such attempts have made in recent years, 35 none of which have
825 E.g., G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. Ch.
1964).
826 E.g., United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
827 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
828 Id. at 383.
829 Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by
Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141, 150-52 (1959). See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
195 '(1964) (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
830 Text accompanying note 754 supra.
831 People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964), and
People v. Kaplan, 44 Misc. 2d 110, 252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Grim. Ct. 1964).
832 N.Y. Laws 1955, ch. 836.
833 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney Supp. 1965).
834 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
835 E.g., H.R. 319, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 3033, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957);
H.R. 3498, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.&. 3663, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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been successful. While other factors may well have entered into this lack of
success,"3 6 illustrative of the drafting problem is a bill introduced in the 89th
Congress."' The bill tries to provide a way by which a recipient of indecent
mail can protect himself and his household. It would enable him to begin a
process that could culminate in a court order forbidding any such future mail-
ings. Although the problem of unsolicited obscene mailings appears to be sub-
stantial enough to warrant congressional attention, 38 the bill will probably die
if it remains in its present form. The basis of the objection centers around a
construction of the bill that would seem to leave determination of the obscene
nature of the mail to the subjective opinion of the recipient; both the Post Office
Department and the Department of Justice have used this interpretation to
raise doubts about the constitutionality of the bill.83"
b. Obscenity - A Prospect
For all the difficulties engendered by obscenity regulation, for all the con-
fusion, the law is amazingly viable. Functionally, the rules to be followed are
clear enough to permit a surprisingly large number of convictions. In 1965
alone, complaints made to the Post Office Department resulted in 696 con-
victions.84 Moreover, it has not been necessary, in the years since Roth, to
sustain every conviction before the Supreme Court. Since 1957, the Supreme
Court has refused certiorari in at least twenty-three cases; 84' numerous other
cases have never been appealed. The number of cases that have in fact reached
the Court would appear to be a relatively small percentage of those which have
arisen. They represent but the apex of the judicial pyramid.
It is also interesting that there are simply no decisions of the Court which
would clearly indicate that the majority reversed on the grounds of non-obscenity
under the Roth standard s42 A modicum of sophistication in reading the deci-
836 Obscenity in and censorship of the mails is a subject which has begun to develop its
own specialized literature treating in full the various censorship devices that have been used
and the constitutional problems that have been engendered. The topic is too broad for in-
clusion here. For a general discussion, see PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP:
OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961); Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54
GEo. L.J. 30 (1965).
837 H.R. 980, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
838 In the 1957 fiscal year, the United States Post Office Department received some 40,000
complaints of violations of the obscenity statutes. For the same period in 1965, the number of
such complaints rose to 128,140. Letter from H.B. Montague, Chief Inspector, Post Office
Department, to Assistant Professor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School, Dec. 20, 1965.
839 H.R. REP. No. 219, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1965).
840 Letter from H. B. Montague, supra note 838.
841 Chronologically, Matthews v. Florida, 356 U.S. 918 (1958); Parr v. United States,
358 U.S. 824 (1958); Padell v. United States, 359 U.S. 942 (1959); Cain v. United States,
362 U.S. 952 (1960); Hochman v. United States, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Collier v. United
States, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Womack v. United States, 365 U.S. 859 (1961); Astore v.
United States, 366 U.S. 925 (1961); Chobot v. Wisconsin, 368 U.S. 15 (1961); Oakley v.
United States, 368 U.S. 888 (1961); Monfred v. Maryland- 368 U.S. 953 (1962); Heinecke
v. United States, 368 U.S. 901 (1961); Kahn v. United States, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); Finkel-
stein v. New York, 371 U.S. 863 '(1962); Zucker v. New York, 371 U.S. 863 (1962);
Goldstein v. Virginia, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); Mishkin v. United States, 375 U.S. 827 (1963);
Darnell v. United States, 375 U.S. 916 (1963); Zuideveld v. United States, 376 U.S. 916
(1964); Fried v. New York, 378 U.S. 578 (1964); Williamson v. California, 377 U.S. 994
(1964) ; Wenzler v. California, 377 U.S. 994 (1964); Aday v. California, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
842 Three of the per curiam reversals, however, cited Roth: Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); One, Inc., v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 '(1958); Sunshine Book
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sions of the Court lends credence to the position that the Court has not been
as "libertine" as certain groups would seem to believe. 4 As Chief Justice
Warren has pointed out:
[O]ourts are often presented with procedurally bad cases and, in dealing
with them, appear to be acquiescing in the dissemination of obscenity.
But if cases were well prepared and were conducted with the appropriate
concern for Constitutional safeguards, courts would not hesitate to enforce
the laws against obscenity. 44
But be that as it may, there is no denying that the many unanswered
questions make obscenity regulation a somewhat unpredictable business. What
exactly, then, is the central issue, if any, that permeates this area? Undeniably,
it is a constitutional one; but that answers nothing by answering all. More
specifically, much has been made of the problem of "vagueness." A great deal
of criticism has been levied on the grounds that obscenity is impossible to define
precisely, as it is a purely subjective concept. Consequently, it is said, workable
rules are impossible to formulate, and regulatory attempts tend to have an
over-breadth running against that which is not obscene."4
It is submitted, however, that workable rules are, to a great degree, attain-
able. Much of the basis for a finding of "unworkableness" is centered on a
finding of inconsistent results.84 To a certain extent, such results can be explained
by the ambiguities of the Roth standard but these could be resolved easily enough
by the Court. Even so, there would probably remain a certain amount of
imprecision. And even this degree of inexactitude would be objected to by some
just as surely as others would feel that the law was too "soft" towards obscenity.
This suggests that the real problem is not the lack of workable rules or
needed definitional refinement. A certain quantity of imprecision has always
been tolerated by the law as long as the rule was set: "In other areas of the
law, terms like 'negligence,' although in common use for centuries, have been
difficult to define except in the most general manner. Yet the courts have been
able to function in such areas with a reasonable degree of efficiency." 4" Indeed,
to demand the black-and-white is to ask that the law become no law, for law
will inevitably run to grays. So the controversy lies deeper. The debate is not
really over great and subtle distinctions; rather, it devolves into an all-or-nothing
Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). Arguably, the Court found the material was
non-obscene rather than that the tests employed were unconstitutional. See State v. Martin,
3 Conn. Cir. 309, 213 A.2d 459, 462 (App. Div. 1965).
843 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1964, p. 37, col. 8 (reporting the attack of "Operation York-
ville" upon the Court).
844 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964) (dissenting opinion). But cf. Justice
Clark's statement:
While those in the majority like ancient Gaul are split into three parts, the
ultimate holding of the Court today . . . requires the United States Post Office to
be the world's largest disseminator of smut and Grand Informer of the names and
places where obscene material may be obtained.
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 519 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
845 See, e.g., ERNST & SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE (1964).
846 E.g., Fanny Hill had been held obscene in Massachusetts, Attorney General v. A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 206 N.E.2d 403 (Mass. 1965),
rev'd, 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966), but not in New York, Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d
399, 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1964).
847 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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choice. What is at issue is quite simply whether or not regulation in this area
is to be accorded the same tolerance as is accorded the law in other fields.
It is to be emphasized that this is no easy choice. But sight of the central
issue should not be obscured by the emotion that is almost certain to be gen-
erated, for the choice must be made in an unusually sensitive area - that of
the first amendment: "The obscenity problem, however, is aggravated by the
fact that it involves the area of public expression, an area in which a broad range
of freedom is vital to our society and is constitutionally protected."84 Discus-
sions centered on "vagueness," "effect," and "clear and present danger" are
somehow inappropriate. Such terms are not touchstones; they are conclusionary
referents appropriately employed only when predicated upon a decision to the
ultimate question suggested above. To employ such words is to presume an
answer. To argue that obscenity should not be regulated unless it presents a
"clear and present danger" is to assume a certain minimal tolerance. The
assumption itself is based on a view of the role of the state in condemning
immorality: "Concentration on whether obscenity may - or may not - incite
to unlawful acts aims beside the mark. The question, rather, is whether the
state may suppress expression it deems immoral .. .. '49
Certainly, the scope of the decision is not to be confined to matters of
morality. Many other considerations weigh heavily here, notably a fear of
undue intervention by the state into the realm of ideas, even though our history
has not been one of suppression. Significantly, it took the Supreme Court nine
years before it held any material to be obscene under the Roth standard. Bal-
ancing these various factors and considering the different risks, the Court has
chosen to maintain the legitimacy of obscenity regulation, manifesting its deci-
sion in the form of a theory as to the meaning of the first amendment. Perhaps
the Court has heeded the words of Justice Holmes: "Now and then an extra-
ordinary case may turn up, but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances
has to take some chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice
will be done."8 In any event, the choice has been made and renewed. The
state will have a part to play in this area of morality for some time to come.
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